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Preface 
 
It took a long time to get this project airborne. Completing it took even longer. This matters 
little now as I am not one who dwells much with the missteps and frustrations of the past. The 
work is finished and I am ready to move on to different fields. Actually, I have already moved 
on. Last October my family and I returned to our hometown of Skien. Since then I have 
worked fulltime in the social services at NAV. While I find the work rewarding, I intend 
eventually to find something which is more related to my education.      
 A substantial part of the preface is usually devoted to expressing gratitude towards 
fellow students and researchers. Well, from a scholarly angle only, this venture has been a 
rather lonesome journey. Not that I haven’t been surrounded by some really nice people 
throughout, I just never involved them much in my work. Looking back, in fact, I cannot 
remember letting any of my closest colleagues read through my manuscripts.  
While I did not bother my surroundings with my own work, the surroundings certainly 
made the experience more enjoyable. I must thank all the students who helped make the break 
room such a pleasant and tight packed space. Extra special thanks go out to Johannes Due 
Enstad and Magnus Haakenstad. Good luck to both of you, whatever you decide to do in the 
future.        
One who was forced to involve herself in my work was my advisor Hilde Henriksen 
Waage. I could go one praising her for her vast knowledge, or even more so, for her 
astonishing work ethic. I choose, nonetheless, to honour her personal qualities. Hilde is just 
one exceptionally likable individual. She is not only refreshingly outspoken, her confidence is 
such that she sees no need to cover up the fact that there are things even she doesn’t know. 
Although Hilde must have been frustrated at times over my lack of progress, she never gave 
up on me. And equally important, she never let any of the frustration she must have felt affect 
our working relationship. I thank her for the work she put in and for the comments and 
corrections she provided. I must also honour her for the great courage she displayed in a truly 
testing time. I wish her the best of luck and hope she eventually recovers fully from the illness 
which has been troubling her lately. I would also like to thank the students who participated in 
the study group Hilde put together. They offered valuable criticism on parts of my thesis.  
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Finally I have to thank my beloved wife and our two children. While my wife has been patient 
throughout, she is definitely happy to see my work completed.  
As for the thesis itself, I am not quite sure how I ended up writing about the aftermath 
of Lord Peel’s partition proposal. I spent far too long a time reading general literature on the 
Palestine Mandate before settling on a particular topic. Eventually I think I came to realize 
that the 1937 partition plan – and especially the demise of that scheme – raised some 
interesting questions. Not so much if partition would have been a success or not, but questions 
relating to Palestine’s significance in Britain’s wider strategy, and, the effects of her Mandate 
policy on Britain’s reputation in the region. In 1935 Palestine was of little or no concern to the 
British Foreign Office. By 1938, it seems, the same department regarded the same strip of 
land as crucial to Britain’s fortunes in the entire Middle East.  
 
A short note on the primary sources 
 
I spent a frantic week at the Public Record Office in London. Thanks to good preparation, 
modern technology (i.e. digital camera) and a helpful and knowledgeable staff I was able to 
amass what I consider to be staggering amount of documents in a very short time. Of course, 
this way of working left me with weeks of organizing upon returning home.  
This material comprises the greater part of the primary sources utilized in this thesis. 
Being what it is – for a large part an account of the inner workings of the British bureaucracy 
– these documents are essential to this study. Through the Gale Group’s databases I have also 
had access to The Times Digital Archive, Arab – Israel Relations, 1917 – 1970 and Iraq, 1914 
– 1974. The former two contain additional material comprised from the Public Record Office. 
Well into the working process I discovered that the National Archives was just starting to 
publish relevant material on their web pages. This resource gave me access to additional 
Cabinet Papers as well as important documents from the Chiefs of Staff.  
A common objection to relying solely on a single state archive is that the material 
tends only to convey a one-sided perspective. There is often a lot of truth to this. This sort of 
criticism, however, does not seem fitting for this particular venture: much of this thesis is 
dedicated at exposing the various dispositions and attitudes of leading policy-makers within 
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the same bureaucracy. And the sources do indeed reveal that there was no “one-sided 
perspective” within the policy-making machinery. Quite the opposite.  
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Introduction 
 
British policy towards the Palestine mandate was revised several times during its 28 year 
existence.1 At no time, perhaps, was the shift as marked as during the period 1937-38. As a 
direct result of the Arab Rebellion which had erupted in Palestine in April 1936, the British 
set up a commission under Lord Peel with the aim of finding a permanent solution to the 
current unrest.  
There were several reasons for the outbreak of Arab Rebellion. Perhaps the most decisive were 
related to Jewish immigration. The wave of Jewish settlers which had entered Palestine in the 
preceding years instilled in many native Palestine Arabs a fear of someday becoming a minority.2 
Moreover, the immigrants bought land on a large scale and competed for many of the same jobs as the 
Arab population.    
The Royal Commission concluded that the present mandate was unworkable because 
of the irreconcilable aspirations of the Jews and the Arabs. As a result of this finding, the long 
overdue report - released on 7 July 1937 - recommended the partitioning of Palestine into a 
separate Arab and Jewish state. The commission considered this alternative to be the only one 
which might eventually bring about a lasting peace. The solution had been silently 
encouraged by the department primarily responsible for Palestine policy, the Colonial Office. 
The head of that office, Colonial Secretary William Ormsby-Gore, would in fact become the 
partition scheme’s chief proponent, and arguably its most ardent defender. 
The publication of Partition Plan caused immediate enmity within Palestine as well as 
throughout the Middle East. A more or less concerted Arab world denounced the scheme, 
regarding it as grossly unjust and as a surrender to the Zionists’ unlawful demands over 
Palestine.  
As it would turn out, however, the proposal to set up a separate Jewish state was not to 
initiate a turn towards a policy which might be accused of favouring the Zionists, but rather 
                                                     
1
 While the British were granted the Mandate in 1920, it came into being two years later.  It would perhaps be 
equally correct to say that British rule lasted for 26 years. 
2
 In 1925 Jewish immigration passed the 30.000 mark for the first time. At this stage, however, the Jewish 
settlers encountered numerous difficulties. For the next seven years Jewish immigration dropped significantly, 
never exceeding 10.000 a year. 1933 again witnessed Jewish immigration of more than 30.000. In 1935 
immigration peaked at more than 61.000 settlers. Shaw, J. V. W., ed., British Mandate: A Survey of Palestine, 
prepared by the British Mandate for UN prior to proposing the 1947 partition plan (London 1991), p. 185. 
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one in the opposite direction.3 By the early months of 1938 the British Cabinet had decided 
that a new commission was to revaluate the recommendations made by the Royal 
Commission the previous year. It soon became apparent to those inside the decision-making 
process that the real purpose of this Technical Commission was to discard the partition 
proposal altogether.4 Indeed, by autumn 1938 signals emanating from the Commission’s 
ongoing investigation more than hinted that the original proposal was by all measures dead 
and buried. This was made official on 9 November 1938 when the Technical Commission 
under Sir John Woodhead released a report devoted in large part to underscore the many 
difficulties inherent in the previous partition scheme. On the day of its release the British 
Government issued a statement which said that:  
after a careful consideration of the Partition Commission’s report, [the Government] have reached the 
conclusion that this further examination has shown that the political, administrative and financial 
difficulties involved in the proposal to create independent Arab and Jewish States inside Palestine are so 
great that this solution of the problem is impracticable.5 
16 months after the Cabinet had accepted the principle of partitioning Palestine, they had 
annulled their own decision. What exactly had happened during this time? 
Broadly speaking, historians have tended to focus their attention on two, closely 
related issues in their attempt to account for the shift in British Palestine policy set in motion 
shortly after the release of the Peel Plan. Firstly, the regional repercussions of setting up a 
Zionist state in the Middle East were considered too damaging for British interests. It was 
assumed that the introduction of a policy strongly deplored throughout the Arab world would 
inevitably bring about a sharp rise in anti-British sentiment. Secondly, this alienation would 
be further reinforced by current changes in the strategic context. The Italian conquest of 
Abyssinia (today Ethiopia) in late 1935 had altered the balance of power in the region 
permanently. From now on Fascist Italy was an intimidating neighbour of the Anglo-Egyptian 
Sudan. The concurrent build up of Italian forces in Libya only increased British anxieties. 
Indeed, an increasing number of Britons and Egyptians alike saw these developments as 
                                                     
3
 There is no consensus among historians as to the direction of British policy in the period prior to the Peel 
Report. The evidence suggests that it is misleading to talk either of a Zionist or Arab line. The British ruled 
Palestine primarily out of self-interest. In the early to mid 1930s, when Palestine was generally calm and the 
mandate could be dealt with in isolation, policies were first and foremost directed towards creating a peaceful 
balance between the two peoples in order for Britain to employ a minimum of investments both in terms of 
capital and personnel.  
4
 This has at various times been labeled the Woodhead Commission, the Technical Commission and the Partition 
Commission.  
5
 “A statement of Policy by His Majesty’s Government”, Cmd 5893, 9 November 1938. 
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confirmation of Mussolini’s imperialist ambitions. This was made further apparent by Italy’s 
increasing use of propaganda. Through the state-sponsored Radio Bari Italy did its utmost to 
reduce Britain’s hegemony in the region by broadcasting vicious attacks on the imperial 
superpower.6  
Somewhat simplified, many historians have since concluded that the combined 
implications of a hostile Middle East aligned with Britain’s enemies effectively overrode the 
arguments in favour of partition. 
While these two factors were undoubtedly important for the turnaround in policy, 
there was at no time thorough agreement within the British political machinery on how to 
interpret them, and thus, on how British Palestine policy should be conducted.7 Within the 
political establishment there existed at this point a diverging set of outlooks concerning both 
the nature of the Arab world, and on the connection between the Arab world and the Palestine 
question.  This divide was brought to the fore over the partition proposal as it cut straight 
across the two British agencies responsible for conducting foreign policy - that is the Colonial 
and the Foreign Office.  
Up until the second half of 1936 Palestine policy had in effect been the sole 
responsibility of the Colonial Office. But the aforementioned developments were to change all 
that. The Arab Rebellion and the sympathy it created throughout the Arab world alerted the 
Foreign Office of the increased importance of the Palestine issue on a regional level. 
However, it was the passionate reactions in the wake of the Royal Commission’s Report a 
year later which made them irrefutably conclude that British interests were at risk under the 
present line of policy. This realization compelled them to interfere and thus implicitly 
challenge the Colonial Office position. From August 1937 until around February 1938 the two 
departments were engaged in an intense and at times hostile debate over whether partition 
                                                     
6
 While visiting Libya in March 1937Il Duce proclaimed himself to be “the friend and protector of Islam”. While 
not an entirely truthful assessment, it certainly underscores his regional ambitions.  Burgwyn, James, Italian 
Foreign Policy in the Interwar Period, 1918-1940 (London 1997), p. 159.  
7
 The leading authorities on British Palestine policy disagree over the forces which shaped policy in this period. 
Historian Elie Kedourie maintains that policy was on the whole vague, lacKing both guidelines and principles. 
He argues that that this was a result of the autonomy enjoyed by the ruling elite within the Foreign Office. 
Furthermore he insists that the line of policy advocated by the Foreign Office exposed a clear pro-Arab 
persuasion. (Kedourie, Elie “Great Britain and Palestine: the Turning Point”, Islam and the Modern World (New 
York, 1980)). Political Scientist Gabriel Sheffer acknowledges that the arrival of the Foreign Office saw a major 
change in Palestine policy. However, he argues that this was largely the result of current changes in the regional 
context, and not a product of the leading officials’ “personal whims”. (Sheffer, Gabriel “Reevaluation of British 
Policies toward Palestine in the 1930s “, Dann, Uriel, ed., The Great Powers in the Middle East 1919-1939 (New 
York, 1988)). 
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should be implemented or not. The Foreign Office gradually convinced the Cabinet that a 
partitioning of Palestine would spell disaster for Britain’s longstanding hegemony in the 
region. It was thus their particular outlook on the Middle East which would form the basis of 
British policy towards Palestine up until the outbreak of WWII, and arguably until the 
termination of the mandate in 1947.8  
There is little doubt that the Foreign Office brought with them new images into the 
policy-making system.9 Prior to this Palestine policy had been conducted according to a 
principle dubbed by one scholar as “symmetrical separation”.10 Its main purpose had been to 
prevent the linkage of the Palestine question to the general problems of the Middle East as 
well as thwarting any attempts of Arab rulers from meddling in Palestinian affairs. This 
principle was now abandoned in favour of one which regarded Palestine not only as part of an 
“organic whole” - which was said to constitute the Middle-East - but from a British point of 
view, arguably the most crucial element in this “whole”.11  
The section responsible for Palestine within the Foreign Office was the Eastern 
Department. 12 Head of Department was George Rendel. At the centre of the Eastern 
Department’s thinking lay an assertion which held that the future potency of Arab unity was 
closely tied up with the direction of British policy in Palestine. The Eastern Department 
maintained that a continued “pro-Zionist” policy in Palestine would spell disaster for Britain 
as it would alienate Arabs everywhere and consequently strengthen a particular anti-British 
brand of Pan-Arabism.13 The papers produced by the department throughout this period 
accentuates this argument by portraying a Middle East were the various Arab states  
cautiously observed the current development within Palestine and where both governments 
and population were ready to turn against Britain should her policy fail to satisfy the 
Palestinian Arabs’ demands.  
                                                     
8
 The Foreign Office would preside over Palestine affairs for the remainder of the mandate. Kedourie argues 
rather convincingly that the line of policy devised by that department during the 1937-38 period was one that 
was to persist until Britain’s demise in 1948.  Kedourie, “Great Britain…”, p. 93.     
9
 Sheffer, Gabriel, “Arab and Jewish Images in British Policy”, Lustick, Ian S., ed., Arab-Israel Relations: 
Historical Background and Origins of the Conflict, volume I (New York 1994), p.125. 
10
 Ibid, p.124.  
11
 George Rendel would repeatedly describe the Arab world as an “organic whole”. 
12
 By 1937 the Eastern Department of the Foreign Office was responsible for Iraq, Persia, Saudi Arabia, Syria 
Turkey and gradually also Palestine. While Egypt was formally situated under the Egyptian Department, it will 
be seen that during the contest over partition the Eastern Department had extensive contacts with the British 
embassy in Cairo. 
13
 It is definitely debateable whether the partition proposal should be labelled as a pro-Zionist policy. The 
Commission itself would certainly not have approved of such a characteristic. Rendel, however, would 
frequently refer to it as “our current pro-Zionist policy”. 
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This impression of the Middle East is problematic for several reasons. As will be 
thoroughly demonstrated throughout, each of the Arab rulers had interests concerning 
Palestine which were not connected to the rights and wellbeing of the Arab population in that 
country. These interests, whether dynastical or political, were undoubtedly a crucial factor in 
explaining the Arab States’ concern over the Palestine question. Yet, there was a persisting 
tendency within the Eastern Department to downplay or altogether ignore this issue when 
evaluating the various proposals and appeals put forward by the Arab Kings.14 A leading 
historian on Pan-Arabism underlines the importance of inter-Arab rivalry in understanding the 
actions of Arab leaders. 
The trouble was that very rarely could Pan-Arabism as a political force be separated from the state or 
dynastic interests of one protagonist or another. Therefore the reaction of other Arabs was usually 
connected with, or even resulted from, their own particular interests and necessitated Britain’s taking 
account of the reactions of the various rival factors among the Arabs.15 
While the release of the Peel Report in July 1937 caused major uproar throughout the region 
and saw an increase in anti-British sentiment, the Eastern Department’s assumption that 
partition would inevitably lead large sections of the Arab world to “turn against” Britain 
seems highly contentious. A lengthy report produced by the War Office in February 1938 
concluded that: 
there are many considerations...to dissuade the present rulers or governments of the Arabic speaking 
countries from combining under existing conditions in concerted opposition to H.M Government, even 
on such an important issue as the future of Palestine.16  
It is also open to debate whether a Jewish state in Palestine would in fact strengthen the Pan-
Arab movement. The Eastern Department’s main adversary over the Palestine question, 
William Ormsby Gore, concluded in the opposite:  
Our policy always has been and must be aimed at preventing the growth of unity and solidarity in the 
Moslem world, and in the Sudan and Nigeria, as well as vis-à-vis Egypt and other Islamic states, we 
have rightly encouraged the growth of local nationalisms as being the lesser danger than Pan-Islamic 
solidarity.17 
                                                     
14
 During 1936 the various Arab leaders had been allowed by the British involve themselves actively in 
Palestinian affairs in order to quell the ongoing rebellion. This practice was to persist right up until the 
termination of the mandate.  
15
 Porath, Yehoshua, In Search of Arab Unity 1930-1945 (London 1986), p. 223.  
16
 War Office to Foreign Office, FO/371/21873/ E788, 9 February 1938. 
17
 Ormsby-Gore to Prime Minister, FO/371/ 21862/ E559, 9 January 1938. 
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This line of policy, Ormsby-Gore maintained, would be sustained by the partitioning of 
Palestine. 
The last issue of contention concerns the Eastern Department’s depiction of the Pan-
Arab movement. Was Pan-Arabism the highly potent, potentially unifying force the London 
office portrayed it to be?  Or was it, in any of its many guises, a predominantly theoretical 
construct, flawed by inherent contradictions. The British official most vocal in his critic of 
Pan-Arabism’s potential and validity was Gilbert MacKereth, Consul at the British Embassy 
in Damascus.  MacKereth argued that: 
Pan-Arabism or Arab nationalism has never flourished otherwise than as a subversive movement 
finding its chief stimulus in a revolt against law and order...especially when established by foreign rule. 
It has thrived only under what is thought to be oppression, and has always died in liberty...The leaders 
of the movement are themselves extremely vague to the meanings they attach to the terms nation, 
nationalism, confederation or Pan-Arabism...Militating against the ideology of Pan-Arabism is...the 
creation and growth of separate Arab states (imbued with all the chauvinism and individuality that the 
word “nation implies)...Herein, perhaps, exists a force that will grow increasingly inimical to Arab 
cohesion and confederation.  18  
While MacKereth would tirelessly denounce the legitimacy of Pan-Arabism from his rather 
remote position in Damascus, London operated in a totally different environment.19As the 
heat was turned up in contest over partition between the Foreign and Colonial Office, the 
Eastern Department’s line of reasoning became increasingly pessimistic: 
every punitive measure and every act of reprisal which our present policy is obliging us to take in 
Palestine is a step further in the consolidation of Arab opinion against us, in the development of intenser 
and more united Arab nationalism, and in the creation of a more compact and solid anti-British block in 
the Middle East. It is inconceivable that our rivals and enemies should not draw the maximum 
advantage from this unhappy situation. We are...playing straight into Italian and German hands.20 
In a lengthy memorandum written in January 1938 George Rendel further elaborated the 
departmental view: 
experience suggests that, under the stimulus of an external irritant, such elements can coalesce into 
compact and aggressive national blocks. The process is already beginning, and the Foreign Office are 
                                                     
18
 MacKereth to Foreign Office, FO/371/19980/ E3039, 15 May 1936. 
19
 During the second half of 1937 MacKereth managed to attract the hostility of George Rendel. As a result of 
this MacKereth’s memorandum would often not be distributed further. 
20
 Foreign Office memo, FO/371/20818/ E6317, 27 October 1937. 
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convinced that the one element calculated to drive the Arab countries into a condition of acute 
aggressive nationalism will be supplied if a Jewish state is created in Palestine.21   
From the numerous papers written on Palestine by the Eastern Department, it is apparent that 
the officials within that office did not always wish to go into specific details as to the actual 
consequences of enforced partition. This was of course understandable, as it was a particularly 
difficult task to accurately predict the moves of a “potential enemy”. Nevertheless, their 
memoranda on the Palestine issue were frequently built around a sort of catastrophic logic in 
which the potentially disastrous outcome of a failed policy seemed an essential part of the 
overall argument. Consequently, the reports occasionally ventured into more specific 
territory: 
I think there is no doubt at all that opposition will continue to grow, and will mean that it will only be 
possible for us to impose partition by force of arms...We know that the northern tribes of Saudi Arabia 
are only being prevented from launching a holy war against the Jews by Ibn Saud’s firm hand, but we 
clearly cannot expect him to continue to restrain them if we are at virtually open war with the Arab 
world. We also know that organisations are springing up as soon as hostilities begin...Feeling is likely to 
be almost equally strong in Egypt and Iraq, when in spite of our treaties, a great deal of help is likely to 
be furnished to the rebels.22 
On 19 November 1937 the Foreign Office put before Cabinet a weighty report on the regional 
repercussions of a partition in Palestine.23 It would be inadequate to describe the 
memorandum as merely a compilation of previous arguments. The tone was more alarmist 
and the predictions more clear-cut. Iraq, Egypt, Saudi-Arabia and Transjordan were each 
treated in separate sections. The prophecies were authored by the Eastern Department, but 
since this was Cabinet meeting, it was presented as the work of Foreign Secretary Anthony 
Eden.24  
The Foreign Office arguments were further augmented by the selective use of reports 
emanating from British officials in the region. Among them was a particularly depressing 
account on the situation in Egypt, written by the influential Ambassador to Cairo, Sir Miles 
Lampson. While each analysis differed slightly, the overall predictions were very much alike: 
                                                     
21
 Foreign Office comments regarding Ormsby-Gore’s letter to Prime Minister, FO/371/21862/E559, 9 January 
1938. 
22
 Foreign Office memorandum, FO/371/ 20814/E5501, 22 September 1937.  
23
 Anthony Eden’s memorandum, CAB 24/273, CP 281(37), 19 November 1937. 
24
 Evidently, Eden had little interest in Palestine. He therefore seems to have left the question largely in the 
hands of the Eastern Department.  
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should Cabinet decide to establish a Jewish State in parts of Palestine much of the Arab world 
might possibly align itself with Italy and become an outright enemy of Great Britain. 
 It is impossible to determine exactly how decisive the 19 November paper was in 
winning over the Cabinet. It definitely dealt a blow to Ormsby-Gore’s own campaign. The 
contest between the two departments had previously seen a steady exchange of memorandum, 
each contribution challenging the previous. On this occasion the Colonial Secretary was 
unable to produce a report which managed to refute the claims made by the Foreign Office.  
He simply stated: 
I hope I do not underestimate the strength of the Pan-Arab movement, but, with all deference, I venture 
to doubt whether it is yet possible to argue with any plausibility that “the Middle East is an organic 
whole.” I do not propose to comment in detail on the paragraphs of Mr. Eden’s memorandum...I cannot 
say what impression these paragraphs may have made upon the minds of my colleagues, but, for my 
own part, I find no conclusive or final evidence in those paragraphs of any widespread or permanent 
feeling in those countries with reference to the Palestine question.25  
Ormsby-Gore’s somewhat subdued memorandum did in fact prove to be the last chapter in 
the inter-departmental struggle. One week later the Cabinet assembled for what was to prove a 
crucial meeting. It was decided that partition would be postponed indefinitely. Prime Minister 
Neville Chamberlain’s intervention was decisive in tipping the scale in favour of the Foreign 
Office. In an accompanying statement he emphasized his fear of Italian advancements in the 
region (especially in the case of Saudi Arabia) as the main reason for his new-found 
reluctance. These were, of course, key arguments in the 19 November memorandum. While 
the dispute over partition would continue into the early months of 1938, the proposal was 
never again to recover from the blow it received at this meeting.  
 
The accuracy of the Foreign Office prophecies  
 
This thesis will look at how the Peel Commission’s partition plan was received in the different 
Arab states. Developments in Egypt, Saudi-Arabia, Iraq and Transjordan will each be treated 
in separate chapters. The proposal will be considered in light of how it affected their 
relationship with Great Britain, and to some extent how it affected domestic politics. In order 
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 Ormsby-Gore’s memorandum, CAB 24/273, CP 289(37), 1 December 1937. 
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to better understand the current British strategy, each chapter also describes briefly the 
imperial power’s role in that country during the preceding decades.   
The Eastern Department considered the Pan-Arab movement to be on the rise in the 
Middle East. Furthermore, they currently believed there was a widespread interest in the 
Palestine issue throughout the Arab world. This issue, they contended, had the potential to 
cause significant political turmoil in each country should Britain come up with a solution 
which failed to satisfy the Arab “demands”. Each of the four main chapters will query this 
assessment. It will look closer at the current level of interest regarding Palestine and the 
partition issue. Also, was this growing awareness a result of Pan-Arab sympathy? In addition, 
the Palestine question’s role in domestic politics will be examined. In the cases of Iraq and 
Egypt especially, just how important was the Palestine issue in the political scene during 
1937-38? 
A greater part of each chapter is nonetheless dedicated to Anglo-Arab relations. 
Simply put: would a partitioning of Palestine run the risk of permanently alienating that 
country, possibly transforming it into an outright enemy of Britain? 
This question touches directly upon the prophecies put forward by the Foreign Office 
on November 19. The predictions will be assessed mainly in light of information available at 
the time. Obviously, since partition was never implemented, it is impossible to draw any final 
conclusions. One important aspect does however make this a more viable task. While it was 
known to insiders that the Technical Commission would most likely advice against partition, 
people on the outside continued to believe that partition was still a likely outcome of the 
ongoing investigation. Both the Arab leaders and the Arab population thus continued - at least 
until October 1938 – to actively oppose such a decision. Consequently, developments in the 
Middle East from late 1937 up until autumn 1938 are enlightening as to how partition might 
have been received.  
While the above summary certainly suggests that Eastern Department was inclined 
towards a fatalistic and arguably flawed outlook on Britain’s future in the Middle East, a 
denunciation of their Palestine policy is not the objective of this thesis. It is not assumed - as 
is largely the case in one major work on this episode - that the department were altogether 
mistaken in their approach to the Palestine issue.26 What is assumed is that the Foreign Office 
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 For a more or less consistent disapproval of the Foreign Office’ role in the formulation of Palestine policy 
from 1936-38, see Kedourie “Great Britain and Palestine…” 
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thinking was marred by a dogmatic position. This rigid attitude was damaging in a several 
ways. As the Eastern Department often refused to incorporate conflicting intelligence into 
their analysis, they ended up advocating policies which did not always correspond with the 
information available. Overall, their pessimistic approach tended to obscure some of the 
available options, which in turn reduced Britain’s room of maneuver in their policy-making 
towards Palestine rather than the other way around.  
It is thus the orthodoxy of Foreign Office assessments which are queried. In practical 
terms this involves demonstrating that there were highly proficient individuals in other 
departments and elsewhere who at the time offered contrasting, yet equally plausible analysis 
on the Palestine question and its effect on developments in the region. Fairly often, in fact, 
these competing analyses seem to have been better founded than the ones provided by the 
Eastern Department. These individuals were sometimes counteracted by the Eastern 
Department, but more often they were ignored altogether. Unsurprisingly, perhaps, the Head 
of Department had a different version to tell: 
It seems to me that the Departments directly concerned are shutting their eyes to the realities of the 
situation and are pursuing a policy which can only steadily increase our difficulties. It is a thankless task 
to prophesy disaster, but I have seldom seen a case where disaster is approaching more inexorably. It 
may be said that this is not mainly a question for the Foreign Office and that we shall allow the other 
Departments to deal with it as they think best. My reply is that if the disaster which I foresee comes 
about...the consequences will be such as deeply to involve Foreign Office interests.27   
It can certainly be argued that a discussion that for the most part centres on how a partitioning 
of Palestine would affect Britain’s standing in the region is somewhat redundant: partition 
would, for a list of reasons, probably not solve Britain’s problems in the mandated area. 
Equally likely, it seems, would be an increase in her troubles.28 Such an objection, though, 
misses the quintessence of this study. The basis for this thesis is very much the outlook of the 
Foreign Office, the causes behind this outlook and the line of policy which derived from it.  A 
look at the relevant documents will show that their gloomy predictions regarding future 
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Anglo-Arab relations formed a decisive part of their case, and, that this line of reasoning was 
crucial in tipping the scales in their direction.29  
 
The rationale behind the Foreign Office policy 
 
While the above attempts to evaluate the soundness of the policies recommended by the 
Foreign Office, it deals less with the components which shaped their particular course of 
action. As demonstrated above, the two departments competing over the direction of policy 
drew conclusions that were largely incompatible. This detail undermines an explanation 
centred primarily on strategic motives. For how could two branches within the same 
administration, with access to the same intelligence be so far apart if both parties were guided 
only by strategic thinking?  
There can be little doubt that some of the departmental disagreement had to do with 
dissimilar responsibilities and objectives. The Colonial Office had for many years enjoyed 
close contact with the Zionist movement. Under Ormsby-Gore’s period in office these 
relations became especially cordial, in many ways resembling a patron-client relationship. 
Furthermore, the Colonial Secretary definitely had a personal desire to see the creation of a 
Jewish state. In an emotional letter to Eden in July 1937, prompted by a formal Iraqi attack on 
partition, Ormsby-Gore wrote: “no more unfriendly act, or one more personally embarrassing 
to me, could have been committed.”30   
The Eastern Department, on the other hand, had little if any contact with the Zionist 
movement during the 1930s.31 Their efforts were instead dedicated towards safeguarding 
Anglo-Arab relations. These relationships undoubtedly instilled in many officials a general 
sympathy with the Arab position. The number of outspoken Arabists serving in the Foreign 
Services during this era underlines this tendency.  Indeed, many of the leading consuls and 
Ambassadors referred to throughout this thesis were of a definite Arabist persuasion.  
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  This tendency was not lost on the Zionists at the time. When information on the inter-
departmental struggle reached them, their anger was vented towards the alleged chief villain: 
George Rendel. Prominent Gentile Zionist, Blanche Dugdale, recorded in her diary: “the 
author of the attack is Rendel - head of Middle Eastern Department – and a Papist.”3233  
Rendel’s main opponent, William Ormsby-Gore, expressed similar sentiments. In an internal 
memo he wrote. “I realise that Mr Rendel is a sincere pro-Arab and anti-Jew and a critic of 
His Majesty’s policy”.34 In conversation with his colleague, the Conservative politician Leo 
Amery, Ormsby-Gore used even more harsh terms. The Colonial Secretary said that partition 
was “being held up...thanks to Rendel a strong RC [Roman Catholic] and anti-Semite.”35   
 As these assessments were provided by persons either belonging to - or sympathetic 
towards - the Zionist movement they must be treated with a great deal of scepticism. 
Nonetheless, political scientist and leading authority on this subject, Aaron Klieman, has to 
some extent pursued the anti-Zionist trail. To begin with, he maintains that Rendel was both 
the architect and initiator of the campaign to override partition; secondly, he implies that 
Rendel was to a large degree influenced by a latent anti-Zionism. Klieman’s trump card, so to 
speak, is a brief characteristic made by Oliver Harvey, private secretary to Anthony Eden and 
“thus in privileged position to judge Rendel from within the Foreign Office.”   
You will have been reading a number of papers on Palestine. From the point of view of objective it is 
worth remembering that Rendel is a Catholic and a passionate anti-Zionist and that the question is also 
viewed from the Eastern Department only.36 
What Klieman fails to mention is that Mr. Harvey can only be described as a passionate 
Zionist himself.37 Not only does this fact strip Harvey of any objectivity on this matter, it is 
also highly doubtful if he in any way can be said to represent the Foreign Office position. 
 In large part the anti-Zionist approach seems to be a blind alley. Obviously, neither 
Rendel nor Lampson had much sympathy with the Zionist project, but their opposition 
towards partition seems have derived neither from a methodical anti-Zionism nor a latent anti-
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Semitism. The years spent consolidating British-Arab relations had convinced them that 
British imperial and strategic requirements necessitated friendly ties with the Arab world. Observing 
how the partition proposal was denounced throughout the region, they came to regard the 
scheme as a possible threat to British hegemony in the area. Consequently, they did what they 
could to prevent its implementation.    
But there was definitely another, more emotional factor. Many British officials had 
come into contact with the Arabs through government work in the region were they had 
become deeply fascinated by Arab customs. This seems to have induced in them a romantic 
infatuation with the traditional, Bedouin way of life. In one way this ascetic lifestyle offered a 
way of holding on to a lost past and of defying the modernization that was occurring in the 
West where they lived. 38 For quite a few the Zionist project appears to have disrupted this 
somewhat picturesque view of the Arab world. Observations made by George Rendel in his 
autobiography support this impression. He seems to have regarded the Zionists’ progress in 
Palestine as artificial, and as the manifestation of increased western influence in the region: 
The new Jewish colonies, however, had greatly multiplied since our previous visit in 1932, and the 
countryside was beginning to take on a rather brash modern look...stout young women from Central 
Europe in exiguous tight shorts, made an odd contrast to the then still more numerous native Arabs, 
glaring suspiciously at these strange invaders.39   
The motives for the Eastern Department’s Palestine policy will be discussed at various times 
throughout this thesis. A recurring theme will obviously be to what degree the Arabist 
leanings of key officials influenced their thinking regarding the partitioning of Palestine.  
  
Theoretical approach 
 
The notion that political decision makers operate in a setting (the psychological environment) 
which rarely corresponds with the actual one (the operational environment) is a common 
concept in political theory.40 The discrepancy between the two can result in the following 
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scenarios: The decision-maker may think there are possibilities for action which do not fully 
exist, if so, his psychological environment is broader than his operational, or as is most often 
the case; he may ignore genuine possibilities, as a consequence, narrowing his own room of 
manoeuvre in relation to the operational one.41  
This simple model can help shed light on the increasingly rigid stand of both 
departments.  Regarding Palestine, it is apparent that the psychological environments of the 
Colonial and Foreign Office were vastly different: a development in a certain direction - 
which one might assume would bring their positions closer together - often, brought them 
further apart.42 Also, where the Colonial Office saw partition (at least partly) as fulfilling a 
20-year old pledge to the Jewish people, the Foreign Office increasingly came to regard the 
same proposal as a betrayal to the Palestine Arabs.  
In continuation of this, another question emerges: was the psychological environment 
of the Eastern Department in 1937 largely the product of its head, George Rendel, or was it 
mostly the other way: that is a situation where the rules and customs “accompanying” the 
office to a large degree determined how the officials behaved? 43 Among political scientists 
there is some disagreement over how much influence a mid-level official such as George 
Rendel might have possessed.44 This discussion is centred on two closely connected levels: 
how much personal autonomy does a bureaucratic system allow for, and how strong an 
influence does a senior official have on the “political climate” inside his own office.   
Rendel was not the first Foreign Office official to vent scepticism at the Zionist 
endeavour.  It is evident, however, that his personal opposition to the project was rather 
passionate. More importantly, his commitment was crucial in redefining British policy 
towards Palestine. Remember, it was Rendel personally who interfered in the Palestine issue 
during the second half of 1936. In the following 18 months he alone drafted all the important 
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papers on Palestine - apparently without any directives from his superiors. Even Rendel 
himself acknowledged that great degree of leverage given to him at the time.  
I... found myself responsible for dealing with all its [the Near East] problems...and free to formulate 
policy, to make recommendations, and to organize the work more or less as I choose...Heads of 
Department had more responsibility and a freer and wider field than they had after the Second World 
War.45     
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Egypt 
 
speeches at Geneva by the Egyptian representative on the League of Nations and a recent statement in 
the Egyptian Parliament by Nahas Pasha [Egyptian Premier] clearly indicates that the [Palestine] 
question is one of interest to the Egyptian public and that the Government is under the necessity of 
showing that they are not indifferent to Arab opinion. If this sympathy is not at the moment very active, 
it is, at any rate, latent and ready to take active form if an occasion arises. Such an occasion would be 
Arab resistance to our forceful imposition of a [Palestine] policy hateful to the Arabs. There is, indeed, a 
real and ever-present danger that the nationalism and religious sentiment of the Egyptians, always 
readily inflammable, may be roused to new excitement by sympathy with their Arab co-religionists, of 
whose civilisation they regard themselves to some extent as leaders...the general delicacy of the internal 
situation in Egypt provide a promising field for Italian propaganda which would not be slow to fan the 
flames of pro-Arab resentment...even in the best circumstances in Palestine...we might find ourselves 
faced with a situation in Egypt which demanded the retention of all our forces in that country.46 
 
British-Egyptian relations 
 
In 1922 the British granted Egypt its formal independence.47 While the country received a fairly liberal 
constitution, based largely on western parliamentary lines, Egyptian sovereignty was limited by 
several British-imposed conditions. Britain retained responsibility for securing imperial 
communications, for the defence of Egypt against outside aggression and for the protection of foreign 
interests and minorities.48  
 Upon his arrival in Cairo in 1934, the new Egyptian Ambassador, Miles Lampson, was 
instructed by the Foreign Office that non-intervention in Egyptian affairs should be his guiding 
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principle.49 The intention was to minimize friction with Egyptian leaders in order to create a stable 
political situation where Britain could best pursue its interests. However, the unequal distribution of 
power between the political parties in parliament and the palace, and the conflicting interests of Britain 
and Egypt on key issues created tension the British Embassy could not overlook.50  
But for Britain, this was not necessarily a bad thing. While it was never going to be an easy 
task, the tension which existed between the Egyptian Palace and the Egyptian Parliament created 
opportunities for Britain to strengthen its own position. This was done by playing the two sides off 
against each other.  
Britain’s position was strongest vis-à-vis the Palace. It was made perfectly clear that they had 
the power to unseat the Monarch if he challenged their fundamental interests, and, that they alone 
possessed the real military and financial power of the Egyptian state.51 While the King was clearly 
vulnerable to British pressure, the constitution of 1923 awarded him extensive powers in relation to 
domestic rivals: the King could appoint the prime minister, dismiss the government, dissolve 
parliament and his assent was required for all bills.52 While the Wafd party won every open election 
from 1923 and onwards, King Fuad (1917-36) – and later his son Farouk (1936-52) – would 
repeatedly find ways of ousting the Wafd from power and rule without them for longer periods at a 
time. The Wafd was Egypt’s leading nationalist party and dominated the political scene during the 
1920s and 1930s. Early on it became the centre of the anti-British movement. This trait was in fact an 
important reason for its success, as anti-British sentiment was prevalent in all sectors of the 
population. 
As a consequence of these recurring setbacks the Wafd would continuously work towards an 
agreement with the British which would award the country genuine independence. After trying for 
more than 14 years the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty was signed in August 1936. This long and frustrating 
process had seen a gradual transformation of the Wafd. The party leaders had learnt the lesson that 
they could never hold power for long against British opposition. While the Wafd never toned down its 
hostility towards the Palace, it had gradually adopted an increasingly moderate attitude towards 
Britain.53  
While Wafd’s increasingly moderate stance certainly contributed to the process, there can be 
little doubt that it was Italy’s current aggression which was the single most important reason for why 
the Anglo-Egyptian treaty finally fell into place. The Italian invasion of Abyssinia and the 
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reinforcement of her garrison in Libya from September 1935 onwards made Egyptians of all parties 
painfully aware of their country’s vulnerability vis-à-vis Italy. The only solution, it seems, was to rely 
on Britain for her defences. Upon the treaty’s release the intellectual weekly, al-Risa, made a 
distinction between the “neo-Roman fascist imperialism” of Italy and the “traditional imperialism” of 
Great Britain. As Britain was the lesser of the two evils, the Wafd Government was judged to have 
done the right thing in accepting the treaty.54  
The Egyptian leadership was in fact fairly happy with the treaty as it recognised Egypt as a 
sovereign state.  Moreover, they were convinced that the country would eventually be moving towards 
full independence. For the British, military considerations were decisive. The treaty guaranteed them 
the right to intervene in the event of an emergency, and it ensured them access to Egyptian military 
facilities.55 While the British had to withdraw their military forces from Egyptian territory, they were 
allowed to station up to 10.000 men in the Suez Canal Zone for 20 more years. The treaty also barred 
Egypt from concluding any treaties on her own or adopting an attitude inconsistent with the alliance.56 
Like the Egyptians the British were fairly pleased with the outcome. There was the appearance of 
Egyptian independence, but the reality was that British forces remained in the vicinity.57        
Miles Lampson was employed in Cairo until 1946. Throughout the 12 years in office he held a 
powerful position in Egyptian domestic policies. Even after Egypt was awarded its independence in 
1936, Lampson for the most part bypassed the Egyptian minister of foreign affairs and instead dealt 
directly with the prime minister.58 The British embassy in Cairo was in fact considered to be an 
extension of the British state. It was by far the largest and most senior diplomatic institution in the 
country, and to most people’s great dismay it held an imposing position in Egyptian political life.59  
 
Egypt and Palestine in British strategy: linkages 
 
The British acquired Palestine first and foremost to use it as a buffer zone to the area north of the Suez 
Canal. The Suez Canal was crucial because it connected the Mediterranean and Red Seas. By the 
1930s Palestine was regarded by Britain’s strategic thinkers as an asset by its own, but its merits were 
still linked primarily with Egypt. Palestine gave Britain a foothold in the eastern Mediterranean 
unrestricted by any treaty. Moreover, when the Anglo-Egyptian treaty of 1936 was set to expire in 
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1956, Palestine might be required accommodate the imperial garrison in the Middle East, now located 
in Egypt.60   
 However, by the later 1930s Palestine had become something of a strategic liability. In order 
to quell the uprising which had erupted in 1936, Britain was gradually forced to divert troops and 
equipment from the United Kingdom and Egypt.61 For Miles Lampson this perceived weakening of 
Egypt’s defence became increasingly difficult to accept. Especially so, since he was convinced that the 
Rebellion would eventually die down if Britain would concede to the general Arab demands: scrap the 
partition proposal and halt Jewish immigration into Palestine.62  
The Italian factor undoubtedly reinforced Lampson’s conviction that the current Palestine 
policy created unnecessary burdens. By January 1938 there were reportedly 95.000 Italian soldiers 
stationed in Libya. British forces in Egypt were numbered at mere 10.000.63  Lampson and Foreign 
Secretary Anthony Eden were among those most alarmed by Italian expansionism in the Middle East. 
As they both believed Italy’s ambitions stopped short of nothing less than the rebirth of the Roman 
Empire, they were convinced that a trial of strength between the two powers was inevitable.64 
Consequently, the Ambassador would repeatedly appeal to the British Chiefs of Staff for a 
strengthening of Egypt’s defences against a possible Italian invasion.    
Lampson’s concerns regarding Palestine could thus be said to have be twofold. The Rebellion 
pinned down an increasing number of British troops in Palestine. By the second half of 1938 there was 
still no end in sight.  Lampson considered this as potentially damaging for the defence of Egypt. More 
importantly, though, Lampson was together with the Eastern Department of the Foreign Office 
convinced that a continuation of the current Palestine policy would alienate Arabs everywhere. In the 
case of Egypt, this might involve a break with Britain and a rapprochement with Italy. 
 
The Palestine issue in Egypt 
 
The notion that Egypt was an integral part of the Arab world found few adherents in Egypt during the 
first three decades of the twentieth century.65 Pan-Islamism and Pan-Arabism was largely rejected 
because both movements were perceived to detract from the main goal: a distinctive Egyptian national 
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identity. Egyptian politicians focused most of their attention towards the domestic political struggle 
and to efforts aimed at ending the British presence in the country.  Involvement in the Arab and 
Islamic areas around Egypt were minimal.66 The Palestine question was no exception. For the most 
part Egyptians were indifferent or ill-informed about the burgeoning Arab-Zionist conflict.67 In the 
press, no more space was awarded Palestine during the 1920s than any other foreign parts of the 
world.68 However, during the Wailing Wall disturbances of August 1929 Palestine did become a key 
issue in the Egyptian newspapers.69 But as the unrest was brought to an end, Egyptian interest in 
Palestine receded to its previous level. What is more, during the incident the press made no attempt to 
link Palestinian and Egyptian affairs. Instead the secular press portrayed the disturbances as a grim 
example of sectarian violence. More than anything else, this ought to serve as a warning to Egyptians 
of the dangers associated with basing unity around religion rather than nationalism.70    
 On an official level, the Egyptian Government followed a policy of strict neutrality and non-
involvement.71 Not only was there a general lack of interest in the fortunes of the Palestine Arabs, 
considerable support was expressed by certain publicists and politicians for the Jewish National Home 
now emerging in Palestine.72  In the 1920s Zionism was in fact regarded as a legitimate concept in 
Egypt. Zionist organisations and associations were allowed to stage various events and Egyptian 
Zionists were allowed to collect funds for the creation of Jewish settlements in Palestine.73 Several 
prominent Egyptian’s - some of whom would a decade later become ardent sympathisers with the 
Palestine Arabs - expressed admiration for the Zionist ideology. One such figure, writer Ahmad Zaki, 
wrote in 1922 that “the victory of the Zionist idea is the turning point for the fulfilment of an ideal 
which is so dear to me: the revival of the orient.”74 
The British were at the time well informed on the difficult and complex affiliation between 
Egypt and the Arab world. Percy Lorraine, British High Commissioner in Egypt made the following 
observation in 1931. “Egypt is so isolated from the Arab World that it is not easily drawn into 
movements such as Pan-Arabism and Pan-Islamism.”75 
 The early 1930s saw a slight increase in the interest awarded Palestine. The real shift, 
however, did not occur until 1936 and the start of the Arab Rebellion. Soon after the outbreak in April, 
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various initiatives in support of the Palestine Arabs were organised. These included protests, appeals 
and speeches. The main organisers were the Muslim Brotherhood and the Young Men’s Muslim 
Association.76 The magnitude of these protests did place the Wafdist government in a somewhat 
awkward position, largely because they at this time were about to complete the Anglo-Egyptian treaty. 
Even so, Premier Nahas did not conceal his pro-Palestinian views to the British. He warned them in 
June that they were “sitting on an oven” in Palestine and urged them to halt Jewish immigration 
immediately.77 At this point, however, the overtures were kept secret to the Egyptian public.  
The opposition was not slow to act on what appeared to be Government inaction. In 
parliament anti-Wafdist politicians accused Nahas’ ministry of suppressing news from Palestine in 
order not to infuriate public opinion at a time when treaty negotiations were nearing its conclusion.78 
Similar sentiments were expressed in the media. Several newspapers urged Nahas to become directly 
involved in the Palestine issue.79 
 There seems to be several causes for this shift in Egyptian attitude towards Palestine from 
1936. Obviously, the outbreak of the Rebellion was decisive. An armed revolt by a neighbouring Arab 
people against Egypt’s traditional imperialist occupier was bound to create sympathy in Egypt.80 But 
there were also changes inside Egypt itself which contributed to this development. From the early 
1930s there had been an increase in Islamic religious sentiment in Egypt. This led to a greater concern 
for the protection of Muslim rights everywhere. The predominantly Muslim character of Palestine 
meant that many Egyptians considered the revolt to be a struggle in defence of Islam. There were also 
mounting interest in Egypt’s role in the Arab world. In the press there were debates on the degree of 
“Egyptianess” and “Arabness” found in the Egyptian national character.81  
Nonetheless, when calm once again fell over Palestine from October 1936, general Egyptian 
interest in the matter faded quickly.82 All through the first half of 1937 - when the Royal Commission 
deliberated - public and private manifestations of support were virtually non-existent.83 Gilbert 
MacKereth’s disparaging assessment of Pan-Arabism which maintained that it thrived mainly under 
oppression and “always died in liberty”, seems to have had some justification.84 
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The impact of the Partition plan 
 
The Peel Report received a lot of attention in Egypt upon its release in July 1937. From the 
traditionally pro-Palestine circles - the Muslim fundamentalists, the Pan-Arab politicians and the anti-
Wafd opposition leaders - reaction to the partition proposal could best be described as hostile.85 In a 
meeting with Sir Miles Lampson held some two weeks after the report was issued, head of the Wafd 
Government, Nahas Pasha, summed up the Egypt position on the matter. Personally “he could not too 
strongly deplore suggestion of partition.” Apparently he feared the potential threat of an independent 
Jewish State. “Who could say the voracious Jews would not claim Sinai next?” The main impression 
given by Nahas was nevertheless a sense of doubt over the scheme’s actual potential. The Egyptian 
Premier put forward a rhetorical question which would be repeated frequently by the Eastern 
Department the following months:  
Why should His Majesty’s Government deliberately estrange the whole Arab world as they seemed set 
on doing?...As a genuine friend, supporter and ally of Great Britain he most earnestly begged His 
Majesty’s Government would pause before proceeding with what he could only regard as their fatal 
policy. 
The Eastern Department reacted positively to Lampson’s despatch. Their comments reveal that the 
content was in line with their current outlook. The factors which had previously done much to counter 
Pan-Arab development in Egypt (i.e. the historically contentious relationship between Egypt and the 
Arab world) were not mentioned.  
It is clear that Arab and Moslem opinion is steadily hardening against partition...there is no doubt that 
the Arab reaction against our proposals is spontaneous and widespread and that it would be a mistake to 
attribute it to any individual act on the part of any Arab leader...It must be remembered that the Arabs 
look on the whole of Palestine as essentially an Arab country...I think we are likely to be in for an 
increasing amount of trouble in the Middle East over Palestine.86  
Nahas approach to Lampson on 24 July initiated Egypt’s official involvement in the Palestine 
question. There seems to have been several reasons for this decision. To some degree it was motivated 
by the international prestige which would accompany a successful intervention. Also, Palestinians and 
Arabs alike looked to Egypt and expected that she would take centre stage in the struggle against 
partition, as she was considered by many to be the predominant regional power.  This position would 
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inevitably be reinforced should the British be compelled to depart from partition.87 There can neither 
be any doubt that strong pressure from the Egyptian public and opposition parties - both essentially 
accusing Nahas of passivity on the Palestine issue - forced the Premier to come out passionately 
against partition. Finally, Nahas was personally committed to the Palestinian cause. Neither Lampson 
nor the generally more cautious High Commissioner to Egypt, David Kelly, doubted the sincerity of 
his appeals.88  
On 18 September 1937 Egyptian Foreign Minister Butrus Ghali made the most definite 
statement on Palestine so far. At the annual meeting of the League of Nations Butrus argued strongly 
against partition. According to the Minister the issue was “engaging the closest attention of the 
Egyptian Government, because of the neighbourly relations between Egypt and Palestine“. He went on 
to assert that “right and justice require that Palestine should remain in the hands of the Palestinians. 
This is the natural law in its simplest and clearest form.”89 Kelly reported that his speech had a 
favourable impact in Egypt. By publically opposing British Policy in Palestine, the Wafd had 
displayed genuine independence and gained considerable credit for itself.90  
After this official reproach, however, Egyptian involvement in Palestine waned considerably. 
This development was undoubtedly tied to an emerging domestic political crisis. The young King 
Farouk had replaced his father in July. Like him, he wanted his own men in charge. This move would 
clearly limit Nahas powers, and he therefore opposed it. But Farouk’s popularity was rapidly 
increasing while that of the Wafd’s was in decline. In December Farouk judged that he could remove 
Nahas. On the 30th he was dismissed.91 The internal situation continued to be highly fragile into the 
early months of 1938. This effectively relegated the Palestine issue to the back. 
On 27 October 1937, while Lampson was absent on leave, his direct subordinate, David Kelly, 
sent a despatch discussing in length current Egyptian attitudes to the Palestine conflict.  The educated 
classes showed little interest in Palestine. They looked more towards Europe than to the East. 
President Nahas did himself possess strong feelings towards the Palestine Arabs, but this was not 
indicative for most politicians. The outlook of opposition leader Muhammad Mahmud was, according 
to Kelly, “largely coloured by the desire of making local political capital out of the question.”  The 
masses themselves, the report stated, were largely unaware of the unrest of the problems in the first 
place. Kelly did acknowledge the sympathy shown by the religious classes towards the Palestinian 
Arabs. Still, their agitation could not affect the general apathy towards the conflict. Also, there was 
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“still a large measure of goodwill towards ourselves due to the liquidation of Anglo-Egyptian relations 
through the Treaty.” 
Kelly concluded, nonetheless, that Britain should remain cautious. Egypt was primarily a 
Moslem country, and this “renders her instinctively sympathetic to the tribulations, supposed and 
otherwise, of her co-religionists.” Increased support for the Palestinians could thus be expected if 
conditions in Palestine deteriorated further.  
Kelly’s despatch is important for several reasons. Like other deviating material, it was not well 
received in the Eastern Department. Rendel wrote: “I am afraid this despatch may be seized upon by 
the Colonial Office in support of their contention that it is quite unnecessary to worry about reactions 
to our Palestine policy in neighbouring Moslem countries. If the despatch is carefully read, it shows... 
that the present lull is in fact due largely to accidental circumstances.”  
It is difficult to disagree with Rendel on this account. The strong reactions in July and August 
did indeed indicate that frustration over British policy in Palestine would increase rather than decline. 
And as Rendel pointed out, Kelly himself acknowledged the favourable factors operating in Egypt at 
the time of writing. “All thoughts have recently been concentrated on the growing tension between the 
Palace and the Wafd and the difficulties of the present Ministry.” 92 
According to historian Thomas Mayer, Kelly’s assessment’s was supported by Egyptian, 
American, German Arab and Zionist sources. Furthermore, the similarity in content of the October 
report and one Kelly had written in August 1936 “may illustrate how small and unimpressive was the 
ground gained by Arabism during this period.”93 Elie Kedourie - also citing Kelly’s report as his main 
source - draws much the same conclusion and argues that this lack of interest in Palestine was no 
“lull” but indicative of Egyptian’s general attitude.94  Both scholars fail to acknowledge that the 
diminution of Palestine related activity was clearly linked to the current political crisis. This seems 
especially odd considering that Kelly himself made reservations on the report’s accuracy exactly on 
these grounds.  The conclusion drawn by Mayer and Kedourie is that that only after Nahas dismissal 
was there in Egypt any widespread interest in the Palestine conflict.  While it is true that the following 
ministry of Muhammad Mahmud saw a definite increase in Palestine related activity - both at an 
official and non-official level – it would be a mistake to neglect similar developments under Nahas’ 
Wafd Government.  Evidence indeed shows that from July 1937 and onwards political parties and 
organisations were strongly engaged in the Palestine issue.  
While the Palestine question was used by certain politicians as a useful tool - and thus did not 
always reflect genuine solidarity with the Palestine Arabs – the issue cannot be dismissed so easily. A 
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contemporary piece in the renowned Foreign Affairs magazine seems to capture essence of the 
Egyptian sentiment vis-à-vis Palestine:  
 
You may say if you wish (though I think it untrue) that Egyptian politicians do not really care what 
happens in Palestine, that they raise the question only for demagogic reasons in order to deflect popular 
from the attention from the crying need for internal reforms...But does not the very fact that the cabinet 
feels obliged to defend the Arab case indicate that there must be many Egyptians who do have a lively 
interest in Arab nationalism?..The politicians may be insincere and their appeal may savor of 
demagogy, but the fact that they make it shows the inclinations of the electorate.95  
After Muhammad Mahmud and his coalition government took over on 30 December 1937 Egyptian 
concern with the Arabs of Palestine only increased. By the following spring, developments in Egypt 
regarding Palestine seemed to have come full circle. Strong commitment to the issue was evident 
among the Egyptian public as well as among the policy-makers themselves. It appears that Sir Miles 
Lampson was not exaggerating when he by May 1938 wrote: 
Every Egyptian is pro-Arab: and Wafd undoubtedly want to embarrass the present government by 
championing so popular a cause. Whilst, therefore, the government are genuinely anxious to prevent 
agitation becoming serious, their position is increasingly difficult as the whole nation sides with the 
Arabs.96    
The summer saw a series of violent demonstrations against the Zionists, the British and the Egyptian 
Government. By championing the Palestine issue the main organiser of these events - the Muslim 
Brotherhood - reinforced their position in Egyptian politics.97 The organisation’s phenomenal growth 
in the later 1930s was indeed closely related to its Palestine related activism.98  
 Interesting to note is that less than two years earlier Lampson had stated that the “the 
Egyptian...is inclined to look on the Arab as an uncivilised person and the Arab is inclined to despise 
the Egyptian for lack of moral fibre.” Consequently the Pan-Arab movement had “very little real 
strength in Egypt.”99 In view of that, the 19 months separating these statements must have seen a 
dramatic change in Egyptian attitudes regarding their own role in the Arab national movement. Why 
this transformation? 
While the interest in Palestine was aroused from 1936 onwards, the partition proposal set 
alight even stronger feelings. This development seems to have been connected as much with Egyptian 
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national interests (real and perceived) as any Pan-Islam or Pan-Arab sympathy. While concern of 
Zionist expansionism had been expressed by some voices in 1936, the Peel Commission’s proposal of 
an independent Jewish state on Egypt’s border greatly enhanced this fear. Some spoke of a Jewish 
expansion within Palestine itself - engulfing the areas assigned the new Arab state. Others considered 
this as just the beginning. One Egyptian newspaper argued that “one day [the Zionists would] direct 
their Zionism towards Egypt.” An editorial in al-Jihad saw the Zionists spreading “into all Arab land” 
100
 Similar fears, remember, were voiced by Nahas in his meeting with Lampson on 24 July 1937.     
 It seems that it was largely the domestic agitation which developed over Palestine that made 
both the Nahas and the Mahmud ministries involve itself actively in the issue. While both Premiers 
seem to have possessed genuine affinity with the Palestine Arabs, they would probably have preferred 
not to get too involved in the issue, the obvious reason being the primacy of Anglo-Egyptian relations 
during this period. 
As reported by Kelly in October 1937, Palestine did prove a useful tool for Mahmud while he 
was in opposition. The same could be said for the Nahas and his Wafd party. When they were 
removed from power in late 1937, they began to take a far more active approach towards the Palestine 
issue while simultaneously decrying the current efforts of the Mahmud ministry.101  
While expressions of Pan-Arabism flourished during 1937, it is doubtful whether the 
movement as it appeared in the first half of the 1930s actually “befitted” Egypt and Egyptians. That is 
not to say manifestations were not genuine, but the public emotions aroused by the Palestine during 
this period tended to obscure the inconsistencies which had previously existed between Egypt and the 
Arab national movement.102 However, rather than a return to the Egyptian nationalism so prevalent in 
the 1920s and early 1930s, developments in the years after 1938 demonstrate that Egypt’s shift 
towards the Arab world (at least on an official level) was indeed permanent. Egypt’s presence at the 
St. James Conference on Palestine in February 1939 was arguably the first manifestation of this new 
role, a role which in subsequent years was to be unmistakeably Arab.103        
 Despite the fact it was highly visible, and that it contributed to the growth of Arab 
nationalism, the Palestine question cannot be said to have been a decisive element in the political 
developments in Egypt during 1937-38. There were simply far too many other pressing issues in 
Egyptian policies. Also, no party in Egypt would benefit from a situation where Palestine took centre-
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stage. Such a political environment would put immense strain on any Egyptian government - 
especially if Britain was to have defied Arab demands and forcefully implemented partition.  
  
The likelihood of a hostile, pro-Italian Egypt 
 
What were the military risks for Britain of alienating Egyptian opinion over Palestine? From a 
strategic standpoint this was indeed a far more decisive issue than the amount of Egyptian goodwill 
lost over policy in Palestine. If - as argued by the Colonial Office - partition would best solve Britain’s 
grave problems in Palestine, Britain would obviously be able to endure a great deal in terms of 
negative reactions from the neighbouring states. There was nevertheless a limit to how much the 
British was prepared to put up with. A military hostile Egypt, for instance, could not be tolerated.   
Many of the leading politicians in Egypt asserted the Palestine issue had the potential to 
destabilize Egypt by “sparking uncontrollable trends” within the country.104 The development in Egypt 
throughout 1938 and the first part of 1939 certainly seems to support the notion of widespread 
resentment. Popular pressure on the government increased steadily and a variety of organizations and 
institutions undertook fundraising activities in support for the Palestine Arabs. Evidence suggests that 
the Muslim Brotherhood’s appeal for jihad in late 1938 may also have found some adherents in Egypt. 
105
 
Was Egyptian resentment towards British policy in Palestine only to result in domestic 
disturbances, however, the Egyptian army – with the assistance of British forces if necessary - would 
have little difficulty in toppling it. During the negotiations which led up to the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty 
of 1936 the British had in fact taken developments of this nature into account. Should the Egyptian 
Government fail to respond to serious disorder Britain reserved the right to institute appropriate 
legislative measures such as martial law and censorship.106 The British could also look to the recent 
past for reassurance. During the 1920s there had been several instances of unrest in Egypt. These had 
been readily detained by a surprisingly small number of British forces.107 
A graver situation would of course arise should the Egyptian government turn unfriendly. 
Indeed, this prospect was a key argument in the decisive Foreign Office memorandum of 19 
November 1937. Such a development would in the current circumstances mean an Egyptian-Italian 
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alliance of some kind. In an appendix to the memorandum, Sir Miles Lampson made the following 
assessment: 
I have become increasingly impressed by inherent danger to our position in Egypt and Eastern 
Mediterranean if our policy in Palestine remains unchanged...I have reported growing suspicion that 
Great Britain is not in a position to protect Egypt from Italian aggression...She [Italy] is at the same time 
fomenting a powerful agitation in Arab countries that threatens to drive them towards Italy if our policy 
in Palestine remains repugnant to the Arab world...we should gravely consider whether it is in our 
power to risk a course which may well end in general Italo-Arab co-operation against us.108  
Miles Lampson is often credited as the architect of the Anglo-Egyptian treaty of 1936.109 
Consequently, he more than anyone ought to have been aware of the special circumstances which 
finally made the treaty a reality after more than a decade of bickering. Even at the time of its creation 
it was widely acknowledged that it was fear of an Italian attack which compelled the Wafd 
Government into signing the treaty. Moreover, fear of Italian colonial ambitions was not that of the 
Wafd alone but was shared by a vast majority of Egyptian politicians.110 Lampson was thus perfectly 
aware that the Italian threat in this instance had significantly benefitted British interests in Egypt. 
Likewise this experience must have demonstrated to Lampson that Britain’s reputation in Egypt – 
although marred – was significantly greater than that of Italy.  
The aforementioned article in Foreign Affairs gave the following explanation for Italy’s 
failure to attract support in the region. 
Whether Italian propaganda, money and arms had anything to do with the revolt of 1936 is difficult to 
say...few Arabs have any desire to substitute Mussolini for George VI. They vividly recall the 
barbarities of Graziani’s conquest of Cyrenaica. What it comes down to is largely this: Fascist and Arab 
for the time being have a common interest in making trouble for the British Empire. 111  
Similar observations were made by renowned American journalist John Gunther. After conducting 
extensive research throughout the Middle East in the second half of the 1930s, Gunther observed that 
“Italy, however ambitious it may be, impedes the growth of Fascism by its own policy in Libya. This 
Italian colony, the Arabs say, is not a good advertisement for Fascist ideals...The Libyan Arabs have 
been fleeing wholesale to oases on the Egyptian border.”112  
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From spring of 1938 and onwards developments took place which should have alleviated both 
Lampson and the Foreign Office. While publically speaking out in support of the Palestine Arabs, 
Egyptian Prime Minister Muhammad Mahmud launched a series of measures in order to dampen the 
more extreme pro-Palestinian activism within the country. This was done primarily in order to not to 
further offend the British.113 Lampson himself was well aware that this Oxford-educated politician was 
well disposed towards Britain. Even more importantly: Mahmud was a weak leader without popular 
support.114  While his concurrent effort in bringing about a reversal in British Palestine policy 
illustrates that he certainly did not approve of partition in any way, Mahmud knew that he was fully 
dependent on Britain regardless of how the issue was settled.  
A reading of the reports on Palestine transmitted from Miles Lampson to London from late 
1937 throughout 1938 reveals that the British Ambassador failed to acknowledge the severe 
limitations that currently existed in the Egyptian Government’s autonomy, limitations which clearly 
increased Britain’s room of manoeuvre on the Palestine issue. On the contrary, the Italian factor 
continued to be portrayed as restricting goodwill towards Britain rather than the other way around. By 
comparison the aforementioned War Office report of February 1938 drew entirely different 
conclusions: 
Egypt has no desire to risk her newly acquired independence and the development of her military 
resources by offending Great Britain. It is realised that British political and military support is essential, 
especially against Italy, whose policy is widely feared in Egypt. ...neither he [the King] nor Egyptian 
Pan-Arab enthusiasts are likely to be in a position to throw Egyptian resources into the scales against 
Great Britain on the Palestine question, either now or for some years to come. In any case the presence 
of British armed forces is likely to be a sufficient deterrent for a considerable period...Egypt would 
probably remain within the British orbit in any case, from motives of self preservation.115   
At the end of 1938 British Defence Security Officer in Egypt made an equally dismissive assessment 
of Italian sympathy within Egypt:  
Whatever may be the views of the Palace, there is practically no pro-Italian feeling in the rest of the 
country, which still manifests towards Italy a healthy contempt and dislike, not unmingled with fear. In 
spite of the events in Palestine, the good feeling towards ourselves which has existed for the last two-
and-a-half years, shows little signs of weakening.116 
The arguably most convincing observations came from a traditionally pro-Arab source. The brothers 
Samuel and Edward Attiyah were employed as intelligence officers at the British controlled Sudan 
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Agency (nickname for a British-controlled Sudanese Intelligence unit in Cairo). Their pro-Arab 
leanings would at times annoy some of the more hard-headed British officials.117 As a result, there was 
frequent debate within the administration regarding the worth of these intelligence reports. While 
generally extremely alarmist about the regional repercussions of Britain’s current Palestine policy, the 
Attiyah’s saw significantly less reason for concern in Egypt:  
 
As regards Anglo-Egyptian relations, the Treaty has been eminently successful. It has produced not 
only a friendly atmosphere, a general attitude of good will towards England, but a certain feeling of 
pride in the British alliance. At the same time most thinking Egyptians continue to regard the British 
Embassy as ultimately the real pivot of Egyptian politics, and are not really sorry that this should be so. 
Nor do I think a different Government would be less amicably disposed towards the Embassy, or less 
inclined to co-operate with it...The chief merit of the treaty is that it has removed the emotional hostility 
to England and the English, which means that Anglo-Egyptian relations are now determined only by 
considerations of interest; and in these considerations one can see no reason for conflict. Indeed, the 
international situation is acting, and should continue to act, as a strong cementing force on the Anglo-
Egyptian alliance. Nor do I believe the alleged pro-Italian sympathies of the Palace will be allowed to 
affect Egyptian policy, even if the Palace comes to have a more active share in the Government.118    
For Great Britain the short-lived Munich crisis of September 1938 was to some degree a test of 
allegiance. In an evaluation Foreign Secretary Lord Halifax stated in Cabinet that “one of the most 
satisfactory features of the recent crisis had been the attitude of the Egyptian Government which had 
responded admirably in every way.”119 Colonial Secretary, Malcolm MacDonald, spelled it out even 
clearer:  
I think that some people exaggerate the extent to which this [Palestine policy] is at present likely to 
place these countries amongst our enemies. It was remarkable that during the international crisis last 
September, when the unpopularity of our Palestine policy was at its height, the Governments of Egypt 
and Iraq did not hesitate to assure us of their full support in case of trouble, with scarcely any mention 
of the embarrassing situation in Palestine...It would take a lot to make these countries adopt any other 
attitude.120    
Despite their reassuring conduct, the Foreign Office remained unconvinced that future Iraqi and 
Egyptian loyalty would be unconditional. They pressed two issues as decisive. One was that the Arab 
Governments retained belief in British determination and ability to defend them from external 
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aggression; the second depended on the outcome of the upcoming London conference on Palestine.121  
As Lord Halifax made clear, the British “must come to an agreement regarding Palestine with Egypt, 
Iraq and Saudi Arabia...even if it means stopping Jewish immigration into Palestine.”122    
 By early 1939 it is safe to argue that threat of Arab intransigence was established as probably 
the most important aspect when Palestine policy was to be drawn up. While it seems likely that a 
partition of Palestine would have infuriated many Egyptians and increased anti-British sentiment, it is 
difficult to accept the notion that the Palestine issue was crucial in preserving the Anglo-Egyptian 
alliance. What the Egyptians sought from Britain was security. The policy of concessions and 
compromise which was now implemented in Palestine might have succeeded in conciliating many 
Egyptians, but it also sent a very different signal: namely one of hesitancy. As a Great Power Britain 
ought to have been aware of the “rules” which accompany such a position. A power which is 
unwilling or unable to resort to the pressure of arms in defence of its interests cannot remain a power 
for long.123  
It was Britain’s military power - not her appeasing policies - which made her an attractive 
partner to Egypt. This point was in fact made by Ormsby-Gore’s during a Cabinet discussion on 
Egypt’s defences in November 1937. The Colonial Secretary simply stated that:”The support of the 
Arab world as a whole would go to the Power which showed the greatest strength.”124 
There is little to surmise that the conciliatory line Britain chose over Palestine impaired 
Egyptian trust in Britain’s readiness to apply force against Italian aggression. But, it is equally 
doubtful that this approach contributed to its declared goal of cementing the Anglo-Egyptian alliance. 
When war finally came in September 1939, Britain expected Egypt to issue a declaration of war on 
Germany. As the Egyptian Government was unable to reach unanimity for such decision, no such 
declaration was made. Then Prime Minister, Ali Maher, told Lampson that several members of his 
government deemed Britain to possess an insufficient number of forces for the protection of 
Egypt.125Although Egypt would comply fully with British demands throughout the war, the Egyptian 
Government maintained its neutrality. The policy of appeasement in the Middle East - primarily tied to 
the Palestine issue – seemed to matter little when it was time for Britain to reap its benefits. This was 
very much what the War Office had predicted in 1938: “History shows that the Arabs are disinclined 
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to take decisive action to support even their friends until they see definite evidence that the side they 
favour is in the ascendant. Until then, their practice is to “sit on the fence.””126 
 
Lampson’s role 
 
The clear-cut observations referred to above leave Lampson’s own reports in a somewhat dubious 
light.  Taking into account Lampson’s experience and immense knowledge of Egyptian affairs, certain 
questions are bound to arise. Did he genuinely believe that Britain’s supremacy in Egypt was in 
jeopardy over the Palestine issue? Or, did his passionate opposition to the partitioning of Palestine also 
stem from personal objections to a Jewish state in the Middle East? 
 Chaim Weizmann held the view that “the misgivings of the Foreign Office are to a great 
extent based on reports from Egypt and Iraq.” This can only said to be partially true, but there is little 
doubt that Lampson’s views carried much weight in London.  As a result of these suspicions 
Weizmann travelled to Egypt to observe firsthand the current situation in the country and also to meet 
Miles Lampson himself. When arriving in February1938 he found a country in some turmoil. 
Weizmann attributed this mainly to current economic difficulties and to the Wafd government’s recent 
collapse. In view of this, Weizmann was “more than a little astonished” when he found Lampson to 
be: 
attaching a grotesquely exaggerated importance to the Palestinian problem, which he seemed to regard 
as the main cause of unrest in Egypt. This seemed to me to be an extraordinarily short-sighted view...I 
cannot understand why all the troubles of Egypt should be laid at the door of Palestine, and I am unable 
to accept a proposal which, in my opinion, would do nothing to relieve the situation in Egypt”127    
Though essentially a moderate, Weizmann was still President of the World Zionist Organisation. This 
hardly made him the most objective of men. Indeed, his attempts at dissecting Lampson’s hostility 
reveal a lack of refinement. Oriental Secretary at the Cairo Embassy, Walter Smart, was the renowned 
author George Antonius’ brother-in-law.128 Weizmann deduced that Lampson “is necessarily bound to 
rely a good deal on the information which comes to him through his Oriental Secretary...this channel 
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cannot be described as unprejudiced.”129  In conversation with the prominent Gentile Zionist 
campaigner, Blanche Dugdale, Weizmann (referring to the Cairo Embassy) said that the “smell comes 
from the milieu.”130   
In due course, however, Lampson’s vigorous campaign managed to annoy the very person set 
to liquidate the partition scheme. By late 1938 Colonial Secretary Malcolm MacDonald was an 
outspoken opponent of partition. He nonetheless maintained that Lampson had been “out-Arabing the 
Arabs...He was simply giving reign to his preconceived ideas...[I] have really got rather impatient with 
the way in which he has created difficulties for us by innocently encouraging Arab opposition.”131 
Lampson was not especially fond of the Balfour Declaration. In October 1937 King Edward 
VIII told Lampson he thought “Old Balfour was a silly old man; and had given (or promised to others) 
something already belonging to someone else!” Lampson said he “personally agreed”. This statement 
was nonetheless confined to his diary. Debating Jewish immigration with the Foreign Office in 
October 1938 Lampson gave the following evaluation of the Balfour Declaration: 
I still maintain that on moral and equitable grounds we could legitimately claim that with over 400,000 
Jews in [the] country (that is one-third of [the] total population) [the] Balfour declaration has been 
adequately implemented. We promised a national home not a national refuge for the Jews: and that we 
have already given.132 
There is little however to suggest that Lampson was motivated in any way by anti-Semitic beliefs. It 
was the Zionist idea he could not approve of. Like many of his fellow officials Lampson belonged to 
the “romantic” school of British Arabists.133 And like the majority of these he genuinely felt that a 
separate Jewish state in the Middle East was an alien creation and a betrayal to the native Palestinian 
Arabs.  
It would not do Lampson justice, however, to insist that his opposition to partition derived 
only from his personal beliefs. It seems that a good part of the Ambassador’s hostility must be 
ascribed also to his obsession with Egypt’s security. In November 1938 Lampson tried to assure 
Foreign Secretary Viscount Halifax of his objectivity on Palestine issues. “As recorded in previous 
reports, I approach this matter mainly from the strategic angle and as affecting our position from that 
angle in the Eastern Mediterranean: not from the angle of the Jew or the Arab, but from the angle of 
British Safety.”134  Straight away, this does not seem entirely convincing. More than anything, 
perhaps, it indicates a desire to counter recent muttering of the Ambassador’s own partisanship in the 
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matter.  However, it is certainly not impossible that Lampson himself considered this description to be 
accurate. Evidence suggests that the Ambassador - in the wider strategic context - saw Palestine first 
and foremost as an annexe to Egypt. Thus, if a mandate policy had the makings to cause difficulties 
for Anglo-Egyptian relations, Lampson would most likely oppose it. An indication of this approach is 
found in the Ambassador’s account of the abovementioned meeting with Chaim Weizmann in 
February 1938:  
I  made it plain at once that  my only status to the question was in regard to the effect which events in 
Palestine were having or were likely to have upon opinion in Egypt and in the surrounding Arab 
countries. The merits or demerits of partition was not my affair though I admitted that I had been 
surprised and considerably taken aback when the Royal Commission had recommended it.135   
Throughout 1937 Lampson became increasingly convinced that Great Britain was not in a position to 
protect Egypt from Italian aggression. While his argument that British Palestine policy was driving 
Egypt into the Italian fold has been closely contested here, Lampson’s concern regarding troops and 
material seems slightly more convincing. In order to quell the uprising in Palestine, Britain was 
gradually forced to divert troops and equipment from the United Kingdom and Egypt.136 For Miles 
Lampson any potential weakening of Egypt’s defence due to commitments in Palestine was difficult to 
accept.  
Lampson’s fears do however seem somewhat exaggerated. Two weeks before the decisive 
Foreign Office memorandum of 19 November, Chief of the Imperial General Staff, Sir Cyril Deverell, 
had made it clear in Cabinet that “any troops that may be despatched to Palestine from Egypt will be 
immediately replaced from elsewhere.”137 An apprehensive Lampson would later receive further 
guarantees in this direction. In April 1939 General-Officer-Commanding Egypt reassured Lampson 
that “Defence of Egypt is given definite priorities over requirements for Palestine.”138 Given 
Lampson’s preoccupation with Egyptian security, it is nonetheless possible to accept his opposition to 
a policy that might detract from her defence capabilities. 
A full examination of the arguments put forward by the Ambassador suggests that, from an 
objective angle, his antagonism towards an independent Jewish state seems to have been stimulated as 
much by his political beliefs as by strategic calculations. Whatever the case, his involvement proved to 
be important for the outcome.139 To prevent the implementation of a Jewish state in Palestine Lampson 
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took on a central role the anti-partition campaign initiated from London.140  What made his 
contribution effective - and what set him apart from most officials - was his considerable influence. 
His experience, the general importance of Egypt in the Middle East as a whole, and his determination 
to convey strong views on regional affairs all contributed to this.141 His cordial relationship with 
Anthony Eden also placed him closer to the decision-making authority than other British officials in 
the region.142 
 The Colonial Office was well aware of Lampson’s outlook and of his considerable influence 
in London. As a result, his conduct over the Palestine question greatly annoyed the officials in that 
department. Referring to a specific episode First Secretary H.F. Downie wrote that this:  
affords a good illustration of Sir Miles Lampson’s inertia in the matter of expounding and defending the 
Partition policy of H.M.G. When the Royal Commission was published, he was supplied with 
explanatory material, but he has never made use of it and has throughout contented himself with 
listening to misguided and ill-informed criticism by Egyptian ministers and others, and passing those 
criticisms on to the Foreign Office.”143 
It is doubtful if this sort of frustration had been vented had Lampson been an official of lesser 
importance. Indeed, it was this authority which made him a favourite with their rivals in the Eastern 
Department. Lampson’s account of how his contribution in the 19 November memorandum came 
about sheds light on the nature of this relationship and on Lampson’s independent nature. Two days 
prior to the Cabinet meeting the Ambassador received a private letter from Rendel: 
saying that the whole question of our Palestine policy was to come up for review by the Cabinet on 
November 19th and asking whether I might not feel disposed to put in my views (of which he was 
aware) in time to reach London before the Cabinet meeting...As in all cases of a policy that has been 
passed and decided on by the Cabinet it is always a matter of difficult[y] and some delicacy to seem to 
change it...But in light of Rendel’s letter and of the subsequent official telegrams from the F.O. I should 
imagine that there is little risk of a rap over the knuckles. Anyway if it comes it matters not, for if one 
has strong feelings on this question clearly it is one’s job to express them. There are two schools of 
action: those who confine themselves to putting up what they think is acceptable, or at any rate not 
inacceptable; and those who say what they really think. I am sure that the latter line of action is really 
the only one. Indeed, one would not be doing one’s job properly if one didn’t follow it.144   
Not only did Lampson share Rendel’s view on the predominance of Palestine on regional affairs, both 
men seem to have revered the autonomous qualities of the civil servant.     
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Saudi Arabia 
 
There are strong indications that King Ibn Saud may before long driven to reconsider his whole attitude 
towards us, and possibly even to throw in his lot with Italy if we cannot give him some satisfaction over 
Palestine...145 
His Majesty’s Government have informed King Ibn Saud that it is their intention to put into execution 
in Palestine a scheme of partition, one of the effects of which would almost certainly be to make the 
Amir Abdullah...and independent Sovereign...if the reports of military activity on the Saudi side of the 
frontier are correct, it is perhaps not unnatural that he should therefore already take preliminary 
measures to prepare for a possible struggle against the Amir...It has been suggested that, in spite of his 
strong feelings on the Palestine question, King Ibn Saud will not become openly and actively hostile to 
His Majesty’s Government unless some major development should occur, such as a European war. But 
it must be remembered that the leaders of the Arab opposition to the Palestine policy of His Majesty’s 
Government are likely to make every effort to induce King Ibn Saud to intervene actively on their 
behalf. 146    
 
Anglo-Saudi relations 
 
In 1927 Ibn Saud signed a treaty with Great Britain which put him and his Kingdom in a unique 
position. As the first Arab state, Saudi Arabia was awarded its independence. This was not the sort of 
limited independence given to Egypt in 1936, but one which recognised Saudi Arabia as autonomous 
in every way.  Developments throughout the 1930s indeed demonstrated that Ibn Saud was by and 
large his own master. He was treated according to international protocol and his foreign relations were 
not constrained – despite certain British attempts do to so. Throughout the 1930s Britain was in fact 
unable to put any real pressure on Ibn Saud, be it military or economic.147  
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Two years earlier, in 1925, Britain had displayed an emerging preference for the Saudi 
Monarch by remaining passive during his victorious campaign in the Hejaz.148 Ruler of the Hejaz, Ali 
bin Hussein, had been forced to flee the region as Ibn Saud’s fighters entered Mecca.149 As the new 
ruler of the Hejaz Ibn Saud suddenly found himself adjacent to the Amir Abdullah and his principality 
of Transjordan.150 Neither Ibn Saud nor Abdullah were content with the borders as they appeared in 
1925. Their ever-present enmity would in due course burden the British and affect inter-Arab relations 
- not least over the Palestine issue.          
Britain’s decision to “let go” of Saudi Arabia in 1927 was, not surprisingly, based on certain 
strategic assessments. In the late 1920s the Kingdom was considered both remote and inaccessible, far 
removed from the stage of great power rivalry. Moreover, the barren region was uninviting and under-
developed. Consequently, Britain could simply see no immediate benefits of maintaining a firm grip 
on the Saudi state.151  
 But there were also motives which were tied specifically to Ibn Saud. After his conquest of 
Hejaz, the British - and especially the Foreign Office - deemed Ibn Saud to be the only leader who 
could control the potentially volatile Arab Peninsula. His achievements in the preceding decades had 
indeed been remarkable. The Monarch had succeeded in dispersing the raiding tribes which had been a 
destabilising feature on the Peninsula for centuries. This he had accomplished either through combat 
or by incorporating key tribal leaders into his government.152 Also, thanks to the Bahra agreements of 
1925, relations with the Hashemites could in the late 1920s be described as satisfactory.153  
Most importantly, though, was Ibn Saud’s outspoken desire for continued friendship and 
cooperation with Britain. In the late 1920s and early 1930s Ibn Saud not only accepted Britain’s 
hegemonic role in the Middle East, but encouraged its continuation.154 The British thus reasoned that 
by preserving a close and cordial relationship with local strongman Ibn Saud their regional interests 
would be secure - all this at a very low cost, and with no military involvement whatsoever.155    
Britain’s only real concern lay with Ibn Saud’s expansionist leanings. There was a genuine 
fear amongst some British officials that the Monarch intended to enlarge his Kingdom - like he had 
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done so successfully in the previous decades.  This route would not only bring about a deterioration in 
Anglo-Saudi relations but would likely impair Britain’s interests elsewhere in the region. Since the 
independence that was about to be awarded Ibn Saud effectively gave him a free hand in foreign 
affairs, the British would have no legal grounds to restrain him should he decide to pursue an 
aggressive regional policy.156  
Initially the Anglo-Saudi axis proved a success. In 1933 the British helped settle renewed 
Saudi-Transjordan hostility. The treaty of friendship signed in July virtually terminated the border 
clashes which had pestered the northern Hejaz area for some time. This induced in the British a certain 
optimism. They became convinced that – despite a lack of formal control vis-à-vis the Saudi State - 
their position as the sole regional superpower allowed them to solve political and territorial disputes to 
their advantage.157 Subsequent events, however, were to reveal that this was more or less an illusion.  
The prolonged Saudi-Yemeni dispute - which resulted in all out war in 1934 - exposed fully 
the difficulties associated with Saudi expansionism. This conflict also introduced Italy as an 
unwelcome element in the Anglo-Saudi equation. Italian incursions in the region were in fact to plague 
that relationship repeatedly until the outbreak of war in 1939.  
In 1930 Ibn Saud had annexed the Asir region. This brought him in direct conflict with Imam 
Yahya of Yemen who also had strong ambitions in the area. Exploiting the anti-Saudi feelings in Asir, 
Yahya encouraged the former rulers - the Idrisi clan – to stage a revolt against Saudi Arabia. Ibn Saud 
responded immediately and rushed forces to quell the uprising. This would have been a fairly 
straightforward operation had it not been for the Italian presence. Italy had since the early 1920s 
aspired to establish a stronghold in Yemen and her fleet regularly patrolled its shores. Since an Italian 
warship was currently located on the coast of Asir, Yahya decided he could adopt an uncompromising 
position towards the Saudis. He sheltered the fleeing Idrisis and rejected repeated Saudi requests for a 
handover.158 But it did not stop there. Imam Yahya soon ordered his own troops to enter the Asir 
region. Once they were in position he ordered Ibn Saud to return all of the Idrisis’ dominions. This 
was unacceptable to the Saudi Monarch. Prepared to wage war Ibn Saud turned to Britain for 
additional arms. This request caused immediate concern in the British camp.  Generally speaking, 
Britain had no desire to become involved in an inter-Arab conflict.159 Nor did they wish to infuriate the 
Italians. Reactions from the Eastern Department of the Foreign Office do however suggest that by 
1933 Ibn Saud had somehow come to hold a special position in the minds of certain officials. While 
the Cabinet declined to supply any weapons, George Rendel nonetheless suggested that Britain should 
at once issue an ultimatum to the Yemenis in order to secure the release of a small group of Aden 
                                                     
156
 Leatherdale, p. 234. 
157
 Kostiner, “Britain and the Challenge…”, p. 129. 
158
 Ibid, p. 133. 
159
 Leatherdale, p. 151. 
39 
 
hostages held by the Imam ever since 1928. A failure to comply should be followed up by aerial 
bombardment of targets inside Yemen. Rendel maintained that this ought to work to Ibn Saud’s 
advantage by providing an unwelcome distraction to Yahya. Rendel was however promptly rebuffed 
by the Air Ministry, the Colonial and the India Office. 160 
Deeply troubled by the possible repercussions, London tried to dissuade Ibn Saud from 
initiating a full-fledged war with Yemen and stressed their objection to any Saudi accession of Yemeni 
territory. This was all to no avail. While Saudi Arabia was clearly hampered by the lack of British 
support, Ibn Saud had no desire to see Britain blocking him from defending an area that he considered 
to be lawfully his own.161  
By early April 1934 Saudi forces had ousted the Yemeni troops encroached in Asir and 
launched a fierce counter-attack which had brought them into Yemeni territory. The Italians saw 
which way the wind was blowing and urged Britain to halt the Saudi offensive. Britain informed Italy 
that it was prepared neither to see Ibn Saud be defeated by their protégé, the Imam, nor accept any 
Italian intervention. But, while Britain was acting tough on the international stage, they were 
simultaneously conducting frantic talks with Ibn Saud in Jeddah to prevent any further escalation of 
the conflict. Luckily for the British, Ibn Saud decided to end his offensive on 12 May 1934.162  
Rendel - always sympathetic to Ibn Saud - considered the assessments put forward by most 
British officials as to why the Monarch had ceased his operations to be marred by an intense anti-
Saudi bias. He himself maintained that the Saudi Monarch had decided to end his offensive early 
because he was afraid that an annexation of Yemeni territory might jeopardise regional stability. A 
more plausible explanation was put forward by the Minister to Saudi Arabia, Andrew Ryan. He argued 
that the war campaign was constrained by the Monarchy’s limited financial resources. Furthermore, 
the Saudi soldiers had shown little enthusiasm for a war being fought on a distant front. In view of the 
fact that these desert soldiers also lacked experience fighting in mountainous areas, Kelly surmised 
that strategically adept Monarch had halted operations following a thorough assessment.163    
The Saudi-Yemeni war taught both Britain and Ibn Saud important lessons. The King had 
observed how the British were prepared to intervene only when the Saudi defence was at stake - that is 
when Italy threatened to force the Saudis from Yemeni territory. Ibn Saud thus realised the hard way 
that his long-time ally was so constrained by the regional situation that they would not support further 
Saudi expansion. More worrying still, Britain’s failure to stand up against Italy demonstrated to Ibn 
                                                     
160
 Leatherdale, p. 151. 
161
 Kostiner, “Britain and the Challenge…” p. 132. 
162
 Ibid, p. 133. 
163
 Leatherdale, 157. Ibn Saud was widely considered to be an eminent strategist, the British being especially 
impressed by his pacification of the raiding tribes. Kostiner, Joseph, The making of Saudi Arabia, 1916-1936: 
From Chieftaincy to Monarchical State (Oxford 1993), p. 61.  
40 
 
Saud that the balance of power was shifting: Britain – despite her superior military capacity - was a 
power in decline while Italy was a likely candidate to replace her. While the Monarch was highly 
apprehensive of increased Italian presence, it must have been equally obvious to Ibn Saud that Italy 
might become useful at a later stage: prospects of a Saudi-Italian alliance would almost certainly 
ensure a British policy more favourable to Saudi Arabia.164     
As for the British, Ibn Saud’s conduct throughout the affair helped confirm previous fears of 
his expansionist leanings and his independent nature. Moreover, the Italian entrée was an unwelcome 
element in their Arabian strategy and did nothing to allay their rather fatalistic outlook. British 
officials realised that Britain - in accordance with her current policy of appeasement - was bound to 
give priority to Anglo-Italian relations. The experiences of the Saudi-Yemeni War clearly 
demonstrated that this might very well compromise future Anglo-Saudi dealings.165 
 
Arab nationalism and the Palestine issue in Saudi Arabia 
 
Saudi Arabia was even “less” of a nation than Iraq. The Kingdom consisted of various tribes which 
Ibn Saud had successfully merged between 1902 and 1932.166 This could not in any way be described 
as an evolutionary process as the population on the peninsula were divided by regional and tribal 
differences which militated against national unity and unification. The Saudi Kingdom was in fact 
imposed on a people with no common historical memory or any sense of national heritage.167   
Generally speaking, the Saudi Arabia of the 1930s was on “a much lower plane of social 
evolution” and had witnessed a “slower growth of national spirit” than other Middle Eastern states.168 
Ibn Saud’s policies in the preceding decade had in fact done little to strengthen the national identity. In 
contrast to the nationalist rhetoric so prevalent in both Egypt and Iraq, Ibn Saud focused his nation-
building project on the one element which the vast majority of his subjects had in common: Sunni, 
Wahhabi Islam.169  
 The lack of a strong nationalist movement in Saudi Arabia was also tied to Britain’s weaker 
position in the country. In Egypt and Iraq, much of what impelled Arab nationalism in the inter-war 
                                                     
164
 Leatherdale, 159. 
165
 Ibid, p. 160. 
166
 Al-Rasheed, A history of…, p. 3 
167
 Ibid. 
168
 MacKereth to Foreign Office, FO/371/19980/ E3039, 15 May 1936. 
169
 Al-Rasheed, A History of…,p. 4, Leatherdale, p. 262. 
41 
 
years was a universal hatred of the British presence. Since this was not the case in Saudi Arabia, Saudi 
attitudes were destined to be of a different nature. 170  
 The Saudi state in the 1930s was an underdeveloped and isolated desert Kingdom.171 No real 
public sphere existed. The people inhabiting Saudi Arabia were simply not in a position to formulate 
any real opinions on Palestine, the simple reason being that they lacked channels of information. Two 
newspapers were founded in 1932 – Umm al Quara and Saut al Hejaz – but they were both closely 
monitored by the Saudi Government.172 The papers must also have had a limited circulation due to the 
high degree of illiteracy at the time.173 There was an Iraqi radio station based in Baghdad broadcasting 
regional news, but there is no indication that this reached a wide audience in Saudi Arabia. Finally, 
one of the principal sources of outside information in normal times was partly down.  The pilgrimage, 
which usually brought in huge crowds from the entire region, was severely affected in the early to mid 
1930s by the concurrent economic depression.174   
 Prior to 1936 there seems to have been no major public expressions regarding Palestine in 
Saudi Arabia. Unlike Iraq and Egypt, civic displays in support of the Palestine Arabs were in fact to 
remain virtually nonexistent throughout the decade.175 As regards official Saudi involvement in 
Palestine during the first half of the 1930s, this seems to have been an equally low-key affair.  
There was however one prominent individual who was determined to involve Ibn Saud in 
Palestine matters. From 1929 and onwards Mufti Hajj Amin al-Husseini tried time after time to 
implicate Ibn Saud in the Palestine issue.176 While the Saudi Monarch’s response was always 
sympathetic, he repeatedly declined to take up an active role in support of their cause. Perhaps the 
most interesting part about these correspondences was that Ibn Saud as early as 1932 warned the Mufti 
that they should “not give the enemies an opportunity to win and succeed.” This was indeed a caution 
to al-Husseini regarding the aspirations of other Arabs - more precisely the Amir Abdullah of 
Transjordan. It is thus apparent that the Saudi position on Palestine was from the very outset shaped by 
Hashemite and Saudi rivalry.177  
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Ibn Saud’s warning to the Mufti in 1932 was conveyed in a letter where the Monarch 
apologised for not having been able to attend the Pan-Islamic conference held in Bagdad the previous 
month. Prior to the event the British Ambassador to Iraq had the following to say about the Monarch’s 
position: “Ibn Saud, apprehensive of Hashemite influence, had now expressed disapproval of the 
whole idea.”178   
 
The Arab Rebellion  
 
Soon after the Rebellion erupted in Palestine, Ibn Saud began sending letters to the British consulate in 
Jeddah. The incentive behind this approach was yet another appeal from the Mufti calling for Ibn 
Saud’s active support.179 The initial British response - authored by the soon-to-be departing Andrew 
Ryan - was sincere and to the point. “The Arab agitation in Palestine is directed against the policy of 
his Majesty’s Government, and for Ibn Saud to declare his sympathy to it would be to declare himself 
on the side of those hostile to British policy in a country under British administration. This would be 
incompatible with his professions of friendly sentiments.”180 
Turned down by the local British representative, Ibn Saud decided to approach the Foreign 
Office directly. The Saudi Minister to London, Hafez Wahba, told the Deputy Under-Secretary, 
Lancelot Oliphant, that fellow Arabs were “upbraiding him as a coward and alleging that he was a 
British Agent for not doing something for the Arabs.”181 As shown already, the Foreign Office were 
often responsive to Ibn Saud’s demands. Convinced that that the Saudi Monarch ought to be given a 
free position on Palestine, Oliphant approached the Colonial Office for their take on the matter. 
Somewhat surprisingly the Colonial Office’s response was all enthusiastic. “If King Ibn Saud can use 
his influence to persuade the Arabs to give up the campaign of violence he will be doing a service not 
only to H[is] M[ajesty’s] G[overnment] but to the Arabs himself.” Exactly why the Colonial Office 
decided to promote this approach is not entirely clear. One likely explanation is that due to great strain 
– caused by the rapidly deteriorating conditions in Palestine – the department was prepared to embrace 
any scheme which might ease the situation. Moreover, they seem to have clung to the rather naive 
                                                     
178
 “Pan-Arab Congress Baghdad”, FO/141/768/27, 21 December 1932. 
179
 Rose, Norman Anthony “The Arab Rulers and Palestine, 1936: The British Reaction”, The Journal of Modern 
History, Vol. 44, No. 2. (1972), p. 215. 
180
 Al-Rasheed, “Saudi Arabia and the...”. 
181
 Kedourie, “Great Britain and Palestine…”, p. 97. 
43 
 
belief that they would be able to control the extent of the Arab leaders’ future involvement in 
Palestine.182  
The details of Ibn Saud’s involvement leading up to the armistice of October 1936 have been 
laid out elsewhere and will not be repeated here.183 In short, Ibn Saud exploited the opening given to 
him and soon attained an important mediating role in the Anglo-Palestinian negotiations.  In July 1936 
Hafez Wahba informed Oliphant that in order for Saud Arabia and Iraq to co-operate with Britain over 
Palestine, Jewish immigration must be stopped while awaiting the Peel Commission’s report. This, 
Wahba maintained, “could not be interpreted as a concession to mob violence.” But how could it not? 
The Colonial Office, recognising their earlier blunder, now admitted that it was “difficult to 
distinguish...between the Arabs in Palestine and the Arab Kings outside acting as mediators.”184  
After several rounds of bargaining, a settlement was reached on 12 October 1936. Not only 
was Ibn Saud a key figure in the negotiations leading up to the final agreement, he had acquired a right 
to be heard on future Palestine policies.185 But why did Ibn Saud choose to get involved in Palestine in 
1936? And what was his opinion of the Palestine Arabs?  
 
Ibn Saud, Palestine and Pan-Arabism  
 
In view of to the attention the Foreign Office was paying to the relationship between the Palestine 
question and the Arab States, it is somewhat paradoxical that Ibn Saud – the Monarch which arguably 
enjoyed the most respect in that office – does not seem to have cared much for the Palestine Arabs. 
There is probably no simple explanation for his apparent indifference. Part of the answer might lay in 
the fact that he to some extent saw the Palestine Arabs as Europeanised due to the transformation of 
Palestine into a largely agricultural society. In doing so they had renounced their Arab tribal ancestry. 
Furthermore, as they were not Wahhabis they did not fit into Ibn Saud’s image of either true Arabs or 
true Muslims.186  
Neither was Ibn Saud’s lack of sympathy for the Palestinians much of a secret at the time. 
Chaim Weizmann- at a moment of frustration – wrote to Ormsby-Gore in early 1938: “I am sure, 
however, that the Foreign Office is well aware that Ibn Sa’ud was completely disinterested in the 
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Arabs of Palestine, whom he despises...But he hates Abdullah and any addition of strength to him.”187 
The British Annual report on Saudi Arabia for 1937 stated that the Monarch quite simply regarded the 
Palestinians as inferior Arabs.188  
 Cultural and religious differences and inter-Arab rivalry also affected Saudi Arabia’s 
affiliation with the Pan-Arab movement. Ibn Saud’s religious and political beliefs were far removed 
from the Arab nationalist ideas which flourished among the intellectuals of Damascus. Indeed, Saudi 
Arabia’s social and economic make-up together with its isolation from European and Ottoman 
influences made the Kingdom into something quite dissimilar from the countries of the Fertile 
Crescent.189 They shared a common language, but not a common history, culture, reading of Islam or 
forced subservience to European powers.190 Ibn Saud was first and foremost a religious fundamentalist 
who sought to awaken an authentic form of Islam based on monotheistic Puritanism. It would thus be 
more correct to label Ibn Saud’s ambitions Pan-Islamic rather than Pan-Arab.191  
From his position in Damascus, the British consul Gilbert MacKereth described the ongoing 
changes in Arabic political thought: 
The more advanced, and possibly the most energetic, protagonists of Pan-Arabism have been ready to 
appeal for support to the “free thinkers” in England, France, Germany and Russia, and to propose a 
union of agnostic and communistic forces against Christianity; anything, in fact, to get freedom from 
the Western yoke. In this way Pan-Arabism has begun to be divorced from Pan-Islamism after but a 
brief marriage.192      
Agnosticism and communism were ideas abhorrent to a deeply religious person such as Ibn Saud. 
Moreover, they were categories imported from Europe by “progressive” Pan-Arabists. Ibn Saud’s 
Wahhabi Islam sought precisely to repudiate and exclude European influences such as these.193  
In May 1937 Reader Bullard noted that “Ibn Saud has been coming out strong as a 
fundamentalist...[H]e published a proclamation criticising on religious grounds the Saudi young men 
who want modernisation, freedom, progress, civilisation, and the like...Perhaps Ibn Saud fears that the 
freer manners of other Moslem countries such as Egypt may spread to the Hejaz by the contact of 
pilgrims with the local population.”194  The Monarch’s repeated refusals to court any Pan-Arab 
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conferences - despite numerous appeals for him to do so – also demonstrated his ambivalence towards 
the Arab nationalist movement.195   
When Ibn Saud decided to approach the British regarding Palestine in May 1936, it was - 
according to himself - because he had received appeals from Mufti al-Husseini and consequently 
needed guidance from the British Government as how to proceed.196 Considering that the Mufti had 
previously sent scores of letters requesting the Saudi ruler’s active support - none of which had met 
with much success – there must have been something more to Ibn Saud’s decision to intervene at this 
point.   
The stir created by the Rebellion in 1936 was vastly different in scale than any previous unrest 
witnessed in Palestine. Ibn Saud immediately recognised this and realised that the situation presented 
him with a set of profound challenges. But imbued in these were also opportunities which Ibn Saud 
could exploit to enhance his own position. Generally speaking, Ibn Saud sought a leading role in inter-
Arab activities. Simultaneously, he was aware that his rivals - most notably the Amir Abdullah - 
sought exactly the same thing. More than any previous event, the Rebellion in Palestine offered a 
window for the various Arab leaders to engage in such activities and thereby increase their own 
prestige. Thus, when Britain not only allowed for Saudi involvement, but actively encouraged it, there 
was nothing to keep Ibn Saud from adopting a leading role in the negotiations over Palestine. From 
being a potential threat to the Monarch’s regional standing Britain’s preferred approach in Palestine 
made for a situation where Ibn Saud could draw several benefits. By taking part in the common appeal 
put forth by the Arab Kings in October 1936 he was able to secure British good-will and also to 
enhance his status as an influential Arab Monarch.197  
 
The release of the Peel plan 
 
Ibn Saud’s initial reaction to Lord Peel’s recommendations was quite restrained. Perhaps equally 
significant: it was not made public but conveyed directly to British officials. The issues raised by Ibn 
Saud during this meeting regarding the proposed partition are also telling because they give an 
indication of the Saudi ruler’s main priorities. 
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The British Minister to Saudi Arabia, Sir Reader Bullard, was the first official to meet Ibn 
Saud following the release of the Peel report. He reported after his conversation with the Monarch that 
he “seems increasingly to regard his security as bound up with ours.” The King’s principal objections, 
it seems, were concerned with the incorporation of the proposed Arab area into the Transjordanian 
state. “he considers liberation of Abdullah from mandate as dangerous to his interests”198 In a second 
meeting between the two, held just four days later, Ibn Saud further elaborated his position. The King 
realised that his own interests would be “affected very unfavourably by prospective renunciation of 
British mandate over Transjordan.” Ibn Saud apparently considered the current form of government to 
benefit his position: “So long as mandated lasted...he knew Abdullah’s intrigues would be held in 
check.”199  
There is thus clear evidence that Ibn Saud was opposed to the Peel Plan’s recommendations 
from the outset. Still, it is important to record on what grounds he initially based this opposition. 
Despite the fact that the proposed partition was reviled by most Palestine Arabs – and that it would 
involve the enforced transfer of some 225.000 people from that population – no expression of 
sympathy or consideration was conveyed by the Monarch at this stage.   
Had Ibn Saud’s concerns been restricted to those relating to his arch rival Abdullah, it is likely 
that he would have abstained from publically condemning the partition proposal, especially if the 
British had sat down with the Monarch to negotiate some sort of compensation or reward for his 
neutrality.200 However, other developments prevented this course of action.  
While the Saudi King was not set on destroying his long standing relationship with the British, 
he wished also to maintain and even strengthen his position as the most prominent of the Arab Kings, 
a role which he had buttressed so successfully the previous year. Consequently, it can be argued that it 
was mainly the fierce, largely uncontested attack from the Iraqi Government under Hikmat Sulayman 
which forced Ibn Saud to come out more openly against partition. Because of his hegemonic ambitions 
he could simply not afford to leave it to the other Arab leaders to direct criticism of the partition plan. 
Nor could he hold back on the religious and political rhetoric which dominated their appeals. Hafiz 
Wahba explained the situation to Lacy Baggalay of the Foreign Office: “It was true that the people at 
large knew that he [Ibn Saud] was opposed to the plan of partition, but they could not understand why 
he did not make his views public in the same way that the Iraqi Government had done.”201 It is with 
this in mind one must evaluate Ibn Saud’s further actions in the struggle over partition.  
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Hikmat Sulayman had temporarily postponed his demise in Iraq by publically denouncing the 
Partition Plan. Unlike Sulayman, however, Ibn Saud was currently under no such threat. But that did 
not stop him from applying much of the same strategy as the Iraqi Premier.  
How could Ibn Saud come out against official British policy and still remain on good terms 
with the British Government?  To escape from this muddle Ibn Saud would make use of the internal 
Saudi opposition, an opposition which supposedly represented a serious threat to his regime. 
Throughout the winter of 1937 and the first half of 1938 the King conveyed repeatedly to the British 
that he would be powerless in restraining the Saudi tribes should the Ulema publish a fatwa declaring 
jihad against partition.202 While evidence suggests that there were elements within the Saudi Kingdom 
set on forcing Ibn Saud to oppose British Palestine policy, it is far less plausible that he would not be 
able to contain this should he wish to do so.203 
On 18 September 1937 Hafiz Wahba transmitted to the Foreign Office a report in which he 
informed of the dangers posed to Ibn Saud by the Ulema:  
if disturbances should break out afresh in Palestine as a result of partition being forcibly carried out 
against the wishes of the people...His Majesty might find his subjects, the members of the tribes on the 
frontiers, participating in the disturbances in support of the Arabs of Palestine against the Jews...If his 
Majesty attempted to stop them...he would undoubtedly be accused of treason to the cause of the Arabs 
and the cause of Islam, and would consequently lose his position among his people, as well as among 
the rest of the Arabs and Muslims.204  
This line of argument was to dominate the appeals Ibn Saud put before the British in order for them to 
scrap the partition proposal. It was a version fully accepted by the London office as well as by the 
local representative, Reader Bullard. It was their opinion that Ibn Saud was at all times doing what he 
could to satisfy British interests, but that there was nonetheless limits to what he could endure before 
the powerful Ulemas would turn against him. Bullard made the following observation in February 
1938:  
if a serious revolt broke out in Transjordan, it would attract the spontaneous participation of the Saudi 
tribes on the border, and when once the movement had begun Ibn Saud would have to allow it to 
continue or perhaps even to take part in it...There is no doubt that at present Ibn Saud does not want 
anything of the sort to happen. If he had not been really attached to the view which he has professed on 
several occasions during the last eighteen months...that his interests and those of His Majesty’s 
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Government are identical, he would hardly have acted as he has done in regard to Palestine. The 
important question is how far he will continue to adhere to that view if there is no radical change in the 
Palestine policy of His Majesty’s Government. I have recently recorded my opinion that he continues to 
support His Majesty’s Government as far as he can because he cannot believe that in the long run they 
will carry out a policy grossly unjust (from his point of view) to the Arabs, and that his strong 
professions of friendship  must not be regarded as a blank cheque.205 
This account was not merely along the lines of what Ibn Saud and his representatives were serving 
British officials, it was in fact a direct echo of that version. Unsurprisingly, perhaps, there were voices 
within the British establishment which were not equally convinced by this line of reasoning. The 
aforementioned War Office report - circulated in the same month as Bullard’s analysis - generally 
concurred with the Eastern Department that Ibn Saud’s fears of unrest following partition were 
genuine: 
He fears Jewish political and economic expansion...religious and worldly interests combine to induce 
him to oppose the execution of the [Peel] report...the fact that he has recently done more in two months 
to reorganise and strengthen his frontier defences than in the past seven years shows that his warnings to 
H.M. Government are genuine and that he is alarmed at what may be the outcome of enforced partition. 
However, on the matter of how the Saudi Monarch would react should British policy on Palestine 
continue to displease him, the two versions diverged. On this question Major Hawthorn contradicted 
the alarming version put forward by the Eastern department: 
We have...good grounds for believing that Ibn Saud regards British friendship and support as a cardinal 
point in his foreign policy, and that his fear of Italy’s aims will keep him aligned with Great Britain in 
spite of his genuine distress over the Palestine question. We also know that he disapproves of the efforts 
being made by certain Arab nationalist leaders to embarrass Great Britain and to intrigue with Italy. He 
also regards most Arab leaders as self seekers rather than genuine Arab patriots. Apart from this, he is 
instinctively jealous of any attempt to ascribe to any individual or country the leadership of the Arabic 
speaking world...We may therefore conclude that it would be with the greatest reluctance that Ibn Saud 
would join in any move directed against H. M. Government.206 
A somewhat similar point of view was put forward by the Chargé d’Affaires at Jeddah, Alan Trott. His 
approach to the issue, compared to that of Hawthorn, was slightly more pragmatic. He seemed less 
concerned whether Ibn Saud would accept partition or not. Nor did Trott believe that Britain should 
automatically rule out enforced partition even if it was likely to cause a major insurrection inside the 
Saudi Kingdom.    
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If partition is enforced without consent of majority of local Arab population, present tendencies will be 
greatly accentuated and Pan-Arab feeling will grow. The Ulemas will probably issue their call for a 
Jihad: in that case anti-British feeling would certainly be inflamed and might become very severe. The 
King’s dilemma would be made still more difficult and though he would continue to endeavour to 
control his tribes he might find himself obliged to lead them or fall himself. British aeroplanes in the 
Amman would deter raiders but the King who has made no secret of his dislike for partition would bear 
us a grudge.207 
Trott’s contribution to the debate was considered anathema by the Eastern Department. “If we 
continue our Palestine policy, Ibn Saud will do much more than merely “bear us a grudge.” More 
importantly, though, Trott’s logic broke completely with the framework in which the Eastern 
Department operated. His thinking went something like this: if we assume the absolute worst case 
scenario - in this case Saudi tribes and paramilitary groups entering Transjordan and possibly Palestine 
- would this be an insuperable task for the British forces to deal with? Furthermore, if partition would 
gradually relieve the grave situation the British were currently facing in Palestine, should she not be 
prepared to pay a fairly a tall price to carry through that policy? While the Colonial Office generally 
cast doubt over the Eastern Department’s “worst case scenario” predictions, Trott was asking - from a 
strictly British point of view - if these same scenarios really were sufficiently bad.  
 
Ibn Saud as an Arabist icon 
 
Trott’s realist approach also helps to illuminate a certain “romantic” aspect of the Eastern 
Department’s thinking. This aspect was especially apparent in their dealings with the Saudi Monarch 
who, for a number of peculiar reasons, had come to hold a unique position in that department.  
Alan Trott, like Gilbert MacKereth in Damascus, frequently questioned the sincerity of the 
Pan-Arab idea as well as the methods used to spread it. “A strong though vague feeling of solidarity 
for Arabs of Palestine has however recently grown up as a result of religious propaganda initiated 
from abroad.” This reading of events was promptly rebuffed by London: “it is inaccurate and 
misleading to speak of Saudi feelings on this question having grown up as the result of religious 
propaganda “initiated from abroad”. The opposition in Saudi Arabia to our Palestine policy is not due 
to foreign instigation, but is spontaneous and deep-seated.”  In January 1938 William Ormsby-Gore 
managed to generate a similar response: “I think we ought to go as far as we can to secure if necessary 
to buy – the friendship of Ibn Saud, either financially or by territorial concessions. He is the only Arab 
leader for whom I have any respect.” George Rendel was appalled by such an idea suggestion:  
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I submit that it is a grave misconception to speak of “buying Ibn Saud’s friendship”. Ibn Saud is not to 
be bought. His strength lies in the consistency of his principles and support and respect of his people. It 
would neither accord with his character, nor serve his own interest, to sell what he regards as the birth-
right of his race for a mess of potage.208 
What qualities did Ibn Saud possess to warrant such praise? Both George Rendel and Reader Bullard 
both seem to fit into the mould dubbed by one scholar as “sentimental pro-Arabs”.209 In contrast to the 
anti-establishment groups which in the last decades have made up much of the anti-Zionist movement, 
these officials were very much members of the establishment. Consequently, there was never any 
doubt that their pro-Arab persuasion was motivated by national interests as they were convinced –
correctly or not - that British imperial and strategic requirements necessitated friendly ties with the 
Arab world. Nonetheless, there was definitely a romantic element in their outlook. Most of them - 
Rendel and Bullard included - had come into contact with the Arabs through work in the region where 
they had become deeply fascinated by the Arab way of life. But their sympathy towards the Arab was 
largely born out of a romantic infatuation with one type of Arab, the Bedouin. This stereotype had 
limited relevance in the contemporary Middle East. What it did, however, was to offer these officials a 
glimpse into an earlier, more glorious period. Arguably, the attraction of this lost past was also 
enhanced by the fact that it defied the modernization that was happening all around them.210 
Observations made by George Rendel in his autobiography seem to support this impression. What is 
more, he seems to have regarded the Zionists’ progress in Palestine as artificial, possibly as a 
manifestation of an increased outside influence in the region. On a visit to Palestine in 1937 Rendel 
recorded the following: 
The new Jewish colonies, however, had greatly multiplied since our previous visit in 1932, and the 
countryside was beginning to take on a rather brash modern look...stout young women from Central 
Europe in exiguous tight shorts, made an odd contrast to the then still more numerous native Arabs, 
glaring suspiciously at these strange invaders.211   
In his memoirs Rendel refers to the prominent British Arabist Gerard De Gaury and his account, 
Arabia Phœnix. On one level the book is a travel account of an official visit to Ibn Saud in 1935 made 
by the author along with Sir Andrew Ryan - then British Ambassador to Saudi Arabia. On another 
level, the book is very much a chronicle of contemporary, British Arabist thinking. The foreword 
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written by the influential Frey Stark - referred to by Rendel as “our mutual friend” – is especially 
enlightening as to their outlook on the Bedouin: 212  
And here lies the charm of Arab travel. We visit something that has vanished from our West long ago, 
and in the East can linger but a short while longer. It is this unconscious background of catastrophe 
which lures us to the Bedouin of the desert rather than to the modern effendi who lives in towns like 
ours and shares our future, whose transitory nature is as yet unapparent.213 
As for de Gaury himself, his fascination with Ibn Saud seems to have been absolute:  
Sometimes in England one hears it asked in which other age one would have liked to have lived...None 
of us had ever thought it possible to combine the two worlds as Ibn Saud had done – to follow the law 
and life of the seventh century while using the amenities of the twentieth.214  
British historian John Marlowe seems to perfectly capture the unique standing of the Saudi Monarch:  
This bearded Bedu figure, with his flowing robes, his classical Arabic speech and his traditional Arab 
ways...in contrast to the cosmopolitan appearance and manners of nearly all the other Arab sovereigns 
and statesmen, was, both for the Arabs themselves and for the Western statesmen who dealt with him, a 
perpetual reminder of the common origin from which Arab nationalism derived both its inspiration and 
its justification.215 
Finally there is Rendel’s own portrayal of the King: 
The most striking characteristic of King Ibn Saud was his commanding personality...in any group or 
company by which he might be surrounded he appeared at once the outstanding figure...The large scale 
of his mind and outlook seemed to correspond to his to his physical appearance...It is perhaps dangerous 
to attribute complete sincerity to anyone where international politics are concerned...But broadly 
speaking it would have been difficult to imagine any Eastern ruler with whom it would have been more 
satisfactory to deal.216 
These comments were made in connection with Rendel’s official visit to Ibn Saud in March 1937. It 
has in fact been proposed elsewhere that the unique position which Ibn Saud enjoyed in the Foreign 
Office by late 1937 was to some extent a result of this very visit.217 The reports Rendel submitted to 
the Foreign Office following his stay at Jeddah certainly serve to support this interpretation. Rendel 
reported, after several conversations with Ibn Saud, that he felt justified ”in expressing the opinion that 
the course of our future relations with King Ibn Saud will depend almost entirely on the nature of the 
report of the Royal Commission and of the decisions which His Majesty’s Government take thereon.” 
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It is clear from Rendel’s memoranda that Ibn Saud was indeed alarmed over the possible conclusions 
of the Peel Commission. Should the recommendations favour the Zionist course, he would be unable 
not “to support the Palestine Arabs in the new revolt which will inevitably break out.” Rendel, 
however, “would go further”. It was his “considered opinion” that “if His Majesty’s Government are 
unable to give the Arabs of Palestine some guarantee that they will not – as must happen if our present 
policy is continued – ultimately become a small minority in a Jewish State, Ibn Saud will be forced to 
change his whole policy towards us and may well become a dangerous enemy.” Rendel was thus 
drawing up alarming conclusions about the repercussions of partition several months before the Peel 
Commission were to publish its findings. Even more troubling was the fact that these conclusions 
seems not to have been founded on statements made by Ibn Saud, but were essentially Rendel’s own.  
 
Ibn Saud’s regional claims 
 
Less than two months after the Peel Commission had put forth its report, Ibn Saud decided it was time 
to reopen another delicate affair, the Aqaba -Maan issue.218  
Aqaba and Maan had been under Hashemite control since it had been captured during the 
Great Arab Revolt in 1917. After nearly a year of fighting it became apparent by spring 1925 that Ali 
bin Husein would be unable to fend of Ibn Saud’s offensive, and that the Hejaz would soon be under 
his control. The prospect of Aqaba and Maan befalling Ibn Saud caused serious concern in London. 
The Foreign Office, by now seeking a conciliatory line towards the new regime, argued that Aqaba 
belonged to the Hejaz and thus proposed ceding it to Ibn Saud. The Colonial Office – at the time 
presided over by the ardent imperialist Leopold Amery – adopted a different position. Amery was not 
really concerned about whether Aqaba formally belonged to the Hejaz or not. To him it was only a 
“lent” anyway.219  
Amery, supported by the armed forces got it his way. It was decided that Aqaba-Maan should 
not “accompany” the Hejaz but instead be incorporated into Transjordan. To lessen the blow for Ibn 
Saud it was decided than Hussein bin Ali, who was currently seeking refuge in Aqaba, should be sent 
into exile. Ibn Saud reluctantly accepted the decision. It was no secret, however, that he did not 
consider this to be absolute. Consequently, the issue was discussed on numerous occasions with 
British officials throughout the 1930s. 
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When the partition proposal was laid out in July 1937 Ibn Saud was quick to recognize its 
wider implications. Transjordan’s merger with the Arab part of Palestine would involve the 
termination of the current mandate. The Monarch thus surmised that this would give him the 
justification to renew his claim on Aqaba-Maan. There was obviously also a fair degree of bargaining 
involved. Bullard wrote: “If Abdullah is to be independent Ibn Saud wants two towns [Aqaba and 
Maan] and a corridor...to Syria.”220   
What is remarkable about this affair is not so much Ibn Saud’s request: the Monarch saw in 
partition an opportunity to attain something which he had coveted for a long time and rather 
predictably pursued this opening. No, the astonishing feature is how the British responded. In 1925 
Aqaba-Maan had been transferred to Transjordan because of its great importance. Ever since, Ibn 
Saud’s cautious inquiries had been rebuffed on exactly the same grounds. Now the Foreign Office, on 
advice from Reader Bullard, was prepared to do a volte face. Bullard maintained that the transfer of 
Aqaba-Maan area to Ibn Saud would prevent him from actively supporting the insurrection in 
Palestine. Once again then, the overall motive was appeasement, the beneficiary once more Ibn Saud. 
What Bullard failed to grasp was that Saudi Arabia – with the addition of Aqaba – would have been 
given a stranglehold on the proposed Arab state. This was arguably not a good starting point for any 
nation considering Ibn Saud’s earlier ventures. The military planners, however, did not buy into the 
Foreign Office reversal. The proposal to relinquish Aqaba-Maan went before the combined Chiefs of 
Staff on 15 November 1937. The Committee rejected the idea on wider strategic grounds: Italy’s 
enhanced position in the Red Sea demanded the retention of Aqaba under British mandate.221   
 
The Italian factor  
 
For Ibn Saud one of the more alarming experiences in the years 1935-36 had been to witness Britain’s 
passive response following Italy’s aggression in Abyssinia. Apparently, the King had been under the 
impression that Britain with her superior fleet would never allow Italy to get away with it.222 In June 
1936 Andrew Ryan transmitted a detailed assessment of Anglo-Saudi relations in the wake of the 
Italian-Abyssinian war. 
Obsessed for many years with Italy he [Ibn Saud] fears that they will turn on the Arab peninsula. As a 
Moslem ruler still engaged in consolidating his position in Arabia, and jealous of his newly won 
independence, he has no genuine love for Britain, a power which blocks his way in various directions, 
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but he has much less to fear from British policy on this side than he thinks he has from Italy...He 
probably still believes a breach with them [Britain] would be fatal to him, and hopes against hope that 
they will see him through in the event of a breach between him and any other European power. He dare 
not offend Italy. He dare not go against Britain.223    
Ryan’s analysis was in fact first-rate. He had outlined the key components in Ibn Saudi’s position 
towards Italy: fear and distrust. These factors were not to change much during the subsequent years, 
but the British evaluation of them was. 
In early November 1937 George Rendel wrote a lengthy memorandum on Ibn Saud’s attitude 
towards Britain. Especially interesting is the section devoted to the Saudi ruler’s position regarding the 
Italian threat. Rendel acknowledged that Reader Bullard, “with his great experience and knowledge, 
does not consider that Ibn Saud will come in actively and openly against us over Palestine unless there 
was a European war.” While he hoped Bullard was right and hesitated “to suggest a more extreme 
possibility”, he nevertheless stressed for the need to at least “allow for an even more disquieting 
possibility”: 
Ibn Saud has had good reason to be friendly with us up until now, but it seems to me quite possible that 
he may now be beginning to question the value of that friendship if, in his view, it means the 
establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine likely rapidly to spread its influence and control over all the 
neighbouring countries. May it not be, then, that Ibn Saud is in fact beginning to toy with the idea of 
turning elsewhere for the help he needs? May he not feel that, if he were to accept Italian assistance – in 
spite of his dislike of the Italians and their methods – he might still be able to free himself from Italian 
control once he had made use of Italian help, and that it would be better to accept the very real 
advantages which the Italians can offer him, than to continue for the sake of a friendship which has 
brought him comparatively little direct material advantage, to keep his hands tied in what is now, to the 
Arabs, the dominating question of the day. 224 
This assessment was written by Rendel under the belief that the question of partition would resurface 
in Cabinet before long. Rendel thus presented the paper to Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden in order to 
provide him additional ammunition in the anticipated exchange with the Colonial Secretary. In other 
words, this was an important statement. Possessing no actual evidence that Ibn Saud was in fact 
courting Italy - or for that matter considering doing so - Rendel still made an effort to substantiate his 
claims. While he believed Ibn Saud “to be more sincere and straightforward than the great majority of 
Eastern rulers...it would be mere ordinary prudence to continue to maintain the façade of friendship 
with us until he was obliged to come into the open as our enemy.”225  
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 In a peculiar turn of events the Italian factor would eventually undermine Saudi-Anglo 
relations, albeit only temporarily. In April 1938 an Anglo-Italian agreement was made public, 
something which apparently came as a shock to Ibn Saud. Up until this point he had relied on the 
hostility between the two powers to maintain his own standing. Now those same adversaries pledged 
themselves “not to acquire a privileged position of a political character in Saudi Arabia and the 
Yemen.”226 Ibn Saud took the agreement as a personal insult and refused to acknowledge it. His 
apprehension over its content would persist well into 1939.227  
The great irony of the affair was that the British official assigned to lead the negotiations in 
Rome was none other than George Rendel.  Rendel himself - having spent the previous year placating 
the Monarch - refused to concede that the final agreement was compromising for Ibn Saud. The King 
did certainly not agree to such assessment. Nor did all the officials within the Eastern Department.228  
The Anglo-Italian Agreement was a part of Britain’s appeasement policy in Europe. Their 
gradual retreat from a partitioning Palestine was also motivated by similar logic, but this time 
involving the pacification of the Arab rulers. The problem was that in this instance the two “parallel” 
policies collided at the expense of Saudi Arabia. This possibility, remember, had been vented by 
British officials four years earlier. Fortunately for Ibn Saud the Italians made no attempts to adhere to 
the agreement, leaving it more or less worthless. Having come on top of the Peel Plan the Anglo-
Italian Agreement was nonetheless important as it further weakened Ibn Saud’s trust in the British. 
This seems to have taught him two lessons: he would have to reduce his dependency on Great Britain: 
this could best be done by bringing in Germany to provide aid and a balance against Italian and British 
pressure.229  
 
German approaches 
 
In contrast to the British Foreign Office, their German counterpart, the Austwärtiges Amt, seemed to 
have regarded the Arab world as largely divided over the issue of partition. They believed the decisive 
political circles in the Arab countries would to their utmost to avoid a serious conflict with Great 
Britain - in spite of the aversion felt towards to the emergence of a Jewish state. This viewpoint 
dominated German thinking in the months following the release of the Peel Plan and prevented the 
Germans from exploiting the situation during this time.230 Despite numerous Arab requests for 
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material assistance for the Arab revolt in Palestine, Germany would continue to reject these due to the 
Government’s desire to keep out of the conflict. This policy was upheld through the first half of 1938 
with the growing suspicion that partition would in fact be discarded. 231 This is the background from 
which one must evaluate German reactions to Saudi approaches in this same period. 
 In November 1937 Shaykh Yusuf Yasin, Ibn Saud’s private secretary, approached 
representatives of the Otto Wolff company to enquire if they would be able to supply the King with 
15.000 rifles.232 Ibn Saud had for quite some time been dissatisfied with the quality and quantity of 
arms supplied by Britain. It is not clear whether Ibn Saud considered weapons from Germany to be 
more easily achievable following the release of the partition plan, but that may very well have been the 
case.  
It was not the Foreign Office which had prevented the sale of British arms to Saudi Arabia but 
the War Office and the Treasury.233 Considering the lengths which the Foreign Office was generally 
prepared to go in order to placate the Saudi Monarch, it is surprising that they were unable to convince 
the two departments to comply with this request. One likely answer is that the Foreign Office misread 
Ibn Saud’s list of priorities and consequently failed to appreciate just how important Ibn Saud 
considered the supply of arms. Much more important, it seems, than the far more publicised Palestine 
issue.   
 Because Germany wanted to avoid any confrontation with Britain at this point, they treated 
Yusuf Yasin’s appeal with great caution. After some deliberation the request was eventually turned 
down. German diplomat, Franz Grobba, told Yasin that Germany wished to remain on friendly terms 
with Britain and was therefore unable to supply the rifles.234 Further approaches were made by Saudi 
officials throughout 1938. The outcome was always more or less the same: A polite German rebuff. 
Germany did not wish to anger Britain unnecessarily and it did not want to furnish arms to a sovereign 
they might very well be at war with before long.235  
 Generally speaking, the Germans seem to have carried a deep mistrust towards Ibn Saud. 
Despite repeated promises by Saudi officials of their country’s neutrality in the event of war, the 
Germans remained unconvinced. Berlin also raised the possibility that Ibn Saud desired closer 
relations with Germany so that he could play the British and the Italians off against each other.236 This 
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seems to have been an excellent reading of the situation. Interesting to note is that the Germans even 
believed the Monarch’s opposition to the formation of a Jewish state in Palestine to be insincere.237  
  The breakthrough in Saudi-German relations came in the early summer of 1939. Franz 
Grobba had finally managed to convince his superiors in Berlin that Ibn Saud’s overtures were sincere. 
This change in official attitude was obviously also a result of Germany’s lessened concerns regarding 
the British position - seeing that war with Britain would most likely ensue anyhow following the 
planned invasion of Poland.238 
 In July1939 Ibn Saud’s pro-German envoy, Khaled al-Qarqani, met Ribbentrop and Hitler in 
Berlin. For the first time all Saudi demands were met. Al-Qarqani was promised 8000 rifles, 8 million 
rounds of ammunition, and a credit of six million German Marks. The deal never materialized 
however. Before the arms could be shipped, Germany had invaded Poland. Britain’s declaration of 
war and her subsequent imposition of a naval blockade made delivery impossible.239   
 When Britain declared war on Germany Ibn Saud all but suspended his newly-formed 
relations with Germany. Throughout the war the Monarch maintained a policy of benevolent neutrality 
towards the Allies.240 A closer look at Ibn Saud’s political manoeuvring in the first half of 1939, 
however, reveals a highly proficient politician, largely uninhibited by his alleged bonds to Britain.  
  Britain did not believe Ibn Saud’s policy was one of playing them off Germany and vice 
versa.241 The sources reveal nonetheless that was exactly what the Monarch was doing. In secret 
meetings with Grobba in February 1939 the King spoke about their common “deadly enemy”, the 
Jews. The question was, according to Ibn Saud, “a matter of survival” to both nations.242 Grobba’s 
reports on his talks with the King seem to suggest that he was beginning to trust Ibn Saud no less than 
his British opposites. “He feels himself to be encircled and oppressed by England ...he assumes a 
friendly attitude towards the British, but in the depths of his heart he hates them and complies with 
their desires only reluctantly.”243 This did not tally well with the version Ibn Saud was feeding the 
British. In October 1937, during a meeting with the retired Political Agent, Colonel Harold Dickson, 
he described Germany as a ravenous wolf “flirting with me at the present moment, but I know they 
will wish to devour me later.”244 During 1938 he repeatedly stressed in meetings with Reader Bullard 
that his interests and those of the British were identical. Obviously unaware of the nature of Ibn Saud’s 
previous meetings with Grobba, Reader Bullard wrote on 24 October 1939: 
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I found the King not at all inclined to sit on the fence, waiting to see how the war in Europe would go, 
but outspoken in his sympathy for the Allies...We need have no fear that Ibn Saud may become a centre 
for anti-British intrigue during the war...Ibn Saud showed no sign of wanting anything from His 
Majesty’s Government. He is not of the blackmailing type, and he would probably admit that the defeat 
of Germany, whom he regards as a danger to Islam and to the East generally, will be a reward in itself 
for his benevolent neutrality. When talking about the course of the war ...Ibn Saud said with feeling: 
“When I heard that[a] battleship of yours had been sunk I felt as though one of my sons had been 
drowned.” It would be possible to belittle this statement as diplomatic exaggeration, or perhaps as the 
remark of a man to whom a son more or less makes little difference, but I am sure that the utterance was 
genuine.245          
It seems that Ibn Saud was no more “friend” of Britain than he was of Germany. However, he appears 
to have been convinced that in the long run his interests were best served by remaining within the 
British orbit. Consequently, the Monarch’s German overtures should be regarded as political 
manoeuvring - aimed primarily at obtaining arms and securing satisfactory relations - rather than a 
contemplated attempt at forming an alliance. 246   
Ibn Saud’s decision to adopt a benevolent neutrality towards Britain demonstrates excellent 
judgement. Indeed, one historian has argued that the King’s understanding of the power of balance in 
the Middle East was far greater than any other Arab leader. In comparison, Iraq’s decision to court 
Germany resulted in a 6 years of British occupation. The Mufti’s decision to side with the Axis was 
possibly just as unfortunate as it contributed to the dispossession of the Palestine Arabs in the post-war 
years.247 Ibn Saud for his part seems to have taken into consideration Germany’s weak position in the 
Middle East. From this he appears to have deduced that her ambitions in the region were at present 
limited - something which made a German intervention far less likely.248   
 
Conclusion 
 
While Partition was not officially abandoned until the release of the Woodhead report in November 
1938, the Cabinet decision of 8 December 1937 to suspend partition until the new commission had re-
examined the issue was arguably the most decisive moment. As it turned out, fear of Italian advances 
in Saudi Arabia was the first issue referred to by the Prime Minister during the Cabinet meeting: 
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He [Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain] was conscious of the dangers which had presented themselves 
to the mind of the Foreign Secretary lest our policy in Palestine should present Italy with a further 
opportunity to make mischief by means of propaganda...This applied particularly in the case of Ibn 
Saud, whose attitude had been perfectly sound and straightforward. He did not wish that Ibn Saud 
should form a lower opinion of us than in the past.249    
Looking at Chamberlain’s comments regarding the importance of Ibn Saud it is impossible not to 
conclude that the Eastern Department had been able to pass upwards their way of thinking. Palestine 
was by this point largely a Pan-Arab issue and few within the system of government seem to have 
questioned this development.  
It is not known at what time Ibn Saud realised that partition would not been carried through. 
What is certain is that it happened well before the release of the Woodhead report. According to the 
Colonial Office their colleagues in the Foreign Office was very much to blame for this. On 19 March 
1938 First Secretary at the Colonial Office, Harold Downie, made following assessment:  
It is deplorable that the Foreign Office and our representative [Reader Bullard] in Saudi Arabia should 
have encouraged or allowed Ibn Saud to obtain an entirely false impression of H.M.G’s Palestine 
policy...It is clear...that Ibn Saud has been left with the impression that H.M.G. are not committed even 
in principle to Partition, and that the new Commission will hear evidence at large, not so much with 
regard to possible schemes of Partition, but with regard to alternative policies.250 
Contrary to what the Foreign Office had been saying, however, this realisation on the King’s part did 
little to change his general conduct. The officials seem not to have realised that it was useless to 
satisfy Ibn Saud by concessions over Palestine alone when his main grievances against Britain 
concerned lack of military and financial security, and with their refusal to concede to his territorial 
claims.251  
Despite his overtures towards Germany Ibn Saud made no anti-British before the war. Both 
Alan Trott and Colonel Harold Dickson had after individual meetings with the King predicted that he 
would indeed refrain from such action. The Eastern Department, with the support of Reader Bullard, 
had disagreed with their assessment. They maintained persistently that there was not sufficient 
evidence to draw such conclusions.252 Bullard, once war had erupted and Ibn Saud had adopted a 
correct attitude, praised the Monarch’s unwavering support and seems to have forgotten all about the 
gloomy reports he had written only a year earlier on the repercussions of a partition in Palestine. This 
seems to suggest that Bullard – like Rendel - was personally opposed to the partition proposal and was 
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only too happy to transmit the dire Saudi warnings with little if any unwillingness – even though he 
might have considered them to be somewhat exaggerated.  
It is argued here that had the Saudi Monarch decided to ally himself with Germany it would 
not have been because of the Palestine issue, but because of what he considered Britain’s neglect of 
Saudi security. Because of their own, inflated view of the Palestine matter the Foreign Office failed to 
separate the issues which were imperative for the Monarch from those which were at best secondary. 
Their failure to grasp Ibn Saud’s apprehension over the Anglo-Italian agreement is very much a 
confirmation of this predisposition. Equally telling was their ill-informed decision not to provide the 
quantity and quality of arms requested by Ibn Saud. There can be little doubt as to the Foreign Office 
will to appease Ibn Saud. It seems, nonetheless, that they chose to do so over an issue which was not 
decisive to the Monarch’s own security, thus leaving their policy largely ineffective. 
 Another question to consider is whether appeasing Ibn Saud, over any issue, really was a 
sound strategy. A different school of British Arabists had long cautioned against such an approach. 
According to them concessions and appeasement were regarded by a “predatory race” like the Arabs 
as a sign of weakness. In 1931, while serving as Intelligence Officer in the Arab Legion, John Bagot 
Glubb made the following evaluation of British dealings with Saudi Arabia: 
There is no use imagining that we are dealing with a civilised government, apprehensive of public 
opinion, or restrained by moral considerations. We are dealing with a greedy, savage, and predatory 
people who regard war and rapine as the natural occupation of man...,who have learnt sufficient from us 
to know that we can be put off by specious talk of friendship while they simultaneously rob, abuse, 
insult, and despise us, and who will stop at no treachery...Bin Saud, for some inexplicable reason, we 
insist on treating like the USA.253  
This assessment is somewhat belittled due to the obvious racial prejudice of the author. What is 
apparent, nonetheless, is that Glubb managed to grasp something of the Arab consciousness which 
eluded the officials in the Eastern Department years later. Despite the attention which he received and 
the heap of praise awarded him it, is obvious that the likes of Rendel and Bullard were unable to fully 
understand the Saudi Monarch. One historian maintains that the British failed to “attribute Ibn Saud’s 
“friendship” to a realpolitik rooted in fear and suspicion.”254 Weizmann seems to have reached much 
the same conclusion when he in 1937 wrote: “as an astute politician he [Ibn Saud] chooses his time for 
the exercise of gentle pressure on the Foreign Office and he unfortunately finds a sympathetic ear in 
some Foreign Office circles.”255   
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On no issue, perhaps, were the British as credulous as over Palestine. Despite Ibn Saud’s 
obvious ambiguity towards the Palestine Arabs, the sincerity of his pleas on their behalf was rarely 
questioned by British officials. Quite the opposite, his recurring “bouts of despair” were frequently 
alluded to. The following is taken from one of Reader Bullard’s memos, addressed to none other than 
Anthony Eden:  
For four months he [Ibn Saud] had not listened to the Jerusalem wireless: he had the news taken down 
and brought to him, but to listen with his own ears to the accounts of what was going on in Palestine 
was more than he could bear...he had decided, however, that he would listen to the inauguration of the 
Arabic broadcasts from London...What were his feelings when he heard the announcement that an Arab 
had been executed in Palestine! He felt as though the rope were round his own neck and could not 
refrain from tears, and the Arabs with him wept too...256 
Bear in mind that this was a man not easily put off by violence. An acquaintance of Ibn Saud, the 
British Orientalist Courtenay Armstrong, once remarked about the Monarch: “Ibn Saud would never 
curse anyone. He might slap a man in the face, or cut off his hands, but he would not curse him.”257 
During Ibn Saud’s campaigns in the 1920s execution by decapitation had been commonplace.258  
In view of Ibn Saud’s initial response to the partition proposal – one which focused solely on 
the gains of his rival Amir Abdullah – Reader Bullard’s wholehearted approval of the Monarch’s 
apparent grief seems somewhat odd.  The tendency to accept Ibn Saud’s explanations outright was 
very much the same in the Foreign Office. In the numerous pages devoted to Ibn Saud from late 1937 
and onwards, little space was awarded to the King’s personal ambitions in the region and how these 
might affect his political behaviour over Palestine. In contrast, the immense emotional strain placed on 
the Monarch because of the injustices in Palestine was referred to frequently. Their conduct must be 
ascribed in part to their overall goal, namely that of discarding the partition proposal. In the case of 
Saudi Arabia especially, it is nonetheless impossible to ignore the Ibn Saud factor. Indeed, the Eastern 
Department’s persistent desires to placate the Monarch resulted in some dubious reasoning. Fully 
aware of the problems caused by the Iraq denunciation of partition in July, Rendel saw no reason why 
Britain should advise against a similar outburst from Ibn Saud. Quite the contrary: 
I submit that we should give King Ibn Saud some sort of assurance to the effect that we will not take it 
ill if he makes known his views publicly...it would be asking too much of him, considering how loyal he 
has been in so many ways, to press him to keep his views to himself any longer. I...will entirely 
understand any action which he may feel compelled to take in order to protect his own position in the 
way of making known to the Arab world the fact that he disapproves of the plan of partition.259 
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Iraq 
 
It must be remembered...that our position in Iraq is by no means too secure, and that Governments in 
that country have of late not been noted for their stability. Arab and Moslem feeling runs high...Were 
public opinion and religious fanaticism to be inflamed by some event or incident in Palestine, such as a 
serious encounter with an Arab band of Iraqi origin, or some serious clash with British forces in the 
process of the establishment of the Jewish State and the eventual eviction of its Arab inhabitants, the 
danger cannot be excluded of a wide movement against us.260 
If responsible leaders now controlling the situation are actually faced with enforced partition, these 
influences will no longer count, and leaders will almost certainly yield to despair and will not only 
cease restraint, but will actively encourage extremist elements in opposing His Majesty’s 
Government.261 
 
Anglo-Iraqi relations 
 
When the British Mandate of Iraq was terminated in 1932, the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty signed two years 
earlier came into effect. The treaty ensured continued British military presence in the form of access to 
air bases at both Basra and at Al Habbaniyah as well as the right to move its troops freely across the 
country.262 It also established that the two nations would co-operate closely over foreign policy. By 
such an arrangement the British were convinced that their strategic interests would be secured in the 
coming decades.  
The treaty was a somewhat odd creation. In what can perhaps be described as an act of 
deception, Britain boasted of bringing the first non-European territory to independence. The reality 
was that the agreement only refashioned their previous relationship, retaining many patron-client 
features.263  But what initially appeared to the British as an excellent arrangement in many ways turned 
out to be the very opposite. The Iraqi state was not a well functioning unit. In simple terms, Britain 
had created a state but it had not been able to introduce either British governing principles or any real 
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Iraqi national ideology.264 As early January 1934 an article in The Times tried to rationalize Britain’s 
failures: “It is not fair to look at Iraq from the point of view of the British official who had hoped to set 
up lasting British standards of justice and efficiency...We must realize that we have to deal in Iraq with 
a country of retarded development and Oriental standards from which 12 years of British 
administration have by no means weaned it.”265  
One major problem was Iraq’s heterogeneous makeup. From the outset the Shias and the 
Kurds - who together constituted the majority of the population – felt alienated. As a result they 
adopted an apprehensive attitude toward the Iraqi state.266 Indeed, the ruling elites were comprised 
predominantly of Sunni Arabs. Within the higher echelons of the officer corps the situation was very 
much the same. 
  Constituting approximately 20 percent of the total population in Iraq, the Sunni Arabs was 
always going to be a minority. For many of Iraq’s key political and military leaders this was not a 
satisfactory situation. This frustration was further aggravated by their lacking sense of Iraqi national 
identity. The kinship felt to the predominately Sunni Arab population of Syria, Transjordan and 
Palestine was in many ways stronger than the affiliation to their Shia and Kurdish countrymen. In fact, 
for the most intransigent Arab nationalists the Iraqi state was only considered a transitional unit, a step 
toward the realisation of their ultimate national objective: a fully independent and united Arab 
confederation - made up of the Sunni dominated lands of the Fertile Crescent.267   
Rather than a much anticipated sovereignty, Iraq was left with a continued British presence. 
The British, for a number of different reasons, were not favourably disposed towards Arab unity in the 
1930s. In order not to oppose the movement openly - seeing how popular it was among Iraqi leaders – 
Britain officially declared that it would view sympathetically any steps taken by the Arabs themselves 
in order to further the cause of Arab unity.268 Their actions spoke in a different direction, however, and 
few if any Iraqis were convinced of their alleged support to the Arab cause.  
Thus, for the Pan-Arabic minded Sunni elites the Anglo-Iraqi treaty was terrible 
disappointment, depriving them of any real independence and in effect suspending their dream of a 
united Arab nation indefinitely. This development augmented the anti-British sentiment of their Pan-
Arabism.  
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The extreme dislike certain influential Sunnis displayed for their patron was also affected by 
their social background. The ruling elites of the major cities - Baghdad, Basra and Mosul - were 
originally composed of former Sharifians, ex-Ottoman Army Officers who had rebelled against their 
former masters and fought under King Faisal I during the First World War.269 Their brief alliance with 
Britain during the war did not remove in them a certain Ottoman thinking on national identity. They 
continued to stress the importance of authoritarian command and military discipline in the creation of 
an ordered society.270 Not only did these ex- officers abhor liberalism in general, but this particular 
variety had more or less been enforced on the Iraqi state. Even worse, it was basically a sham. Britain 
was the occupier, and thus used non-liberal methods to keep control. They tampered with elections, 
deported oppositional politicians, manipulated politics and encouraged reactionary elements.271 This 
obvious hypocrisy induced in many an intense dislike for Britain and her alleged liberal ideas.  
Indeed, a large part of the Iraqi officer corps was to be characterized by Pan-Arabic and anti-
British thinking. What was to become even more damaging for Britain was that these officers 
commanded an army which was gradually growing more powerful. 
In August 1933 General Bakr Sidqi and his troops massacred hundreds of Assyrian villagers. 
The Assyrians were - despite the small size of their community - presented in the Iraqi press as a threat 
to the national integrity of Iraq.272 Consequently the onslaught was seen as a great victory for the Iraqi 
state. Moreover, it was a swipe at the “oppressors” as it crushed a community associated with service 
to Great Britain. Most importantly, perhaps, the trouncing of the Assyrians raised the Iraqi Army’s 
status as saviours of the country. 273 This in turn served to convince the public that the large resources 
devoted to the military was essential for the defence Iraqi state. 
  The Arab Rebellion in Palestine served to expose the incompatible positions of the British and 
the Iraqi military. But it also exposed a split among the Sunni elites when it came to Iraq’s relationship 
to Britain. The urban politicians - in contrast to the officers - were far more constrained by the political 
realities. While wishing for greater independence they were painfully aware that British presence 
ensured Iraq’s survival as a unified state despite its internal centrifugal tendencies. More importantly, 
it helped protect Iraq from the threat posed by neighbouring states Iran, Turkey and Saudi Arabia. 274  
So, while certain politicians adopted a similarly anti-British rhetoric when expressing support for the 
Arab struggle in Palestine, their practical approach was bound to be different than that of the officers.  
The problem was, from a British perspective, that during the period in question the “reasonable” and 
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“moderate” politicians were losing ground to the politicised officers. Indeed, between 1937 and 1941 a 
climate developed where no Iraqi government could enter or leave office without the consent of the 
army leaders.275 
 
The Palestine question in Iraq 
 
In the late 1920s Iraqi Arab nationalists began paying attention to developments in Palestine. As in 
Egypt, the Western Wall disturbances of September 1929 were covered extensively in Iraqi 
newspapers. The British High Commissioner to Iraq, Gilbert Clayton, reported in the aftermath that 
the events had “no serious repercussions in Iraq” but “that the country at large has been profoundly 
stirred.” Also, while no spread of the disorders should be expected in Iraq, “Moslem sentiment...has 
undoubtedly been aroused.”276  
Unlike Egypt, awareness of the Palestine issue seems never to have waned completely after 
the 1929 troubles subsided.  That is not to say the interest was constant or all-encompassing 
throughout the first half of the 1930s: it increased markedly when divisive events took place in 
Palestine (such as the Islamic Conference in Jerusalem in 1931 and the Jaffa Riots in 1933) and, real 
comprehension of the issue was in the early 1930s confined largely to a small section of the Iraqi 
population, for the most part well-educated people of the middle-class.277 Nonetheless, in the wake of 
the loathed Iraqi-British treaty of 1930 a passionate debate arose in influential circles on Pan-Arabism. 
Among those who professed to Arab nationalism, Palestine was considered to be an important part of 
the future Arab federation. As Britain was gradually compelled to expose the iron hand of domination 
in order to secure a peaceful Mandate, interest in Palestine itself – and the wellbeing of the Arabs 
living there – was destined to be adopted by the Arab nationalists in Iraq. Moreover, while the 
segment dedicated to the Palestine issue was relatively small, its members made up a large part of 
Iraq’s administrative and educational services and of the press.  These factions were to have a 
significant effect on the formation of national opinion.278 
It became apparent by the mid 1930s that the Palestine issue was not going to be just any 
element in Iraqi Pan-Arab ideology, but rather one of its more important components. This 
development must be ascribed in large part to the emergence of Syrian and Palestinian activists in the 
Iraqi educational system. During the 1920s and early 1930s these individuals were instrumental in 
spreading their particular brand of Pan-Arab thought in Iraqi schools. This was no mere coincidence, 
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however, but rather an intended development. The “father” of the Iraqi educational system, Arab 
nationalist Sati ’al-Husri, had been actively recruiting the activists and placing them in influential 
positions. It was indeed their historical interoperation which was to dominate the history textbooks. 
This resulted in a curriculum which emphasised Pan-Arab political matters at the expense of Iraqi 
national concerns.279 One widely used history book - written by the prominent Palestinian Darwin al-
Miqdadi- declared that Palestine was an indispensible part of the Arab territory. It went on to describe 
how the “unholy” alliance of Britain and Zion was set on establishing a Jewish national home in 
Palestine. This was going to be a difficult task however, for as book on ancient history proclaimed, it 
was “impossible for it [Palestine] to lose its Arabism as long as there are Arabs in the world.”280  
Consequently, the strong link that was established between Pan-Arab ideology and the 
Palestine question must not be seen as an inevitable development. At this time - in what must be 
described as Pan-Arabism’s infancy - the movement was something of an empty shell. It was thus up 
to its various proponents to define its particular character. The Syrian and Palestinian activists 
operating in Iraq had a similar anti-imperialistic agenda: the liberation of Syria from France and 
Palestine from Great Britain. This undoubtedly influenced their brand of Pan-Arab ideology.  
Time would show that many of the young Iraqis who were privileged enough to attend 
secondary schools in the first half of the 1930s were to make up the core of the anti-British  protesters 
few years later. While this faction was to become the dominate force in Iraq by the end of the decade, 
it is important to note that there were other trends prevalent in the heterogeneous society. As early as 
1934 Pan-Arab teaching had succeeded in offending large sections of the Iraqi populace. Shias and 
Kurds now objected strongly to the Pan-Arab nature of the secondary education. They spoke of the 
Palestinian and Syrian teachers as foreigners, and in several demonstrations they carried the slogan 
“Iraq for Iraqis”.281  
  
Prelude – the Palestine Arab Rebellion 
 
Of all the Arab states, it was Iraq who witnessed the strongest reactions to the 1936 unrest in Palestine. 
One reason for this was the relative independence of the Iraqi state. Compared to Syria and Egypt, the 
Iraqi press and public were freer to express the general dismay caused by current events in 
Palestine.282 Another, possibly more important reason, was the current political environment in the 
country. As seen, Pan-Arabism had been gaining ground since the late 1920s. The outbreak of 
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violence in April 1936 corresponded perfectly with the worldview furthered in this ideology: the 
suppressed Arabs were finally rising up against the imperial oppressor. As elsewhere in the region, 
Britain’s stature was also impaired by the Italian invasion of Ethiopia the previous year and by the 
ideological challenge brought about the emerging German state.     
Throughout the summer emotions ran high. Soon the Iraqi Government realised the immense 
difficulties this situation was going to cause them. Both for reasons of internal policy and for the sake 
of their good relations with Britain, they did not want to be involved in any sort of anti-British 
agitation.283 But public pressure proved too great. While banning open meetings and demonstrations, 
they were forced to allow public mourning campaigns. The Government treated the press in a similar 
way. Newspapers whose anti-Semitic and anti-British content was considered too strident were closed 
down.284 Generally though, the press would continue to enjoy a relatively high degree of freedom. As 
a result, the unrest in Palestine quickly became a major issue in most newspapers. According to a 
Foreign Office memorandum from June 20 1936, circulated all the way up to Cabinet, “the calamities 
besetting the Arabs in Palestine were [in the press] placed solely upon the shoulders of the mandatory 
power.”285  
In June, the Palestine Defence Committee was set up in Iraq by two leading Palestinians with 
clear Pan-Arab leanings. Leaflets spreading extremely distorted news about the revolt in Palestine 
were an important component in the Committee’s campaign. Although its activity in Iraq must be 
described as fairly successful, it was in this early phase limited in scope.286 
While the Iraqi Government in June delivered a “friendly but serious warning” to the British 
Ambassador Archibald Clark-Kerr about the dangers of a pro-Zionist policy in Palestine, they were 
vary of undermining Anglo-Iraqi relations. 287 More forceful opposition to Britain’s Palestine policies 
was thus confined to politicians of the oppositional parties. Observing how public support for the 
Palestine Arabs were growing, and also how crippled the government was in dealing with the issue, 
the more independent politicians of the opposition were quick to take advantage of the of the current 
conditions. The government’s situation was made even worse by the fact that the current ministry 
under Yasin al-Hashimi based part of its standing on Arab nationalists, many of whom were outspoken 
supporters of the Palestine Defence Committee.288  
Needless to say, the Iraqi government wanted nothing more than an early solution to the unrest 
in Palestine. From August onwards Iraqi Foreign Minister, Nuri al-Sa’id, made attempts to mediate 
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with the British on the behalf of the Palestinian Arabs. Reactions to this initiative in Iraqi newspapers 
are indicative of how dominant Pan-Arab ideology had become by 1936. Nuri’s mission was hailed as 
“a big stride towards the cementing of Arab unity and the making of Palestine as an integral part of the 
system of Arab countries” and “as an act which has done away with the local character of Palestine 
and put upon it the international Arab stamp.”289 
Bringing an end to the Rebellion in order to quiet the domestic situation in Iraq was not the 
only motive guiding Nuri. If the Foreign Minister could contribute in restoring peace in Palestine it 
would award his government credit and prestige in Britain as well as inside Iraq.290 But at the back of 
his mind lurked even greater plans. Nuri had for years dreamt of establishing a Fertile Crescent Arab 
Federation, where Iraq, and indeed Nuri himself would play a leading role. An end to the troubles in 
Palestine brought about by his mediation would be a first step towards this ambitious goal.291  
 The process of outside intervention also exposed inter-Arab rivalries. King Abdullah of 
Transjordan was convinced that Nuri’s mediation was undertaken following a British initiative. He 
was fearful that a move to award Iraq a preferred status in Palestine was a confirmation of Britain’s 
partiality of the Iraqi Hashemite wing over his own.292   
Even more profound was the situation which arose vis-à-vis Saudi-Arabia. Ibn Saud had 
unsuccessfully attempted to mediate on behalf of the Palestinians in July. The fact that Nuri was now 
given the go-ahead aroused Ibn Saud’s suspicion. It did not help the situation that the Iraqi Premier 
had remarked to Saudi Minister Hafiz Wahba that Ibn Saud’s failure had been due to British 
mistrust.293 Ever since his conquest of Hejaz in 1924-25 - and with it the expulsion of the Hashemite 
Kings – mutual suspicion had existed between Ibn Saud and the Iraqi rulers. Consequently, the Saudi 
ruler strongly opposed any strengthening of the Iraqi Hashemites. An Arab federation created under 
Iraqi leadership would be nothing less than the materialization of such fears.294     
 After several failed attempts, the first phase of the Rebellion was brought to an end on 10 
October 1936. Both Iraq and Saudi Arabia had been actively involved in the negotiations leading up to 
this agreement. For Britain, however, the decision to allow for outside mediation – one largely spurred 
on by the Foreign Office - turned out to be a costly affair. Ibn Saud, and even more so the Iraqi 
Government, were of the opinion that by their contribution they had acquired a permanent right to be 
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heard in Palestine matters.295 Britain had by their own decision in fact turned Palestine into a Pan-Arab 
issue, abandoning their tried and tested policy of treating the Mandate in isolation. Once this principle 
was discarded there would be virtually no turning back.296 While Britain refused to halt Jewish 
immigration – the Palestine leadership’s chief precondition for ending both the strike and the 
insurgence – few saw the agreement as a victory for Britain. The Cabinet continually rejected the War 
Office proposal of introducing martial law and terminating the uprising by the use of military force. 
Instead they chose to follow the recommendations put forth by the Foreign Office and the High 
Commissioner in Palestine, Arthur Wauchope. This was essentially a surrender to violence, achieving 
something which resembled an armistice more than a lasting peace.297 This was made further evident 
by the fact that Britain was precluded from disarming the rebels, leaving the insurgents fully organised 
and equipped when fighting recommenced in September 1937.  
 As for Iraq, the Pan-Arab sentiment which had prevailed throughout summer and autumn 1936 
was not shared by every Iraqi. On 26 October the government was deposed by a military coup headed 
by General Bakr Sidqi. Most members of the new government, among them Prime Minister Hikmat 
Sulayman and Sidqi himself, were not active in Pan-Arab circles and had no links whatsoever to the 
Palestine Defence Committee.298 The new administration - comprised of Shiites, Kurds and Sunnis – 
was considered anathema to most Pan-Arabs. They saw in it everything which they despised: it was 
deemed separatist, anti-nationalist and anti-Arab.299   
 
The Peel report 
 
When the Peel report was released in July 1937, it encountered violent protest from the Iraqi 
government under the joint control of Prime Minister Hikmat Sulayman and Bakr Sidqi. Iraq was still 
a close ally of Britain and such an official attack on British policy was considered both surprising and 
out of line. Yet, the official British response was rather muted. The Times’ correspondent passed on 
the reactions of the Iraqi public: 
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some has gone so far as to argue that the Prime Minister of a country so dependent on British good will 
as Iraq would never have ventured to use such strong language if he had not been encouraged to do so 
by the Foreign Office, which for reasons of its own wishes to see the Royal Commission’s dropped.300  
A month later, the Times further elaborated on the Iraqi response to the Peel Report. The prime 
minister’s “inappropriate” behaviour had to be seen in its proper context, something not lost on the 
paper’s Special Correspondent: 
the Arab Nationalists have distrusted the apparent pro-Turkish trend, both in sentiment and practice, 
that has recently seemed to mark the policy of the Baghdad Government. There is therefore material for 
surmise that Hikmet Sulayman welcomed the Palestine issue as affording an opportunity to “prove” to 
the Pan-Arabs his devotion to the Arab cause. An Arab Prime Minister in Baghdad would be under no 
such necessity; indeed, one of the complaints made by present Iraqi Ministers, when they took power 
after the coup d’Etat, was that the former Cabinet had been sacrificing Iraqi interests in chasing Pan-
Arab will-o’-the-wisps...Until his views had been made known the partition proposal was received 
calmly enough in Baghdad. But as soon as the Prime Minister had declared himself protests came 
flooding in from the Press, professional associations, and from the Moslem religious leaders...If the 
Royal Commission had proposed that the Kingdom in Iraq should take over the Arab part of Palestine 
(including the outlet on the Mediterranean coast) Baghdad’s reaction to the partition might have been 
very different.301 
This version is essentially consistent with the later historiography of the episode.302 Not because of any 
particular brilliance on the Times correspondent’s part, but because the circumstances surrounding 
Hikmat Sulayman’s public denunciation of the Peel proposal were easily evident. Observers of the 
Iraqi political scene knew that Sulayman faced serious difficulties. Not only was he not of Arab origin, 
he had also previously been an outspoken opponent of the Pan-Arab idea.  While the strong public 
opposition to the Peel proposal in Iraq put him in a further difficult position, it also awarded him a way 
out of the current political crisis. Sulayman seized the opportunity, and indeed tension was relieved - 
albeit only temporarily. British Ambassador to Iraq, Archibald Clark-Kerr, observed: “The press and 
public in Baghdad praise the Prime Minister’s attitude and provinces have expressed their approval in 
the usual way by sending telegrams of support.”303  
 Sulayman did not really wish to antagonize Britain. He was therefore quick to admit to the 
“falseness” of his recent appearance. In two separate meetings with Clark-Kerr Sulayman argued that 
                                                     
300
 “The Future of Palestine”, July 15 1937, The Times Digital Archive. Hikmat Sulayman was of Turkish decent. 
This was frequently made use of by his political opponents who sought to question his allegiance to the Iraqi 
state. 
301
 “The Murders in Iraq”, The Times Digital Archive, Saturday, August 14, 1937. 
302
 See for example Michael Eppel’s article ”The Hikmat Sulayman-Bakir Sidqi government in Iraq, 1936-37, 
and the Palestine question”, Middle Eastern Studies, 241:1, 25-41(1988) and  Y. Porath’s, In Search …,  pp.166-
167.  
303
 Clark-Kerr to FO, FO/371/20808/E3965, 12 July 1937. 
71 
 
in order to survive politically he saw no other opportunity than to condemn the Peel proposition. 
Clark-Kerr wrote the following: “while he in no way wished to embarrass His Majesty’s Government 
his Government would be obliged to show that they fully shared popular feeling in this matter, for if 
they did not, everyone would be against them and they would not be able to control the situation.” 
Sulayman also believed that partition in the end could not be carried out: “without the consent of the 
League of Nations and that time would show that this consent would be withheld.” 304 
 Not only was the Iraqi Premier trying to calm the situation through communication with the 
British Ambassador in Baghdad, similar efforts were made in Britain. On direct orders from 
Sulayman, the Iraqi Minister to London contacted the Foreign Office in order to arrange an 
appointment. In a meeting with George Rendel he stated that “his Government were obliged to take 
this line because of their public opinion, but admitted confidentially that he himself saw no alternative 
to partition.”305 While the last statement might just as well been the Minister’s personal opinion, there 
could be little doubt as to the Iraqi Government’s desire to remain within British orbit.  
Sulayman’s opposition towards partition was undoubtedly also tied up with his own dynastical 
ambitions. Unsurprisingly, this issue was not announced in the Prime Minister’s public outburst. They 
were nonetheless familiar to the British as similar schemes had been vented previously by Sulayman 
himself. Intent on finding a lasting solution to the Palestine question the Prime Minister had conducted 
talks with the Foreign Office the previous February. Like Nuri Al-Sai’d before him the Iraqi Premier’s 
proposal involved setting up a loose federation of Iraq, Transjordan and Palestine, admittedly under 
the Iraqi Hashemite crown. “This would conjure the minority bogey and the Arabs would no longer 
worry if a million Jews came in.” Although the Foreign Office once more rejected the offer, regarding 
it as both impracticable and imaginary, the idea stuck with Sulayman.306  
The implementation of Lord Peel’s recommendations would in fact have disposed of this 
scheme once and for all: a Jewish state would have made it very difficult to create a viable Arab 
federation encompassing the entire Fertile Crescent. The Jews, being awarded the coastal area of 
northern Palestine, would be in a position to block Iraqi oil and other exports that moved through 
Palestine on their way to Europe. The proposed handover of the remaining Arab part of Palestine to 
Iraq’s rival, King Abdullah of Transjordan, would effectively put an end to all hopes of such a 
federation.307 
The circumstances surrounding Sulayman’s position arguably warranted a certain scepticism 
towards the Iraqi Government’s role in the Palestine issue. No such reservations seem to have affected 
the Eastern Department as they tacitly went on to accept both the Iraqi Premier’s objections to the 
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Partition proposal and his right to express them publically. The main reason for this passivity on the 
Eastern Department’s part seems to be the perceived usefulness of Sulayman’s renunciation. Their 
own campaign against partition was by now gaining momentum and Arab opposition - whatever its 
incentive - would undoubtedly strengthen their case. On 30 July Sulayman reiterated his objections to 
the Partition proposal in a communication put before the Permanent Mandates Commission at Geneva. 
The Eastern Department made the following comment on the Premier’s statement:  
it does not necessarily follow that the general effect of the communication has been entirely bad. For 
instance, some of the Geneva correspondents say that it has opened the eyes of the Mandates 
Commission, which has hitherto been apt to look at the problem from an exclusively Jewish point of 
view, to the fact that there is an Arab side to the question and to the difficulties which confront the 
Mandatory Power. 308 
Keep in mind that at this point Partition was official British policy. It was thus rather peculiar for an 
official to argue that new-found scepticism on the part of the Mandates Commission was a good thing.  
 
The Iraqi military intervenes  
 
Within the armed forces resentment of General Bakr Sidqi arose gradually. Sidqi’s competing bloc, 
the so called nationalists, was afraid that the General might seek to establish a dictatorship.309 These 
officers also felt that Sidqi had neglected Pan-Arabism, an issue they believed should be paramount in 
any Iraqi government. On 11 August Sidqi was assassinated in Mosul. Despite having been totally 
dependent on Sidqi’s faction, Hikmat Sulayman made an attempt to continue his rule without the 
General. This was to no avail. On 16 August Sulayman was forced to resign after strong pressure from 
the leading nationalist officers.   
As regards Palestine, there seems to be no indication that the issue played much of a role in the 
downfall of the Sulayman-Sidqi government. If anything, Sulayman’s strong condemnation of the 
partition proposal in July might have prolonged public support towards the increasingly unpopular 
administration. 
 Both Sulayman and Sidqi had from the outset been branded as anti-nationalist, separatist and 
anti-Pan-Arabist.310 This, however, had little to do with their Palestine policy. It was their desire to 
establish links with Iran - and in particular with Turkey - which aroused such hostility among many 
Iraqis. The Iran-Iraq Frontier Treaty of July 1937, in particular, created suspicions among the Sunni 
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elites. What Sulayman branded as an “Iraq first” policy, they considered an attack on their Sunni 
hegemony and a betrayal to Iraq’s Arab obligations.311  
 King Ghazi now called upon veteran politician Jamil al-Midfa’i to form a new government. 
The main reason for this decision was the support Midfa’i enjoyed among the officers presumed to be 
responsible for the murder of Bakr Sidqi – the so-called “Seven”.312 Fearing that this group might once 
again decide to meddle in political affairs, Midfa’i demanded that they pledged to abstain from any 
such activity.313 This was agreed to. In return Midfa’i promised not to open an inquiry into the murder 
of Sidqi. He also appointed all of the Seven to prominent positions.314  
  On 26 October 1937, a few weeks prior to the important Foreign Office memorandum on the 
regional repercussions of partition, the Eastern Department received a despatch from Sir Oswald Scott, 
Chargé d’Affaires at the Baghdad embassy. Scott had recently held a meeting with the upcoming Head 
of the Palestine Defence Committee, Naji al-Suwaydi, and wished to convey the apparent changes this 
made to Iraqi position. Scott wrote: 
There is nothing of the fanatic in him and he is clearly most anxious to find a way out of the present 
deadlock without getting on bad terms with us.  This morning he outlined a solution which appeared to 
be on the lines of cantonisation with a modified British mandate. He had obviously obtained the assent 
of the Prime Minister [Jamil al-Midfa’i].315 
While it was evident that the Pan-Arab movement was gaining further ground in Iraq - with the 
Palestine question acting as a unifying element - it should have been equally obvious to the Foreign 
Office that al-Midfa’i was essentially a moderate, British oriented politician. His decision to employ 
the overtly pro-British Tawfiq al-Suwaydi as Defence Minister conveyed his desire to tighten control 
over the pro-Palestinian activities in Iraq as well as preventing Pan-Arab quarters from damaging his 
country’s relation with Britain.316 
In fact Tawfiq’s similarly minded brother, Naji al-Suwaydi, had delivered the opening speech 
at the Bludan congress on Palestine the previous month.317 The British Consul at Damascus, Gilbert 
MacKereth had written a very thorough report on that event which he had duly transmitted to the 
London office: 
[Suwaydi’s speech]...was quite moderate and full of common sense: he said that the Arabs were at all 
times good friends and allies to the British Government and we should like that our friendship 
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continues.  At present however on account of this unfortunate Zionist question we reached a bifurcating 
road. The British Govt. will have either to choose to back up the unjust demands of the Jews and thus 
lose the confidence and old friendship of the Arab race in general or to render justice and equity to the 
Arabs and thus strengthen their old friendships...we are now at the gate of a great war and hope that we 
shall be faithful allies of Britain as in the past.318 
The speech was clearly not made by a person wishing to oppose Britain. This becomes especially 
apparent when considering the composition of the audience. The congress assembled Pan-Arabists 
from all over the Middle East, many of whom held extremist positions. Suwaydi’s speech stood out as 
probably the most moderate contribution made during the three-day assembly. MacKereth affirms that 
the speech was not well received, the Palestinian and Syrian delegations being especially dissatisfied. 
These delegates did increasingly come to dominate the congress with a “striking demonstration of 
Pan-Arabism” and an “exhibition of Anglophobia.” It was according to the consul “only with growing 
difficulty the moderates led by Iraqian Naji al Suwaydi, were able to tone down the violent 
recommendations.” 
The Bludan congress turned out to be a rather unsuccessful affair. The main reason for this, it 
seems, was that delegates could not agree on a common policy towards Great Britain. The extremists 
proposed to give the British Government an ultimatum: it must renounce its previous decision to 
partition Palestine and withdraw the accompanying plan of deporting approximately 300,000 Palestine 
Arabs. Al Suwaydi, nonetheless, ”objected by saying that we have always been friends and allies [of 
Britain] and we desire to reach to an equitable understanding and agreement.” 319  
Interesting to note is that the Colonial Office quickly perceived the positive effect the new 
government under al-Midfa’i was likely to have for Britain. Also taking into account the division 
witnessed at Bludan they concluded in October that the Arab world was not united in their 
denunciation of British policy in Palestine. They also argued that the failure to reach agreement at such 
a highly anticipated congress would have a positive effect inside Palestine itself their as many more 
Palestine Arabs would now inevitably acquiesce in partition.320   
 
Mounting discontent with the Midfa’i Government 
 
While the Foreign Office could to some extent be criticised for not acknowledging the positive 
development which the al-Midfa’i Government initially represented, their predictions on how the 
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Palestine issue might serve to increase anti-British sentiment - and thus serve to destabilize Iraq - did 
eventually prove to be sound judgements. Major Hawthorn of the War Office had in February 1938 
pointed out that political disunity in Iraqi society – one largely drawn between Sunnis and Shias - did 
extend far into the military. His conclusion had been that no Iraqi Government could expect the 
wholehearted support of the armed forces.321 Thus, if the Government did indeed wish to challenge 
Great Britain, it would be highly uncertain that the military would back it. The observation made by 
Hawthorn was at best only partially correct. What he failed to understand was that it was precisely the 
army and its leading officers who possessed truly Pan-Arab and anti-British sentiments. 
Midfa’i had been forced into a complicated balancing act ever since his takeover in August 
1937. His initial approach was one of “forgetting the past”.322 One element in this policy was to allow 
the return of politicians which had been expelled under the Sulayman government. This decision 
caused a lot of problems for Midfa’i as many of the restored exiles were actively opposed to his 
administration. The result was that Bagdad once again became the scene of intense political rivalry 
and intrigue.323 But it was Midfai’s inability to keep the Seven out of politics which proved to be the 
most detrimental aspect. Despite promises in the opposite, the officers did eventually decide to 
intervene in political affairs. Frustration over the Midfa’i ministry’s handling of the Palestine issue 
was according to the officers themselves a contributing factor for their decision to go back on previous 
guarantees.324       
Within the Seven there were four officers known as the Golden Square. The most prominent 
of these - the ardent anti-imperialist Salah al-Din al-Sabbagh - was to take on a leading role in the 
overthrow of Midfa’i. The general was to remain at the forefront of Iraqi politics until he was forced to 
flee the country in 1941.  Sabbagh is indeed a particularly intriguing character. His political views as 
they are expressed in his memoirs are valuable for understanding the singularities of the Iraqi brand of 
Arab nationalism.325  The following is Sabbagh’s assessment of Great Britain’s historic role in the 
Middle East: 
There is no wolf so deadly to the Arabs, and no such sworn enemy of Islam as Great Britain; as for the 
Arabs, it carved up their body into ministates, parties, and tribes, for them to fight each other while 
[Britain] picks up the spoils.326  
Sabbagh deplored Britain’s continued presence in Iraq. He believed the country was actively 
obstructing the growth of the Iraqi armed forces. According to Sabbagh Britain did not wish to create 
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an Arab army, but an Iraqi. This was to be controlled by Britain and intended for use mainly against 
internal opposition. The arms dispute (which remained largely unresolved under the Sulayman or the 
Midfa’i ministries) only served to reinforce Sabbagh’s conviction.327 Sabbagh believed that Britain – 
having witnessed the strong opposition to the Peel plan in Iraq - would not rearm the Iraqi army 
because she feared that Iraq might intervene militarily in Palestine.328 Moreover, he maintained that 
Britain’s favoritism of the Jews in Palestine was the definitive confirmation of their desire to keep the 
Arab world weak and divided.329   
In Sabbagh’s mind the historical struggle between Christianity and Islam had never ended. At 
present, it was the British imperialists who fought the Christian battle.330  
 
The fall of the Midfa’i Government 
  
In August 1938 fatwas were issued by leading Sunni and Shia clerics. These stated that all Arabs were 
bound to join their brothers’ struggle in Palestine. The Government responded by refusing a public 
procession in support of the fatwas.331 Not only that, but Midfa’i instructed the media to report that his 
government had actively prevented this demonstration from taking place.332 This decision was clearly 
in line with his previous approach to the Palestine issue, namely that of countering public activity 
which might damage Anglo-Iraqi relations. This time, however, Midfa’i had miscalculated the 
situation. The Prime Minister seemed to have forgotten that he owed his own elevation to power to the 
army. Thus, if his policies ran fully counter to the wishes of the Seven, he was bound to come up 
against severe problems.333   
The August decision greatly annoyed the Pan-Arab officers, but also the Iraqi public in 
general. This collective frustration led to a definite increase in pro-Palestinian activity. Under the 
support from oppositional elements, a series of attacks on Jews and bombings of Jewish clubs were 
instigated from August and onwards.334 Already at the end of the month Midfa’i confessed to Jewish 
                                                     
327
 Hemphill, P.J., ”The Formation of the Iraqi Army, 1921-33”, in Kelidar, Abbas, ed.,  The Integration of 
Modern Iraq (London 1979), p. 96.  
328
 Simon, 128 
329
 Hemphill, p. 103. 
330
 Ibid. 
331
 Tarbush, p. 262. 
332
 Eppel, The Palestine Conflict …, p. 78. 
333
 Khadduri, p. 131. 
334
 Eppel, The Palestine Conflict …, p. 78. 
77 
 
Community Leader, Hakham Sasson, that he was powerless in restraining the Pan-Arab nationalist 
circles.335   
Knowing that he had aroused the suspicion of the Seven, Midfa’i was forced to take certain 
steps. Instead of trying to placate them a second time around, he aimed instead to reduce their 
influence. On 30 October, the Premier instated Colonel Sabihb Najib as Defence Minister.336 Najib 
immediately set about to undercut the disgruntled officers. A part of this process involved elevating a 
counter-group known for their Iraqi nationalism.337 This process backfired badly however. On 24 
December the Seven were informed that the Government was planning to place certain officers on the 
retired list. After a short meeting they decided that it was time to overthrow Midfa’i. The Premier was 
immediately informed of this decision. Midfa’i had no desire to see violence and thus decided to step 
down immediately.  
According to Sabbagh’s memoirs the Palestine issue were among the reasons why the Sevens 
decided to remove Midfa’i. He also mentioned the Government’s failure to meet the army’s demands 
for equipment - in effect a criticism of Midfai’s total dependence on Britain for Iraqi security.338 The 
accuracy of Sabbagh’s statements is obviously open to debate. They were committed to paper while he 
was in British detention awaiting the implementation of his death penalty. Sabbagh clearly had a 
desire to go down in history as renowned Pan-Arabist – a feat which he undeniably achieved. His 
vehement anti-British/pro-Palestinian stance undoubtedly contributed to such a reputation. 
Nonetheless, Al-Sabbagh’s track record does clearly strengthen his claims. From the early 1930s he 
had been outspoken in his beliefs regarding the centrality of Palestine in Pan-Arab thought. Moreover, 
throughout the Arab revolt in Palestine Al-Sabbagh was personally involved in a gun smuggling 
operation to aid the rebels.339          
The Foreign Office predictions of November 1937, that the Palestine question had in it the 
potential power to topple any Iraqi government, did prove at least partially correct. As in neighbouring 
countries the public outrage in Iraq towards Britain and its Palestine policy was formidable. This did 
not prove decisive in either Egypt or Saudi Arabia. Unlike those countries, however, Iraq boasted a 
largely independent, highly powerful officer corps. Influential segments of this corps possessed strong 
Pan-Arab as well as anti-British attitudes. Even more importantly, unlike the Iraqi politicians who 
were still tied to Britain these officers were not afraid to act on these beliefs and provoke their former 
patron. As the British Ambassador to Iraq put it in early 1940: 
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In any debit and credit balance for Iraq...Arab sympathies for Palestinian rebels and agitators should 
certainly be given full weight on the debit side. The Army is the most important single factor. In most 
countries the Army is very nationalist here it is inclined to be extremist and Pan-Arab, and to resent our 
special position in Iraq and Palestine and elsewhere in Arab States.340 
 
Palestine as a constant in Iraqi politics  
 
While there is little doubt that British Palestine policy played a role in the chain of events leading up 
to the Midfa’i government’s removal, the process reveals that its impact in Iraq was less and less 
responsive to British adjustments of that policy. Indeed, a closer study does raise the question if the 
current dismay was attached primarily to the partition proposal itself. 
Although a decision to abandon partition looked likely from the early months of 1938 to those 
inside the decision-making process in Britain, those outside it were obliged to wait significantly longer 
for information in that direction.  It is clear that Foreign Minister Tawfiq al-Suwaydi gathered that the 
British were intent to withdraw from the partition plan after a meeting he had with the Colonial Office 
in September 1938. Two months later, on November 9 1938, the Woodhead Commission’s report 
made it officially clear that Britain had postponed partition indefinitely. The al-Midfa’i government 
immediately attempted to represent the change as having resulted from its own diplomatic activity, 
and highlighted this claim in addressing pro-Palestinian circles in Iraq.341 The British embassy in 
Baghdad reported that the Woodhead statement “has for the moment quietened agitation concerning 
the future of that country [Palestine] and thereby strengthened the hand of the Government which 
appears at present to be maintaining its position.”342 This lull proved to be short-lived however. Within 
few weeks demonstrators again filled the streets, reiterating their previous Pan-Arab slogans and 
accusing the government of failing to assist the Arabs of Palestine. What this indicates is that the 
Palestine issue was in the process of becoming an established component in Iraqi domestic politics. 
While the release of the Woodhead report might have lessened the pressure somewhat, the protests and 
opposition carried on largely as before. This was precisely because the uncertainty over Palestine was 
used as a lever by the opposition. Their decision to increasingly employ this device from August 1937 
and onwards effectively “overrode” any good news emerging from Palestine during the same period. 
So whilst the Iraqi Government had to all intents and purposes been awarded with a decision on 
Palestine which they had strived for since their inauguration in August the previous year, the 
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opposition and their supporting demonstrators continued to accuse the government of failing to assist 
the Palestinian Arabs and of co-operating with Great Britain.343  
The problem was that the release of the Peel plan seems to have altered the political realities in 
the Middle East on a permanent basis. On one side it strengthened the Pan-Arab movement in every 
single country - developments that would only be sustained the following decade. At the same time it 
introduced a tool which politicians of all colours could employ - especially useful, it seems, for 
oppositional groups. Once this instrument had been brought into politics it was not in the interest of 
those who employed it to discard it easily. The effect of the Palestine issue as a device for rivalling 
groups was of course further increased by the fact that every Arab government (some more than 
others) were obliged to maintain a “proper” relationship with Great Britain. The case of the Midfa’i 
government serves as a prime example of the difficulties this caused the party in power.  The release 
of the Woodhead report, which clearly stated that the implementation of the Peel Commission’s 
recommendations was infeasible, was simply insufficient in shutting down this effective vehicle.  
 
The Partition proposal’s effect on Anglo-Iraqi relations 
 
There can be little doubt that the proposed partitioning of Palestine played a definite role in Iraqi 
domestic politics during the period in question. It is also clear that it served to complicate relations 
between Iraq and Britain. However, did the Palestine issue have the potential to cause a complete 
breakdown of the Anglo-Iraqi alliance?    
 As in Egypt a departure from the British alliance would inevitably necessitate a rapprochement 
with another major power. In Egypt it was feared that Italy might fill that role, in Iraq concerns were 
directed at Germany. However, while it has been argued here that Britain’s fear of an Egyptian-Italian 
alliance was overrated, others have argued that very opposite was the case with Iraqi-German 
relations. It does seem that Britain - at least until 1936 - did minimise the scope of German influence 
in Iraq and also failed to notice the growing Iraqi fascination with Nazism.344 
In October 1936 the Foreign Office expressed unease over possible German incursions in Iraq. 
This was primarily tied to Bakr Sidqi who was suspected of having German sympathies. There seems 
to have been some truth to these assertions. According to the German envoy in Baghdad, Dr Fritz 
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Grobba, Sidqi would repeatedly enquire about the prospects of purchasing arms from Germany.345 The 
Foreign Office conveyed unease over the outcome of such purchases: German instructors would soon 
follow and German influence in Iraq would increase.346 Despite fears that Sidqi and the military 
establishment might eventually turn its arms against the poorly defended British airbases at Basra and 
Habbaniyah, it was decided to adopt a more forthcoming position regarding Iraqi arms requests in 
order to prevent any further “Germanification”.347  
 Following the violent reactions to the Peel Commission’s report in July 1937, the Foreign 
Office reintroduced the German bogey. This time the fear was not connected with the delivery of arms 
but over the effects of policies in Palestine. 
 Looking at the many papers written by George Rendel in late 1937, it becomes apparent that 
both his interest in and his knowledge of Iraq was rather limited. He preferred instead of dealing with 
Saudi Arabia, and to a somewhat lesser extent, with Egypt. Given that his main argument against 
partition revolved around the detrimental effects such a policy would have on the whole region, he 
was nonetheless bound also to consider Iraq. On 3 November Rendel drew up a chain of events which 
he considered likely to ensue should partition be implemented. Regarding Iraq he predicted that anti-
British sentiment would reach new heights: 
A new massacre of Assyrians would be a not improbable consequence, and the trouble is likely to 
become very serious in the more fanatical districts of Syria and Iraq. This in turn could hardly fail to 
lead to an Anglo-Iraqi crisis, with difficulties over the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty, and the position of our Air 
Force in Iraq. 348     
A week earlier he had recorded that Britain were “by practically every measure we take in Palestine, 
playing straight into Italian and German hands.” Furthermore, it was inconceivable “that our rivals and 
enemies should not draw the maximum advantage from this unhappy situation.”349 Archibald Clark-
Kerr, seemed to have held similar sentiments. In the crucial 19 November memorandum he argued that 
an enforced partition “would leave the field clear for unfriendly foreign activities, the effect of which 
might well be disastrous.”350      
It appears as if the Foreign Office attitude towards Iraq found ready adherents among the 
military planners.351 In a Cabinet meeting on 15 December 1937 regarding future defences, the Air 
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Staff put forward memorandum of their own. This branch spoke with great authority on Iraqi matters 
owing to the importance of the British air bases in the country:  
Events in Iraq...have of late given rise to some doubt whether the political stability of that country will 
be maintained and developed to the extent which is necessary for our Imperial interests...Moreover, the 
internal stability of both these States [the other being Egypt] is of the utmost importance to us, a matter 
over which we have now renounced the means of immediate and effective control, but which may, 
nevertheless, require active intervention on our part should any serious degree of deterioration occur. 
Furthermore, the situation in Palestine is far from satisfactory, and it is apparent that our relations with 
the Moslem world...contain the germs of possible future troubles.352    
The Midfa’i Government did of course maintain proper conduct vis-à-vis Britain throughout the 
Munich crisis. It appears, nonetheless, that the event was damaging for the present ministry and for 
pro-British forces in general. For the sections in Iraqi society already predisposed towards Germany, 
her ruthless approach and subsequent success during the autumn of 1938 further augmented their 
admiration. Thus, it appears that after Munich the orientation of Iraq towards or away from Germany 
became a crucial dividing line in Iraqi politics.353 And even more importantly, the momentum was 
increasingly with Germany.   
   
The deterioration of Anglo-Iraqi relations 1939-1941 
 
While this thesis deals primarily with the 1937-38 period, the particular developments in Iraq warrants 
a brief look at the ensuing period.  
Britain would eventually experience a complete fall-out with Iraq. This led ultimately to the 
short-lived war of May 1941. According to the Iraqi government of the time, this rupture was caused 
in part by dismay over Britain’s Palestine policy.354 Consequently, it would appear that the most 
pessimistic Foreign Office predictions of November 1937 did eventually transpire almost four years 
after they were first presented.  
Despite the fact that it was the Pan-Arab faction of the army which brought down the Midfa’i 
ministry, its successor was in many ways of similar make-up. Like Midfa’i before him, Nuri al-Said’s 
pro-British persuasion did not prevent him from allying himself with the nationalist officers headed by 
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Salah al-Din al-Sabbagh.355 In due time, however, he would experience the very same problems as his 
predecessor. While Britain had anticipated that the White Paper of 1939 would finally satisfy Arab 
grievances over Palestine - and thus relieve the domestic situation for moderates like Nuri - this was 
not to be. Following the lead of the Mufti and his Higher Arab Committee, the Iraqi Pan-Arabists 
denounced the White Paper’s recommendations outright. The political realities in Iraq were such that 
Nuri was bound to follow suit and publically condemn the paper - despite being a supporter of the 
recommendations himself.356         
In accordance with a prearranged deal Nuri Pasha resigned as Prime Minister on 31 March 
1940.357 Nuri apparently believed he could maintain control of Iraqi foreign policy from his new post 
as Foreign Minister. His assumption, however, proved to be erroneous.  
 Nuri’s successor, Sunni Rashid Ali al-Gaylani, had a long history of opposition to the Anglo-
Arab treaty of 1930. Furthermore, as a staunch Arab nationalist he held strong views on the Palestine 
issue. After he assumed power Anglo-Iraqi relations deteriorated fairly quickly. This development was 
closely related to the serious military setbacks suffered by Britain in the spring of 1940. As a result of 
these blows most of the Iraqi ruling elites were by mid 1940 convinced that Germany would emerge 
victorious in the war.  
Rashid Ali repeatedly told the British that he was prepared to cooperate more willingly once 
their Palestine policy had been modified even further.358 These demands led to serious discussion in 
the British War Cabinet. Foreign Secretary Halifax, Colonial Secretary Lloyd and War Cabinet 
member Chamberlain were all in favour of ceding to the Iraqi demands. Prime Minister Churchill, 
however, was not. The ardent anti-appeaser stated that: “Iraq had done nothing to deserve special 
consideration from us, and would be far more likely to be impressed by military success.”359 
Churchill’s view prevailed and no further concessions were given. 
The Golden Square soon took full control of the Rashid Ali ministry. This time around the 
officers were prepared to challenge the Anglo-Iraqi treaty. Counting on German support should 
hostilities ensue, the Iraqis informed Britain that any further landing of imperial forces at Basra was 
dependent on prior approval.360  
Britain had long been concerned about developments in Iraq. Rather than comply with the new 
Iraqi restrictions the British Ambassador to Iraq, Kinahan Cornwallis informed Rashid Ali that more 
British troops was soon to arrive at Basra. This was met with Iraqi intransigence. The government 
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ordered Iraqi troops to take up positions in the hills surrounding the Habbaniyya airfield. The Iraqis 
then informed Britain that all her air activity was to cease immediately and that any plane trying to 
take off would be shot down. Britain refused to comply and instead demanded the Iraqi forces 
encircling the air base withdrawn. When the Iraqis failed to act on these instructions, the British 
commander at Habbaniyya ordered his troops to attack on 2 May. War had erupted.361  
 Three days later a major dispute arose within British ranks. The nature of this discussion was 
such that it is possible to see it as a continuation of the debate of 1937-38. This time, however, 
opposite attitudes prevailed.  
To alleviate the British forces at Habbaniyya the Chiefs of Staff ordered an Iraqi relief force to 
be diverted from Palestine. This was labelled the Habforce. General Officer Commanding-in-Chief of 
Middle East Command, Archibald Wavell opposed this move. For one, he doubted that that the 
Habforce would be strong enough to relieve Habbaniyya. Secondly, he feared the regional 
ramifications of open war with Iraq. In a letter to the war cabinet Wavell wrote that it was his “duty to 
warn you in the gravest possible terms...that I consider the prolongation of fighting in Iraq will 
seriously endanger the defence of Palestine and Egypt. The political repercussions will be 
incalculable...I therefore urge again most strongly that a settlement should be negotiated as early as 
possible.”362 Wavell’s argument very much resembled that which the Eastern Department had fostered 
almost four years earlier. In 1941, however, the British prime minister was not an appeaser. Winston 
Churchill replied that he was “deeply disturbed at General Wavell’s attitude...He gives me the 
impression of being tired out.”363 To renewed protests from Wavell, the Prime Minister ordered British 
forces to march on Baghdad.  
From a British perspective, the operation turned out to be very successful one. By the end of 
the month Iraq had surrendered.  It seems highly likely that Churchill’s swift decision-making was 
crucial. German documents do reveal that Hitler had concrete plans for Iraq which he described as 
significant for the Middle East as a whole because of their effect on British communications and for 
her capacity to wage war in other theatres. British bombing of the airfields at Baghdad and Mosul 
effectively averted such developments as it prevented the German’s from establishing themselves in 
Iraq.364 Left on their own the Iraqi army was no match for the British forces.  
  It is important to note that the events of 1941 did arise following events which were more or 
less unforeseeable in 1937. In neighbouring Syria an anti-British regime had been installed following 
the collapse of France in 1940. Accompanied by serious British military setbacks in the spring of 1940 
– and corresponding German success - this served to create conditions were the militant Arab 
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nationalists finally deemed it possible to form a viable government entirely opposed to the Anglo-Iraqi 
treaty.365  
The key to understanding Iraq’s increasing hostility towards Britain lies perhaps not so much 
in external factors such as Palestine, but in the Anglo-Iraqi relationship itself. What made Iraq 
different from Saudi-Arabia and Egypt was the depth and longevity of anti-British sentiment among 
influential groups, and interconnected with this a strong desire for genuine independence. Britain’s 
efforts to solve the mess in Palestine certainly contributed to reinforce their preconceptions: Britain 
was an imperial power which sought to control the Arab World indefinitely, and their backing of the 
Zionist project in Palestine was a branch in the larger scheme of domination. But this was in one sense 
a “wanted” development as such an outlook on the world benefitted the forces which sought an 
absolute break with Britain. In that respect the Palestine issue can be seen not only as an important 
instrument in domestic politics but also one in the larger struggle for Iraqi independence.  
 
The Foreign Office prophecies – the verdict 
 
In contrast to their largely misconstrued predictions on Saudi Arabia and Egypt, the Foreign Office 
prophecies concerning Iraq seem to have materialized with the coup of 1941.  However, when the total 
breakdown of Anglo-Iraqi relations occurred Britain had pursued the conciliating line to the limit. This 
does indeed suggest that whole idea of appeasement over Palestine was something of a dead end all 
along. It should have been pretty obvious from 1938 and onwards that it was always going to be Mufti 
Hajj Amin al-Husseini and his unyielding faction who would dominate the political arena. Their 
approach was one of constantly calling for further concessions regardless of the offers currently on the 
table. This was made perfectly evident when the Mufti denounced the 1939 White Paper and in effect 
denied every other Arab state the option of accepting it.366   
By 1941, in fact, all of the main recommendations outlined by George Rendel in the second 
half of 1937 had been adopted: partition had been called off, Jewish immigration severely limited and 
serious restrictions on land sale to Jews had been imposed. These concessions had not put an end to 
the Palestine Rebellion (the revolt was suppressed in 1939 only through the extensive use of military 
force), not checked Iraqi criticism of British policy and it did not prevent Iraq from adopting a pro-
German position when global developments finally allowed for this to happen.367 What thus becomes 
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apparent is that by the late 1930s Britain’s standing in Iraq was such that she was incapable of 
improving her reputation in Iraq simply through any adjustment of policy in Palestine.   
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Transjordan 
 
there are indications that trouble is brewing in Transjordan. The Amir Abdullah, partly by his ready 
acceptance of our partition policy, and partly by his ill-timed flirtation with the Turks at a moment when 
they were being particularly anti-Arab, has become regarded as a traitor to the Arab cause by the great 
majority of the Arabs. It may well be then that, when we begin enforcing our Palestine policy, or when 
the situation in Palestine enters on the next stage in its inevitable process of deterioration, a movement 
against the Amir Abdullah will develop. Ibn Saud, who has been told that we propose to relinquish our 
control over Transjordan may well be preparing to step in in such an emergency, if only with a view to 
protecting his northern flank.368 
Having been thoroughly routed by Ibn Saud’s Wahhabi forces in the battle at Turaba in 1919, 
and having received no encouragement from the British regarding the “vacant” Iraqi throne, 
Abdullah realised his options were fading quickly.369 As a result Abdullah decided to turn his 
attention to the rather uninviting area east of the Jordan River. Abdullah and his entourage set 
off from Medina on 26 September 1920. After a long journey which included a stay in Maan, 
Abdullah finally reached Amman on 2 March 1921. Here he set up a permanent camp. 
Abdullah soon declared to the British that he intended to raise an army in with the objective of 
invading Syria from the South.370 
 Ten days later, on 12 March, Britain convened a Middle East conference in Cairo. 
When the attention turned to the area east of the Jordan, Colonial Secretary Winston Churchill 
suggested Abdullah as the future ruler of that Kingdom. As Churchill had already promised 
the Iraqi throne to Abdullah’s younger brother Faisal, not to mention that Abdullah himself 
was already situated in Amman, the Colonial Secretary considered this to be convenient 
solution for all the parties involved. Abdullah’s qualities also seem to fit the bill. The ideal 
person, in the words of the illustrious T.E. Lawrence, was someone “who was not too 
powerful...who was not an inhabitant of Transjordan, but who relied on His Majesty’s 
Government for the retention of his office.”371 
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Despite certain misgivings by some conferees, it was decided to pursue this solution. 
Following a series of talks between Churchill and Abdullah in Jerusalem, Abdullah – on the 
condition that he renounced his declared attention of conquering Syria and recognized the 
legitimacy of the British Mandate - accepted the administration of Transjordan for a period of 
six months, with a personal grant of £5,000 per month.372 Deemed highly unlikely at the time, 
but for Abdullah these six months were in fact to stretch into a lifetime. 
 After three troublesome years where Abdullah managed to get into heavy debt and 
attract the hostility of Major-General Peake Pasha – Commanding Officer of the newly 
constituted Arab Legion – relations with Britain reached a low point in August 1924. While 
Abdullah was away on his yearly pilgrimage, the British decided to frame an ultimatum. For 
Abdullah to return to Amman, it was demanded of him that he resolved the economic mess, 
that he allow for more British military inspection and control and that he abolished the 
department of tribal administration. On 14 August - the same day that the newly appointed 
Resident to Transjordan, Colonel Henry Cox, was suppose to deliver the ultimatum to 
Abdullah - Wahhabi raiders conducted a violent attack on villages south of Amman.373 
Aeroplanes from the RAF intervened and bombed the Wahhabis into retreat. The incident was 
the perfect reminder that Abdullah was entirely dependent upon the British to retain his 
throne. The ultimatum was delivered as planned, and Abdullah – allegedly with tears in his 
eyes – had no option to accept the conditions.374 
 The event marked a new phase in Abdullah’s relations with Britain. The policy now 
pursued by Cox was one of relegating Abdullah to the role of a decorative head of state - a 
person who reigned but did not rule.375 In this he largely succeeded. Contrary to Egypt, where 
Britain at least tried to give an illusion of an Anglo-Arab partnership, no such endeavour was 
deemed necessary in Transjordan.376 It was thus apparent for all to see that Abdullah’s 
dynasty rested entirely upon British might and money. Were they to go away, his Kingdom 
would crumble. 
 Abdullah recognised the limitations of his rule as much as anyone. He did not have 
any particular liking for the British, but furnished with more pragmatism than the majority of 
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Arab leaders he accepted the current realities and tried to manipulate British rule rather than 
oppose it. While these traits made Abdullah fairly popular among the British, it did not sit 
equally well with Arabs in general. His blatant subservience to the British made him a pariah 
to the more nationalistically minded – a perpetual reminder of Britain’s continued hold on the 
region.  
 In 1928 Transjordan finally acquired an official agreement with Britain. While it gave 
Abdullah a recognised status in international law - as His Highness the Amir of Transjordan - 
its foremost purpose was once again to consolidate British control. The law basically stated 
that the Amir agreed to be guided on any issue which the British might wish to guide him. 
Also, due to fears that Syrian nationalists might seek to convert Transjordan into an anti-
French bastion, no officials other than Transjordanians could be appointed without British 
consent.377     
  
Transjordan and Palestine  
 
Although their governments were different Transjordan and Palestine fell under the same 
mandate. The high commissioner for Palestine was at the same time the high commissioner 
for Transjordan. Their economies were also much intertwined: from 1927 they shared a 
common currency; the long border between them was more or less open allowing scores of 
seasonal workers from Transjordan to freely enter Palestine; likewise, the new Transjordanian 
bureaucracy was partially manned by educated Palestinians.378  
 Like in the rest of the region the Wailing Wall disturbances in 1929 aroused some 
compassion in Transjordan. Demonstrations were held in several towns and some tribes even 
threatened to cross the Jordan River in order to actively join the unrest. From a British 
perspective this was obviously unacceptable. Abdullah was thus given the task of checking all 
further manifestations in support of the Palestine Arabs. The Amir’s effort proved highly 
successful, so much so that Britain could move forces stationed in Transjordan to Palestine 
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where they were needed to quell the unrest. Following this ordeal Britain decided to award 
Abdullah by giving him a private estate of lands.379       
While his efforts to repress aspiring Arab nationalist sympathies in Transjordan hardly 
made him popular, Abdullah’s ties with the Zionist movement were to become far more 
damaging to his reputation. In fact, no other aspect of his rule was to incite as much suspicion 
and anger from the region as Abdullah’s flirtation with the Zionist leadership.380  
Despite British warnings that leasing land to Jews was highly unwise, Abdullah 
decided to do just that. In January 1933 he signed what was supposed to be a secret agreement 
with members of the Jewish Agency granting them the right to lease large areas of mostly 
barren land in the Jordan Valley. It was not to remain a secret for long however. When made 
public it caused a storm of protest in the Palestine press.381 Even inside Transjordan, where 
public censure of Abdullah was usually restrained, the agreement produced quite a bit of 
uproar.382  
As for Abdullah’s motives, they seem to have been twofold. Given that Abdullah was 
almost totally dependent upon British grants – funding which in any case never seemed 
sufficient - he was keen to find alternative sources of income. The second motive was far 
more grand. Despite promises to Britain in the opposite, Abdullah had never discarded his 
previous goal of uniting Greater Syria under his crown. Acquiring Palestine was seen as the 
first stage in such a scheme. Abdullah reasoned that by establishing good relations with the 
Zionists in Palestine he would then be able to bridge the gap between the two populations. 
This would put him in a situation where both the Zionists and the Palestine Arabs were more 
liable to accept him as the future ruler in a unified Palestine-Transjordan.383         
 In the spring of 1934 Abdullah was ready to publicly announce his designs. His 
emissary, Muhammed al-Unsi, was sent to Political Department of the Jewish Agency in 
Jerusalem where he put forward several suggestions. Apart from the unification itself al-Unsi 
proposed that: the Arabs would have to recognise the Mandate - including Jewish rights; the 
Prime Minister from each community would be at Abdullah’s disposal and carry out their 
policy after consultation with the Amir; an agreement had to be reached between the Jews and 
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the Palestine themselves regarding Jewish immigration and land purchases. If that was not 
enough, Al-Unsi revealed the full dimension of Abdullah’s strategy by adding that Syria 
might join the Kingdom at a later stage.384   
 While al-Unsi was in Jerusalem Abdullah himself met representatives from the two 
leading parties in Palestine (the Palestine Arab Party of the Husseinis and the National 
Defence Party of the Nashashibis) where he put forward his ideas - though hardly in the same 
blunt fashion as his emissary had done in Jerusalem. The outcome of these meetings is 
illustrative for how the Palestine issue was to play out in the coming years. Hajj Amin al-
Husseini rejected the proposals outright. He insisted that the Mandate had to be dissolved, the 
Balfour Declaration proclaimed void and the Arab population be given full independence. 
Raghib Nashashibi on the other hand declared his full support to all of the Amir’s 
proposals.385       
 Having shown restraint in their treatment of Abdullah following his ill-timed leasing 
agreement with the Zionist Agency in January 1933, the Husseini controlled newspaper al 
Jami’ah al-Arabiyyah now decided it was time to release all their venom upon Abdullah. The 
Amir was described as the “Jews’ friend” and his Nashashibi allies as traitors.386 The cause of 
this fury was obvious: the question was no longer about Jewish immigration into Transjordan 
but Palestine’s very future.  
Following the Husseinis’ bid to tarnish Abdullah’s reputation the Nashashibis were 
forced to initiate some sort of counter campaign. This effort became apparent when Abdullah 
on his way to London in June 1934 passed through Palestine. The Nashshibi Party had 
arranged for enthusiastic crowds to greet the Amir as his procession entered the various 
Palestinian towns. Soon after it became obvious that the Abdullah-Nashashibi alliance had 
become a permanent affair. In connection with Italy’s attack on Abyssinia in 1935 the two 
parties collaborated in an anti-Italian propaganda conceived by Britain. Then, at the end of 
1935 Raghib Nashashibi went as far as to declare his support for Abdullah’s Greater Syria 
scheme.387  
As regards Arab nationalism, this remained during the first half of the 1930s a fairly 
low-key affair in Transjordan. The elites inside the country were not primarily of the literate 
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type but tribal sheikhs. These elements - very much like in Saudi Arabia - stood outside the 
orbit of Arab nationalism.388 Also, since these elites were highly dependent upon their British 
patron any ideology which might be considered to be hostile to British presence in the Middle 
East was not a sound one to adopt.   
There was nonetheless a political opposition in Transjordan, and this faction 
established in the early 1930s contacts with the Pan-Arab movement centred around 
Abdullah’s Hashemite rivals. In the summer of 1933 King Faisal of Iraq visited Amman. 
Abdullah suspected that this had come about as a result of contacts with the Iraqi Monarch 
and Sharif Shakir – the Amir’s former friend and comrade-in-arms. Following Abdullah’s 
recent dealings with the Zionists the opposition in Transjordan – consisting mainly of 
members of the Istiqlal party – had been strengthened by a growing fear that the country was 
about to be thrown open to Jewish colonisation.389 As a result these elements sought a 
solution where Transjordan was to be united with Iraq under King Faisal.390  
Throughout the summer of 1933 the situation in Amman became very intense. Both 
factions organised conventions and open meetings where they endorsed their own scheme and 
hurled abuse at the other party. Faisal’s untimely death in September 1933 would however put 
an end to the political tensions inside Transjordan. Upon receiving news of his brother’s 
demise Abdullah arranged for a reconciliation with the Istiqlal. As for an Iraqi lead Arab 
federation, Gilbert MacKereth noted in 1936 that “much hope of this died with the late King 
Feisal in 1933”.  But the same MacKereth now reported that “the Pan-Arab phoenix [was 
rising] again with an astonishing display of vigour”.391 This time the arena was Palestine. 
 
The Palestine Rebellion 
 
The Rebellion probably presented Abdullah with more opportunities than any other Arab 
leader. His relations with Britain were excellent and he was not caught up in internal unrest 
like Iraq. The stage was set for Abdullah to do what he had failed to do in 1934, that is, to 
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enhance his own position in Palestine and in the region as a whole. This Abdullah hoped to 
accomplish by mediating peace between Britain and the Palestine Arabs.392  
 It must have been very satisfying for the Amir when the newly-founded Palestinian 
organisation - the Arab Higher Committee - elicited the Amir’s active support. The AHC was 
made up of both the Husseini and the Nashashibi clans. While the Mufti was personally 
opposed to the request forwarded to Abdullah in April 1936, he was unable to prevent this 
course of action.393      
 As has been told already, several rounds of negotiations were held before the first 
wave of unrest was brought to an end in October 1936. As a whole, the process can be seen as 
one where Abdullah expanded his support base in Palestine and strengthened a legitimacy 
which of late had been waning. He had undoubtedly been the most “moderate” of the Arab 
leaders - asking the Palestine Arabs to compromise and play down their demands. But, he had 
also tried to extract concessions (most importantly a temporary suspension of Jewish 
immigration) from both the British and the Jews.394  
It would be a mistake, however, to maintain that the negotiating process only brought 
benefits for Abdullah. Throughout the summer of 1936 the Husseini faction – mainly through 
intimidation and outright violence - acquired an ever more dominating role in the AHC. Then, 
in August Amin al-Husseini himself informed Abdullah that his services were no longer 
needed. Al-Husseini was quoted saying that “the Amir and the moderates are trying to end the 
strike without getting anything in return.”395 To make matters even worse the Iraqi Foreign 
Minister Nuri al-Said was called in to replace him. When an agreement was reached in 
October Abdullah’s name was included in the final document. Despite having had nothing to 
do with this part of the process Raghib Nashashibi insisted that the Amir be credited. 396 
 Compared to Egypt and Iraq, public manifestations in support of the Palestine Arabs 
remained fairly modest during the summer and autumn of 1936. British reports throughout 
these months in large part credited this to Abdullah and his determination to maintain peace 
inside the country. The same reports did nonetheless describe numerous instances of sabotage 
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related to the Rebellion in Palestine. British owned oil-pipelines were destroyed and 
government buildings vandalised.397  
While Arab nationalist thought was not particularly widespread or well-developed in 
Transjordan, Palestine was all the same its closest neighbour. The population of Transjordan 
was thus bound to feel compassion with the Palestine Arab populations’ plight, regardless of 
their feelings towards the more extreme demands of the Husseinis.  
In June 1936 John Bagot Glubb, from his position in Amman, focused on the distinct 
nature of the Transjordanian public to explain the relative peace in the country. Glubb 
maintained that the majority of Transjordan’s 350,000 population lacked any serious anti-
Hashemite or anti-British sentiment. “Just as in Palestine every Arab thinks he has a 
grievance...in Transjordan, the ordinary Arab has no grievance at all.”398 Glubb’s superior, 
Resident Harold Fox had a slightly different take on the matter: “peace reigns because it has 
an Arab Amir and Government and no Jewish problem.”399 
 
The Peel Report 
 
While several of the Eastern Department’s gloomy reports predicted armed uprising in 
Transjordan following a partition of Palestine, the country was never a centre of attention 
when threats to Britain were assessed. For a number of reasons, however, Transjordan and its 
ruler were to play an important role in the process which led to the partition proposal’s 
demise. 
 The Peel Commission’s report recommended that the proposed Arab section of 
Palestine be incorporated into Transjordan. Although not spelled out directly in the final draft, 
it was assumed by all that Amir Abdullah was to become ruler of the new Kingdom. It is 
difficult to exaggerate the level of dismay this decision caused throughout the Arab world - 
especially so among the Arab leaders. To them, the elevation of Abdullah was almost more 
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intolerable than the setting up of the Jewish state itself.400  Intentionally or not, by this 
decision the British had awarded themselves with yet another major obstacle on the already 
difficult path towards the partitioning of Palestine.  
When reviewing the Peel report one week before its publication, George Rendel (who 
at this point had not yet adopted his vehement resistance to the principle of partition) jotted 
down a number of objections. Regarding Abdullah especially, he made the following 
assessment: 
the proposal that the new Arab state should be incorporated in Transjordan, while no doubt sound in 
principle, is open to the somewhat accidental objection that this will presumably mean that it will come 
under the rule of the Amir Abdullah, who is regarded by most of the Arab world as very doubtfully 
loyal to the Arab cause...The Amir Abdullah, though possessing many virtues, is politically short 
sighted, and a good deal given to petty intrigue. It may be then that to hand over large areas of Palestine 
to a new state under his rule will lead to difficulties of a new type between Transjordan on the one hand 
and other Arab states, such as Syria and Saudi Arabia, on the other. This aspect of the problem will 
need careful consideration, and may make it desirable to impose severe conditions on the on the Amir 
Abdullah before the Arab areas are definitely handed over to him.401  
This evaluation not only made a lot of sense, but much of it was fairly obvious. Consequently, 
Rendel was not the only official expressing qualms over Abdullah’s projected role. The 
blatantly “partitionist”, William Ormsby-Gore, seems to have been equally unconvinced of 
the decision to elevate the Amir. Indeed, this aspect was especially problematic as the report 
did not go into details as to why the commission had decided to recommend a unification of 
Transjordan and Arab Palestine.  What is more, promotion of Abdullah was not supported by 
any influential British official. Nor was it part of the commission’s original intentions.402 As a 
result of these concerns Ormsby-Gore requested leading member of the Commission and 
professor of Colonial History at Oxford, Reginald Coupland, to clarify this issue. Coupland’s 
response was subsequently appended in a paper Ormsby-Gore presented to Cabinet on 25 
June 1937.      
Lord Peel and his colleagues considered the unification an act of justice. They 
regarded the decision to cut off Transjordan from the Palestine state in 1921-22 to be a 
mistake, and consequently saw in their work an opportunity to amend this. Furthermore, the 
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proposed Arab State would on its own be very small. In contrast, a merger with Transjordan 
would make for a viable unit.  Also, the entry of educated Palestinian Arab officials would 
help to counter the “desperately backward” features of Transjordanian society.  
These were on the whole reasonable arguments, but they formed only a part of the 
dilemma. Concerning Abdullah especially, the commission seemed to believe that he would 
be able to attract the moderates in Palestine and thus counteract the more extremist elements. 
“the Nashashibi and all those Arabs who desire a quiet life (though under present conditions 
they dare not openly oppose the Extremists) are probably on Abdullah’s side at heart.”403  
This was simply a dreadful reading of the current situation. To begin with, the promotion of 
Abdullah gave the Mufti of Jerusalem and his radical following an additional cause to oppose 
partition. Secondly, this section was contrary to the commission’s belief considerably more 
powerful than their moderate rivals.  
Arguably, the most crucial aspect of their decision was the effect an Abdullah led 
Palestine-Transjordan unit under would have for inter-Arab rivalries. This aspect, in fact, was 
discussed neither in the final report nor in Coupland’s complementary letter. To the Amir’s 
life-long adversary Ibn Saud and to his Hashemite rivals in Iraq, it was simply unacceptable 
that Britain intended to enlarge Abdullah’s Kingdom.  
Beginning in March 1937 more specific rumours began leaking from the Royal 
Commission. The word was that Amir Abdullah was to receive the proposed Arab areas 
following partition. Many Zionists quietly welcomed such an outcome.404 The same thing 
could not be said of the Arab leaders.  
The reaction of the Mufti serves to illustrate the scale of the Arab resentment. The 
Turkish consul in Jerusalem reported to the Zionists that he was so hostile to partition that he 
might be prepared to make a deal with them.405 Although nothing came out of this incident, it 
should anyhow have demonstrated to the British that setting up Abdullah as King over the 
new Arab state would dramatically increase the difficulties of implementing partition. Indeed, 
when the Commission’s report was finally released in July the reactions to Abdullah’s 
proposed gains were spontaneous and violent. More importantly, they had an instant, 
detrimental effect on the Amir’s standing in the region.  
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Raghib al-Nashashibi, leader of the moderate National Defence Party and the Mufti’s 
main political rival, had upon hearing the preceding rumours come to the conclusion that 
Abdullah’s leadership might offer his party considerable advantages. They would replace the 
then ousted Husseini clan as leaders of the indigenous Arab community, and they would be 
awarded key positions in the new administration.406  
Shortly before the release of the Peel report Abdullah urged the Nashashibi party to 
initiate a campaign against the Mufti faction. They acted upon this request and withdrew from 
the AHC only two days before the report was released. This was widely interpreted as a 
support for partition. The problem was that there existed no unity within the Nashashibi 
organisation. The leadership also seemed to lack resolve. Upon witnessing the almost 
universal denunciation of the report doubt crept into the party. Two weeks after its release 
they saw no other way than to revoke their previous support for partition and return to the 
Arab fold.407  
Inside the Zionist camp the shortcomings of the Nashashibi clan were well known. 
Moshe Shertok, then head of the political section of the Jewish Agency, had for some time 
warned his associates of the dangers which lay ahead should they choose to cooperate with 
the Nashashibis. Shertok regarded the National Defence Party as unreliable, of an unstable 
make-up and inclined to modify its position according to popular opinion.408 It thus seems as 
though Abdullah may have made much the same mistake as the Peel Commission, that is 
overlooked the Nashashibis’ volatility and miscalculated their standing within Palestine 
society. 
Within weeks of the Peel reports release Abdullah found himself all alone. Several 
assassination plots against him emanating from both Syria and Palestine were averted. Even 
among his own followers they were those who were opposed to partition.  Rumours suggested 
that the most intransigent were in fact prepared to act against him should Ibn Saud agree to 
invade Transjordan. So strong was Abdullah’s sense of isolation that he sent his close 
confidant Muhammad al-Unsi to Jerusalem to ensure that the Jewish Agency was not about to 
desert him in favour of more popular Arab leaders.409  
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Abdullah and the Arab world 
 
Part of the Iraqi outburst against partition had been targeted directly at Abdullah. Despite 
being told by the British that he should not rush to publicly announce his support for partition 
as it would leave him open for criticism, Abdullah had made several statements in this 
direction. The Amir thus earned himself the dubious honour of being the only Arab leader to 
have come out in support of partition. Iraqi Prime Minister Hikmat Sulayman expressed in his 
opening contact with the British, that “by his acceptance of the partition scheme, Abdullah 
had brought himself in contempt.”410  Sulayman’s denunciation set the standard for what was 
later to be printed by the Iraqi press. The London Times’ correspondent had the following to 
say, “The Amir Abdullah, who stands to gain most from the partition of Palestine, has been 
treated so roughly by the Iraqi Press as to suggest that the Pan-Arabs or the Court had hoped 
that Great Britain would obligingly hand over the proposed Arab State in Palestine to the 
Government of Baghdad.”411 
Once again it must be emphasized that there were other issues at play. The Iraqi 
Government had its particular reasons to come out strongly against Abdullah. The Bakr Sidqi 
coup of October 1936 had brought about the loss of power for Abdullah’s nephew Ghazi, 
King of Iraq. As a result, Abdullah had initiated his own private campaign to secure the 
Monarch’s continued influence. His tactless attempts to interfere in Iraqi politics, however, 
had left even Ghazi annoyed.412   
The Iraqi Government was furious. They repeatedly tried to get Britain to curb 
Abdullah’s indiscrete meddling, but with little success. Thus, when Abdullah flagged his 
support for partition it awarded the Iraqi Government with the perfect opportunity to discredit 
him and to counteract the potential effect of his intrigues.413  
The underlying reason for Ghazi’s aversion towards the Amir was linked to Hashemite 
rivalry. When Abdullah’s brother, King Faisal of Iraq, passed away in 1933 Abdullah was 
convinced that he was going to be the bearer of the Hashemite claim to the Syrian throne and 
leader of the Arab unity movement. As a result, he adopted a paternalistic attitude towards 
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Faisal’s heir, Ghazi. Ghazi however, was not to be intimidated. His father had been - despite 
certain treaty obligations to Britain - an independent head of state. In contrast, Abdullah was 
totally reliant upon British guidance and subsidies and thus incapable of pursuing an 
independent policy.414 Under no circumstances would King Ghazi accept that this “British 
client” be head of the Hashemite dynasty.      
 These issues were in fact crucial to how Abdullah was perceived not only in Iraq, but 
throughout much of the Arab world. The way the Amir had risen to power, indeed the very 
creation of the Transjordanian state, implied the non-fulfilment of the Great Arab Revolt’s 
vision of an Arab Kingdom. Abdullah wished to present himself as the Arab champion of the 
desert set on liberating Damascus and restoring Arab glory. The reality was somewhat 
different. By 1937 he was still a puppet ruler by British grace in a remote an artificial 
principality.415  
 
British reactions  
 
Ormsby-Gore immediately realised the damage Sulayman’s attack had inflicted on the 
partition campaign. His denunciation “heartened the Mufti and the irreconcilable elements 
long opposed to Britain in Palestine, and depressed Abdullah and the friends and moderate 
elements favourable to us in Palestine”416 This was all perfectly true, but should not the 
Colonial Secretary have foreseen that this was by far the most likely outcome considering the 
Arabs well-known antipathy towards the Amir? Like most British officials Ormsby-Gore 
would probably preferred a solution where the Mufti would preside over the proposed Arab 
State. Al-Husseini’s increasing intransigence towards Britain - and towards partition in 
particular - effectively ruled out any such solution.417  
 The difficulties associated with elevating Abdullah was not foreseen by the specialists 
only. In the Common’s debate on the partition proposal held on 20 July 1937, Scottish Labour 
politician Cambell Stephen made the following observation: 
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I can quite well understand that the Arabs in Palestine do not want to have anything to do with the Emir 
Abdulla and his rule, because there are only 300,000 people in a territory three and a-half times the size 
of Palestine, and there has been no development of it under the Emir Abdulla. They will go to the most 
backward ruler in the whole of that vast country, and it is to be said that, as a reward for his 
misgovernment of Transjordania, that part of Palestine is to be added to his domains. I cannot 
understand what the members of the Royal Commission were thinking about when they made that 
suggestion.418  
 
Abdullah’s options 
 
While there can be little doubt as to British short-sightedness regarding their decision to 
elevate Abdullah, it is tempting to put some blame on the Amir himself. Arguably more aware 
of Arab sentiment than any British official, should he not have predicted the trouble that 
would ensue from his support of partition?   
It seems as though Abdullah throughout his reign was preoccupied above all with one 
concern: the territorial expansion of the Transjordanian state. Former Resident to Transjordan 
and close friend of Abdullah, Sir Alec Kirkbride, said of the Amir some thirty years later that 
he was “a born land grabber”.419  
Regarding Palestine especially, one leading historian on Abdullah maintains that up 
until 1937 this area had little place in his territorial ambitions. However, when the Peel Plan 
proposed that he was to rule over the new, enlarged Transjordan, “Abdullah jumped at the 
chance.”420 It is difficult to disagree with this assessment, but it misses an important aspect. 
Did in fact Abdullah have any real alternatives when the proposal was put forth? Taking into 
account Abdullah’s strong dependency on Britain, it seems as though they were at best very 
limited. As regards Abdullah’s own reputation, it is tempting to conclude that he was prepared 
to sacrifice this in order to enlarge his Kingdom. There was not really too much to sacrifice 
anyway. The Amir’s standing, keep in mind, was seriously tarnished by years of British 
affiliation. 
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Misgivings over Britain’s determination to implement partition did nevertheless arise 
early. In August Abdullah’s emissary Mohammed al-Unsi met with Jewish representatives. 
Al-Unsi expressed that his master doubted Britain’s sincerity. This wariness was based on 
several issues. The British Government had shown ambiguity during the Parliamentary 
debates, and again before the League of Nation’s Permanent Mandates Commission. Like 
many, Abdullah was also concerned over the circumstances surrounding Iraq’s denunciation. 
“The Amir believes that Hikmat Sulayman would not have dared to act in this way if the 
British had not allowed him to do so.” Finally, the Government in Palestine was not applying 
any measures to curb the freedom of action of the opponents of partition.421 These were 
indeed sound judgements. But while there might have been a an ever so slight possibility for 
Abdullah to have turned down Britain’s offer in July, there was at this point no way the Amir 
could break with the British. Just as Abdullah had become a serious liability for the British 
section in pursuit of partition, so had Britain more than ever before become a burden for 
Abdullah.  
If Abdullah did indeed make crucial miscalculations, it seems that the most 
detrimental were over British conduct rather than over the damage his support would cause 
him throughout the region. By early 1938 Abdullah had come to realize that Britain was 
probably not set on imposing its policy. Because of the Amir’s apparent misgivings the High 
Commissioner to Palestine, Lord Wauchope, had tried in January to assure Abdullah of 
Britain’s commitment to the Peel Commission’s report. This was apparently to no avail. In a 
meeting with representatives of the Jewish Agency a few days later, the Amir made it 
perfectly clear that he no longer had any confidence in the British to stand by their previous 
commitments. He rightly regarded the Cabinet’s decision to appoint a technical committee the 
previous December as a “considered and contemplated withdrawal”. Abdullah emphasised 
that he for the duration of the Arab uprising had stood firmly behind the British. Now, while 
paying the price for this absolute support, the British showed no inclination to come to his aid. 
Abdullah could in fact reach no other conclusion that only the obstinate and violent Arabs had 
succeeded in extracting their demands from the English.422   
When partition was officially abandoned in November 1938, Abdullah immediately 
conveyed to the British that he expected compensation for his unfaltering support in the 
partition scheme, and for his success in keeping the internal opposition quiet throughout the 
                                                     
421
 Gelber, p. 118. 
422
 Gelber. p.129. 
101 
 
affair. Without much delay, London awarded Abdullah with a non-recurring grant of £1,500. 
In addition, the Amir’s chief minister, Tawfiq Abu’l-Huda, was invited to the round-table 
conference on Palestine ahead of the other Arab delegates in order to discuss Transjordan’s 
status.423  It is difficult to interpret the British response as anything other than an 
acknowledgment of the difficulties caused by their wavering over partition. 
 
The Foreign Office and Abdullah...and Ibn Saud 
 
By first dragging Abdullah into the Partition affair, only to depart from the scheme six months 
later, it seems rather obvious that Abdullah became an unintended victim of British 
vacillation. Indeed, when the Foreign Office initiated their campaign to overturn partition in 
order to appease the “prominent” Arab states Abdullah’s fate was not really a concern of 
theirs.  It is thus illuminating to observe how the Foreign Office perceived the Transjordanian 
ruler and how they rationalized when advocating policies clearly detrimental to his position.  
September through October 1937 saw a delicate affair involving both Saudi Arabia 
and Transjordan.  Major John Glubb, then commander of the British Legion’s Desert Patrol, 
had for some time warned London that Ibn Saud had increased the number of forces along the 
Transjordanian border. In a report posted on September 10, Glubb concluded that Ibn Saud’s 
motives were most likely of an aggressive nature.  Glubb was also convinced that weapons 
designated for the Arabs in Palestine were passing through Saudi Arabia. Given that these 
stories, if true, posed a definite threat to British interests - and that they were presently 
causing disquiet in Transjordan - Glubb suggested that the issue be looked into by the British 
Minister in Jeddah. In the following week Glubb dispatched two more reports on the threat 
posed by Ibn Saud, each more alarming. So how did the Foreign Office react to the advice 
given by this highly respected officer? 
 It appears as if the Foreign Office at first were prepared to ignore Major Glubb’s 
request altogether. Only when the Colonial Office picked up on the affair and urged for a 
response did the Foreign Office provide a statement.424 To begin with, Rendel strongly 
advised against having the British representative currently located in Jeddah look into the 
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matter. While Reader Bullard was on leave Arthur Trott was Britain’s leading official in 
Saudi Arabia. According to Rendel, Trott’s inexperience, and the fact that he was situated in 
Hejaz and not Jeddah, precluded him from running a thorough investigation. The fact of the 
matter was that Rendel very much disliked Trott’s outlook, or as he put it himself, “We 
recently received a despatch from Mr. Trott which, in our view and in that of Sir R. 
Bullard...and of the Embassy at Cairo...gave – quite unintentionally – a very misleading view 
of the Saudi attitude towards Palestine.” It is thus reasonable to assert that Rendel feared 
Trott’s investigation would confirm Glubb’s allegations. Such an outcome would have been 
embarrassing for Ibn Saud, but even more so for his British advocate, George Rendel. 
 The alternative, as suggested by Rendel, was to approach the Saudi Minister, Sheikh 
Hafiz, in London. Anyhow, this approach was also somewhat problematic as the minister was 
probably “in so indignant a frame of mind about our Palestine policy that it may be a little 
difficult to ask him for any favour on this question...which I am personally – after my recent 
painful interviews with him – most reluctant to do.” 
More than anything else the memo reads as an apologist statement in favour of Ibn 
Saud. On the receiving end, Amir Abdullah - Britain’s closest associate in the region. Rendel 
maintained that it was “natural enough that he [Ibn Saud] should take preliminary measures to 
prepare for a possible struggle against the Amir. This does not, I think, mean any aggressive 
intention on his part at this stage. To anyone familiar with the attitude adopted by the Amir 
Abdullah towards Ibn Saud during the past seven years, it is obvious that Ibn Saud could not 
be expected to trust the Amir an inch.” A more impartial estimate of previous Saudi-
Transjordan enmity would invariably show that Ibn Saud was no less the aggressor than 
Abdullah.  
The Amir did not receive any credit from Rendel for his support of Britain’s current 
Palestine policy. Quite the contrary. “The Amir Abdullah, partly by his ready acceptance of 
our partition policy, and partly by his ill-timed flirtation with the Turks at a moment when 
they were being particularly anti-Arab, has become regarded as a traitor to the Arab cause by 
the great majority of the Arabs.”425 
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The underlying message of this statement is problematic. Was not the support of 
Abdullah called for by the British in the first place? From Abdullah’s point of view, was not 
collaboration the only genuine alternative?  
As predicted by most British officials the Amir’s support of partition had made him 
immensely unpopular throughout the Middle-East.  But, as this was a British proposal it is 
difficult to accept that the Foreign Office was not prepared to take at least some responsibility 
for his difficulties. More troubling still was the Eastern Department’s tendency to side with 
Abdullah’s main adversary Ibn Saud. This decision was obviously influenced by their general 
dislike of the partition proposal and must be seen as part of their campaign to overturn that 
decision. However, when considering the ease in which the Eastern Department explained 
away the palpable Saudi hostility, it is tempting once again to ascribe some of it to the special 
position held by the Saudi Monarch.  
Even more troubling, perhaps, was Rendel’s predictions regarding Abdullah’s likely 
actions. The Head of the Eastern Department implied that following a partition - which 
awarded Abdullah with the Arab section of Palestine - the Amir would virtually overnight 
invade Saudi Arabia to reclaim contested areas. Adhering to this version Rendel ascribed 
military movement along the Saudi border to defensive measures, measures which to most 
observers indicated hostility on Ibn Saud’s part.  
The fact of the matter was much simpler. Ibn Saud could not accept the 
aggrandizement of Abdullah, not mainly because of fear, but because of long-standing rivalry 
and general contempt. This was not lost on all British officials. From Transjordan, acting 
High Commissioner, W.D. Battershill, made the simple observation that “There is reason to 
believe that Ibn Saud dislikes the scheme for the partition of Palestine, if only for the effect 
which he fears that such a scheme would have upon his own interests.” Furthermore, 
Battershill proposed that Ibn Saud might very well have seen the whole affair, whatever its 
outcome, as an opportunity to obtain a bargaining lever vis-à-vis the British. “It seems 
probable that these factors have induced him to oppose partition of Palestine and that he has 
decided to foment a more or less artificial agitation against it in the Nejd and Hejaz for use as 
a diplomatic weapon in negotiating with His Majesty’s Government and as a means of 
preserving or even enhancing his popularity in the Arab world.”426 
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Although inter-Arab rivalry was not exactly the Eastern Department’s favourite line of 
argument against partition, they could not deny its existence. In the case of Ibn Saud and 
Abdullah, the reason was simply that the Saudi King right from the outset made it perfectly 
clear that Abdullah’s proposed gains was a major reason for him to oppose the partition 
scheme. What is interesting to note, however, is that Ibn Saud altered his rhetoric along the 
way. In the crucial 19 November Foreign Office Rendel gives the following account of his 
transformation: 
It is true that, when the recommendations of the Royal Commission on Palestine and the conclusions of 
His Majesty’s Government thereon were originally communicated to the King at the beginning of July, 
His Majesty did not at once react as violently as he has done since, and that it looked at first as though 
his main preoccupation was with his own immediate interests, in so far as they might be threatened by 
the emancipation of the Amir Abdullah from British control, and the constitution of Transjordan and 
“Arab Palestine” into a single independent and possibly hostile state. There are now indications, 
however, that King Ibn Saud has now realised that the formation of a compact homogenous and 
independent Jewish sovereign State on the Mediterranean coast of what he regards as an essentially 
Arab country...must involve a serious threat to the hopes which he is known to cherish of the evolution 
of an independent Arab confederation.427 
This was not an entirely sincere account of Ibn Saud’s “conversion”. In the preceding months 
Rendel and Bullard had made little secret of their disbelief in the partition proposal when 
meeting Saudi officials. Nor had they failed to disclose the causes behind this opposition. 
Hafez Wahba and Ibn Saud were both experienced politicians. Consequently, they adapted 
their arguments so as to fit the Foreign Office version.428 This seems to have mattered little as 
Rendel’s version found its adherents among the more influential British officials. On 7 
February 1938 Sir Miles Lampson was approached by Chaim Weizmann in Cairo. Lampson’s 
own diary gives the following account on their differences over Ibn Saud’s position over 
Palestine: 
I countered his [Weizmann’s] suggestion that Arab leaders such as Ibn Saud were not particularly keen 
about Palestine itself and that the main preoccupation of Ibn Saud was lest the Emir Abdullah of 
Transjordania should be given the Arab State of Palestine. I told Weizmann that this did not tally at all 
with the reports that I had seen regarding Ibn Saud’s attitude.429  
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The likelihood of a major rising in Transjordan 
 
Ever since the start of the Palestine Rebellion in the spring of 1936, Italian propaganda had 
been employed to weaken Britain’s position in the Middle East. Part of the Italian strategy 
involved undermining Amir Abdullah’s authority. Already in June 1936 Radio Bari reported 
that “the Mandatory Power in Palestine is very much afraid of Trans-Jordan whose Arabs 
have decided to cooperate in the Holy War”430 Mufti Amin al-Husseini notified Rome in 
September 1937 that he intended to have the Amir overthrown. Mussolini must have agreed to 
this strategy because he immediately approved a payment of £15,000 to the Mufti’s 
organisation. Italy’s other contribution, so to speak, was to step up its propaganda campaign. 
In late October 1937, Radio Bari announced fictitious reports on the alleged destruction of the 
Allenby Bridge that crosses the Jordan River, and on skirmishes on the Transjordan-Saudi 
frontier.431  
Once again, the Eastern Department’s reaction must be described as peculiar. Even 
though these accounts were patently false, Rendel advised against refuting them. As he firmly 
believed that there “was every possibility of an early rising in Transjordan...it would be 
embarrassing if we had to follow a denial by an admission that the story we were denying was 
merely prophetic.”432 It is difficult to determine what exactly was the motive behind this 
dubious logic. Either Rendel genuinely believed an uprising in Transjordan was imminent, or 
he considered anything which would foster such an idea to benefit his cause.  
Sincerely or not, the Foreign Office advocated through official papers that a movement 
against Amir Abdullah, and thus against Britain, might materialize should partition be 
enforced:  
there is likely to be a rapid recrudescence of terrorism, and the gradual formation of bands, particularly 
in Transjordan. The Amir is notoriously unpopular and his authority is precarious. The bands may 
therefore operate from Transjordan, where it is very possible that there might be a widespread rebellion, 
which it would be very difficult for us to control with our very exiguous troops.433    
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What are we to make of this prediction? The Amir might have been “notoriously unpopular” 
in the region as a whole, but that was definitely not the case inside Transjordan. As for his 
authority, how could this in any way be “precarious” when British military might lurked just 
behind his shoulder? Furthermore, British soldiers had proven in the past- and would prove in 
the upcoming years – that Transjordan was generally one of the less demanding districts to 
defend.   
Once again the War Office report of February 1938 offers a far more credible 
appraisal of the current situation:   
The present government in Transjordan depends largely on British support for its stability. The 
influence exerted by British officials over the desert tribes has so far proved more than sufficient to 
prevent subversive movements making any headway either against British interests or the Emir 
Abdullah. The presence of British air forces, and the proximity of British troops in Palestine are also 
deterrents. The fact that the Palestine Royal Commission’s proposals would enhance the political and 
economic status of Transjordan, and the latent fear of Saudi Arabia, also impose a brake on any 
tendency to give way unduly to sentimental feelings for their brethren in Palestine. The Emir Abdullah 
enjoys a certain prestige as the eldest surviving member of the Hashemite family, and although he is not 
personally popular, this helps to minimise internal opposition to his pro-British attitude.434 
The peasants of the Ajlun district in the northwest corner of Transjordan served as a safe 
haven for rebels during the uprising in Palestine, supplying them with cover and provisions. 
Indeed, the population in this area had always been rather suspicious of Abdullah, feeling 
more akin to the Palestinian peasants of the Hauran and the Galilee than to the tribal traditions 
of Transjordan.435 Nonetheless, the effect of the Arab Legion and the Transjordan Frontier 
Force can hardly be overstated. George Rendel had himself acknowledged the strength of this 
force only few weeks before predicting disturbances in Transjordan. Regarding the Saudi-
Transjordanian border, it was “only the presence of Major Glubb and the British frontier force 
that has kept any kind of peace on this singularly artificial and purely de facto line.”436  
The Legion was arguably the best trained army in the entire Middle East. Like almost 
everything else in the Transjordanain state it was fully financed by the British. Consequently, 
it was at all times loyal to Abdullah and Britain and, unlike the Iraqi army, not in pursuit of 
any political influence.  
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During March-April 1936 armed bands from Syria had descended upon the Ajlun 
district. These were successfully engaged by the Legion on at least two occasions. The Legion 
had thus proven its efficiency prior to the release of the Peel report. Moreover, the events of 
1936 had led to a further strengthening and militarisation of the Legion.437  
 In February 1938 the Committee of Imperial Defence met to discuss how to best 
secure British strategic interests in Palestine. They made the following assessment regarding 
threats to Transjordan. “Any attack by Saudi Arabia would be of the nature of raids into 
Transjordan and Southern Palestine and should be adequately dealt with by the British forces 
that would be available.”438  
In March and April 1939 a militant movement based in Syria, formed largely of 
displaced Palestinians attempted to bring down the Transjordan government. This group 
consisted of more than 100 insurgents. They were quickly spotted and successfully defeated 
by divisions from the Arab Legion and the Frontier Force. Contrary to what the insurgents 
had anticipated, they received no support from the Transjordanian population. The lack of 
assistance put an abrupt end to the insurgents’ ploy of igniting a mass uprising inside the 
country.439 A contemporary account goes far in explaining the reasons for their failure: “On 
the whole, the Bedouin nomad tribes of the desert were not enthusiastic...the normal attitudes 
of the tribesmen was that this trouble between cultivator and townsmen, whether they were 
Arabs or Jews, was not their immediate concern.”440  
 
Conclusion  
  
Though not exactly a decisive argument in their case against partition the Foreign Office’s 
predictions of a serious uprising in Transjordan may have been among their least convincing 
prophecies. In the words of one historian Transjordan remained in the 1936-39 period, by and 
large “an oasis of peace by the side of storm-shaken Palestine.”441 The little fighting that did 
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take place actually strengthened the Arab Legionnaires’ attachment to Britain. It also helped 
justify the Legion’s further expansion in the forthcoming years.442  
 The general lack of support from the Transjordanian population has been ascribed to 
an undeveloped Arab nationalist sentiment and also to the rigid control imposed by the Amir 
Abdullah. Like in the rest of the region it was mainly the educated section of the 
Transjordanian population who displayed Arab nationalist sentiment. In the words of Glubb: 
“[The more] European influences there is in any class or district, the stronger is the national 
feeling.” The problem was that the pro-Palestinian officials – many of whom were themselves 
Palestine Arabs – were unable to translate their sympathies into action due to their official 
positions.443 There was also another far more obvious reason for the general inaction: few 
people were likely to object to the expansion of their own state. 
Any way you look at it, the Abdullah factor made it considerably easier for the 
Foreign Office to overturn partition. Having witnessed how the Amir’s collaboration with 
Britain over partition had rendered him a traitor in the eyes of most Arabs, officials in the 
Eastern Department realised that they could use the Amir as an instrument in their own bid. 
Since the “Arab cause” was seen by as perfectly justifiable reaction to the “Zionist policy” - 
which partition purportedly represented - Iraqi and Saudi hatred towards the Amir was 
considered to be a legitimate and just reaction to his disloyalty. Indeed, this opposition was 
not only tolerated but eventually abided by: the Arab states’ strong opposition to partition and 
their gloomy predictions regarding the regional consequences of such a policy was fully 
adopted by the Foreign Office and soon formed the nucleus of their own campaign.  
Regardless of the Foreign Offices’ less than honourable campaign, there can be no 
doubt that the proposed elevation of Abdullah was a major blunder on the part of the Peel 
Commission. It is difficult to determine to what extent the schemes’ main proponent, the 
Colonial Office, might have been able to coerce the Commission members into revising this 
aspect prior to the report’s release. In view of the independent nature of the Commission and 
its work – as well as the great attention attached to it - there was little the Colonial Office 
could do once the report was made official.  
Enlightening in this respect are also observations made by Major Glubb. Apart from 
being one of Abdullah’s closest and most loyal servants, Glubb (having almost single-
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handedly transformed the Arab Legion into the most respected fighting force in the Middle 
East) knew the make-up of Transjordanian society better than most. The officer concluded in 
the summer of 1937 that the mentality of Palestinians and Transjordanians had grown further 
apart during the last two decades. “Apart from Amman Transjordan is still tribal, old-
fashioned, Muslim and Arab. In Palestine, the influx of Jews and foreigners, and 17 years of 
direct British administration have made the country Levantine or Mediterranean, rather than 
Arab.” Following unification the better educated Palestinians were “likely to monopolize all 
the lucrative appointments.” 444 This could hardly have been a good starting point for the 
proposed state.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
444
 Morris, p. 43 
110 
 
Conclusions 
 
During 1937-38 the question of Palestine affected each of the countries examined here 
differently.  In Egypt and Iraq the issue became during this period a more or less permanent 
component in domestic politics. Many of the committees and organizations established in 
support of the Palestine Arabs were set up by individuals who unquestionably believed 
strongly in the Pan-Arab idea. Nonetheless, when the issue entered official politics other 
factors also came into play. In Iraq – and even more so in Egypt – the governing party was 
bound to preserve good relations with Great Britain. Consequently, the government was often 
forced to tone down their posture on an issue which may otherwise have scored them many 
free points. More than anything else this left the door open for the opposition to exploit the 
issue to the full. The activities of the Egyptian oppositional leader, Muhammad Mahmud, 
during 1937 was apparently “largely coloured by the desire of making local political capital 
out of the question.”445 This tendency was equally apparent with the behaviour of the Wafd 
Party. While in power they had to show considerable restraint when handling the Palestine 
issue. This was evident in 1936 during the first phase of the Arab Rebellion and once again in 
1937 after the release of the Peel Plan. Then, after being removed from power in late 1937 the 
Wafd – and the newspapers they controlled - adopted a more forceful approach towards 
British policy in Palestine. 
 Despite the fact that the Palestine issue was to some extent exploited for political 
reasons, there can be little doubt that by 1938 Palestine’s future was a genuine concern for 
large groups of the Egyptian population. What is also evident is that the growing awareness of 
the Palestine Arabs plight during this period accelerated a process which saw many move 
away from a strict Egyptian identity towards one which was unmistakably Arab. 
 In Iraq the hatred of Britain was stronger than in Egypt. Generally speaking the Iraqis 
were more impatient since they were convinced that their objectives could only be secured 
through a radical break with Britain. This point is vital in understanding the Iraqi attitude 
towards Palestine. While many in Iraq were devoted Pan-Arabists with strong feelings on the 
Palestine issue, its centrality in Iraqi politics during this period should be seen first and 
foremost in the light of the prevailing anti-British sentiment. Thus, when the Iraqi Prime 
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Minister Rashid Ali during 1940 repeatedly cited British policy in Palestine as crucial for the 
deterioration in Anglo-Iraqi relations, it should be treated with great caution. In the eyes of the 
ardent Iraqi nationalists British policy in Palestine – regardless of any concessions the 
Mandatory Power was prepared to make – would always be interpreted as the work of the 
“imperialist oppressor”. Accordingly, the policymakers at the Foreign Office should have 
realized that continued British influence in Iraq required not compromises over Palestine but a 
Britain that was either prepared to abandon the country completely or one that was still 
determined to apply the amount of force “befitting” that of a colonial superpower. 
The role of Saudi Arabia in this matter was different from both Iraq and Egypt. In 
contrast to those two nations, the Saudi state was fully independent with no British bases or 
troops stationed on its territory. The decision to award Saudi Arabia independence in 1927 
had been made after the British military planners had concluded that area’s strategic 
importance was limited. The situation was somewhat different by 1937, but from a military 
point of view Saudi Arabia remained very much in the vicinity. As has been frequently 
demonstrated throughout, however, no Arab ruler received the same degree of benevolence as 
Ibn Saud. Where Miles Lampson’s anxiety over partition was reasonable in light of the great 
strategic importance of Egypt, London’s motives for appeasing Ibn Saud were far less 
obvious. The importance of maintaining the Monarch’s long-lasting “friendship” to Britain 
was often quoted as a motive. So was Ibn Saud’s alleged role as the foremost molder of Arab 
opinion. Historian Clive Leatherdale has shown in his comprehensive study covering the 
1925-1939 period that Foreign Office preference for Ibn Saud was a well established practice 
by 1937. It appears, nonetheless, that the years 1937-38 saw the most striking displays of such 
favoritism to date. By late 1937 Foreign Office officials were prepared to comply with Ibn 
Saud’s objections to the partition proposal - despite the fact that his previous commitments to 
the Palestine cause had been less than remarkable, and, that his initial reaction to the proposal 
had focused solely on the gains promised to his main adversary, Amir Abdullah.   
While many of the prophecies put forth by the Eastern Department were quite 
extensive, they often revealed an insufficient grasp of Middle Eastern affairs. A common 
theme in many of the reports was the growing unpopularity of Abdullah. It was argued that 
the Amir’s support of the scheme would disgust his own populace and that this might bring 
about serious unrest inside Transjordan and eventually the downfall of Abdullah. This was not 
a convincing analysis. Abdullah’s position in Transjordan was not and had never been 
connected to his “popularity”. Rather, the Amir’s legitimacy rested on the extent of his 
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powers. These powers were provided by Great Britain. It was thus at they and they alone who 
decided over Abdullah’s future in Transjordan. In a similar fashion, the Eastern Department 
expressed concern over Ibn Saud’s standing in his desert Kingdom. They maintained that 
should Britain decide to partition up Palestine “his own position will become impossible and 
he himself go under.”446 Ibn Saud was in many ways the “archetypal” despot. His rule was 
based mainly on conquest and intimidation and not on popular support. Also, Saudi Arabia 
was essentially a barren and backwards country. Unlike the population in Egypt and Iraq most 
Saudis had little or no access to outside information. Finally, most Saudis considered 
themselves to be of a different “stock” than the Arabs of the Fertile Crescent. Consequently 
much of the Saudi populace was either unaware or indifferent to the direction of British policy 
in Palestine. It seems highly unlikely that these people would be prepared to rise against Ibn 
Saud over an outside issue such as Palestine.    
 
Why did the Eastern Department oppose partition so vehemently? 
 
By and large the Foreign Office tended to exaggerate the consequences of carrying out a 
policy in Palestine which ran counter to general Arab opinion. While they repeatedly 
cautioned against the preeminence of Palestine, the record tells a different story. Simply put, 
British relations with Iraq, Egypt and Saudi Arabia were decided by issues other than 
Britain’s policy in Palestine. This leaves one crucial question: why did the Eastern 
Department adopt such an overly pessimistic outlook regarding the repercussions of 
partitioning Palestine when developments suggested that such a decision would in fact not 
ruin Anglo-Arab relations?     
One notable scholar has gone far in arguing that the Foreign Office’ entry into 
Palestine affairs did not really represent a break with the policies previously devised by the 
Colonial Office. He contends instead that the line pursued by the Foreign Office from mid-
1937 and onwards was largely the result of a rapidly changing strategic context and not a 
change in the general outlook.447 This seems to be an unsatisfactory explanation. Before the 
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Foreign Office approach was fully adopted, the Colonial Office continuously questioned the 
analyses and fought the recommendations of their senior department. This clearly shows that 
there existed an informed alternative to the line that was eventually taken. Thus, had the 
Colonial Office remained at the helm, policies towards Palestine would surely have been 
different from those that were ultimately pursued. As for partition in particular, it seems very 
likely that there would have been serious attempts at implementing this policy.  
This thesis has shown that the efforts of certain individuals – in particular George 
Rendel and Miles Lampson – were decisive in reshaping Palestine policy. This policy was in 
general based on beliefs vastly different from the ones held by their main adversary, Colonial 
Secretary William Orsmby-Gore. The overall logic behind the Eastern Department’s approach 
was undoubtedly one of conciliation. It is nonetheless doubtful if the leading proponent of this 
policy, George Rendel, saw his effort towards the Middle East only as an extension of the 
appeasement policies concurrently directed towards Italy and Germany. Although these 
hostile states were mentioned repeatedly in Rendel’s memoranda on Palestine, the overall 
content of his reports leave the impression that he very much sought to placate Arab opinion 
for its own sake.448 For Rendel, appeasement over Palestine was not only strategically sound, 
it was also the morally right thing to do: the creation of a Jewish State in Palestine would not 
only be a gross injustice to Arabs everywhere, it would be an artificial construct - one which 
would be culturally at odds with the entire region.  
While Rendel’s autobiography from 1957 rather unashamedly plays down his own 
role during the disagreements of 1937-38, one passage is illuminating as to Rendel’s overall 
thinking on Palestine.449 “I still believe that that this issue …played a major part in altering 
the whole trend of our relations with the Arab and Moslem world, and that many of our 
Middle Eastern difficulties today are due to the inconsistencies of our Palestine policy during 
this critical period.”450 These observations written with nearly twenty years of hindsight 
reflect an unusually strong belief in the preeminence of Palestine on Anglo-Arab relations. 
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The experiences of WWII had apparently done little to modify Rendel’s conviction even 
though developments – especially in Egypt and Saudi Arabia - clearly demonstrated that 
issues other than Palestine were decisive in maintaining good relations between Britain and 
her traditional allies. Also, to suggest that Britain’s handling of the Palestine issue was the 
cause of much of the current (i.e. from a 1956 perspective) grievance towards that country in 
the Middle East seems farfetched. The general dislike of Britain in the Arab world was at the 
time of writing related mainly to the imperial project as a whole, a venture which had 
succeeded in dominating the Middle East for decades.451 It is in fact tempting to argue that the 
likes of George Rendel sometimes forgot that they were leading representatives of the world’s 
greatest imperialist power. None of their attempts at placating Arab demands – however 
generous they may have been - would come close to alter this stark reality.   
In a seemingly homogeneous milieu such as that of the British bureaucracy, the 
Eastern Department and their rival counterpart, the Colonial Office, repeatedly reached 
disparate conclusions. This wide discrepancy can perhaps best be explained through the 
concept of a psychological and operational environment. Rendel’s fascination with “Arabia”, 
his rather obsessive belief in Britain’s need to maintain the best possible relations with the 
region, his close affiliation with Ibn Saud and the Eastern Department’s “nonexistent” 
relationship with the Zionist movement undoubtedly shaped his psychological environment.  
The Eastern Department was however not the only organisation suffering from 
“harmful” commitments. Ormsby-Gores close relationship with the Zionist movement was – 
at least politically - not a healthy one. In his rejoinder to the 19 November memorandum 
Ormsby-Gore warned that “the grave consequences of abandonment, on grounds of 
expediency, of our obligations to the Jews must be weighed in the balance against any 
“Middle Eastern” interests that may be held to justify so formidable change of policy.”452 A 
competent policy-maker at this level, and at such critical point in time, should almost 
certainly be more concerned with the “expediency” of a policy rather than its capacity to live 
up to an ambiguous pledge given twenty years before.      
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 This thesis has also shown how George Rendel was able to exert decisive influence on 
the decision-making process. Although Rendel in his memoirs “purged” himself of any 
responsibility regarding Palestine, on more general terms he admitted that during his stint as 
Head of Department he was “free to formulate policy, to make recommendations, and to 
organize the work more or less as [he] choose.” Rendel ascribed this to the pre-war system 
which he depicted as less organised than its successor. While there is probably a lot of truth in 
this, this was not the only factor which played in Rendel’s favour. Anthony Eden’s lack of 
commitment regarding Palestine was arguably even more important. To all intents and 
purposes the Foreign Secretary left the question entirely to George Rendel.453  
The assertion that a bureaucrat was able to attain almost decision-making powers is 
certainly not considered unfeasible among political scientists.454 In this connection they stress 
one important fact: the person/department which provides the information is very often the 
actual decision-maker.455 In our case it is apparent that the Head of Department hand-picked 
the information sources and interpreted these according to his own psychological 
environment. Finally, Rendel did not merely present his own recommendations for Anthony 
Eden, he was given authorization to produce the office’s final reports under the Foreign 
Minister’s name. The most important of these - the November 19 memorandum – was 
Rendel’s project altogether: he authored the majority of the texts, the rest was provided by 
officials who shared his outlook on Palestine. In the case of Miles Lampson, Rendel 
personally instructed the Ambassador to make a statement.      
  The main criticism of the Eastern Department should arguably be directed at their 
inability to readjust their course. As has been demonstrated numerous times throughout this 
thesis, alternative assessments on Palestine written by officials from other offices were readily 
available. Had these been treated with a fair degree of detachment they would inevitably have 
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served to shift their psychological environment closer to the operational. Instead this 
“deviating” material was for the most part rejected forthright. Illustrative in this respect was 
the department’s handling of the much cited War Office report of February 1938. Despite an 
obvious lack of military knowledge Rendel and his subordinates frequently dabbled with 
predictions on likely uprisings following a partition - several of which found their way into 
the crucial 19 November memorandum.  The meticulous War Office report - written by an 
officer with far greater knowledge of British military capacity and of the various groups who 
might consider causing trouble over Palestine - was swiftly rebuffed. “It gives nothing like 
enough importance to the dangers, which cannot be stressed too highly, which partition will 
present in the event of a war...if partition is enforced our prestige and reputation will never be 
the same again and...the Arab world will wait, if necessary for years, for the revenge upon us 
and the Jews, which any preoccupation on our part elsewhere will give them.”456 These were 
prophecies of the sweeping kind. Where officer Hawthorn had treated each country in 
isolation, looking at which were invariably tied to Britain and which were not, the Eastern 
Department officials preferred to operate on the more general level. Like in the example 
above, these assessments often revealed a lack of knowledge and conveyed a sense of fear 
which to quite a few at the time seemed exaggerated, and in retrospect appears to have been 
out of all proportion.  
By the time of War Office report, it seems, the psychological environment of the 
Eastern Department had become so fixed that it effectively shut out any information which 
might challenge its framework.  In fact, the officials seemed incapable of accepting that a 
policy towards Palestine which might serve to temporarily upset Arab opinion did not 
automatically rule out the possibility that it may very well be the best policy for Britain in the 
long run.  More worrying still, they appeared oblivious to the fact that British relations with 
the various Arab countries rested mainly on issues which for the most part had nothing to do 
with Palestine. 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
456
 WO to FO, FO/371/21873/E788, 9 February 1938. Lacy Baggallay was a senior member of the Eastern 
Department, serving directly under Rendel and sharing fully his views on Palestine.   
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A pro-Arab policy? 
 
There can be no doubt, then, that the determination to overturn partition stemmed in large part 
from a conviction that the conciliation of Arab opinion was essential. In that sense the policy 
that was formalized by the White Paper in 1939 must be seen as one heeding to Arab 
demands, demands which invariably came at the expense of those previously presented by the 
Zionists. But does that necessarily make it a pro-Arab policy? In accordance with the 
conclusions drawn above it would be erroneous to label the Palestine policy pursued either 
pro-Arab or pro-Zionist. The policy devised in Palestine was always first and foremost pro-
British. The line drawn up in the 1939 White Paper was no exception. What is apparent, 
however, is that this particular policy was founded on a number of false premises. This was 
clearly reflected in the outcome, one which can hardly be said to have achieves its main 
purpose. While the scrapping of partition might have brought about a certain amount of 
goodwill throughout the region, there is nothing to indicate that it helped secure British 
regional interests in the long run. Quite the contrary, British vacillation over Palestine seems 
to have reinforced in some quarters the impression that Britain was a superpower in decline, 
either unable or unwilling to enforce its policy to the extent she had done in the previous 
decades.  
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